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ABSTRACT 
 
Raquel Zanatta Coutinho: The Transition to Low Fertility in Brazil 
(Under the direction of S. Philip Morgan) 
 
In Brazil, the Total Fertility Rate went down from 4.26 children per women in 1980 to 1.91 
in 2010. Internal disparities exist, however, regardless of the low value results at the macro 
level. For most socio-demographic groups, fertility rates are now lower than the desired 
family size, suggesting that women are, on average, having fewer children than they wish. 
In this dissertation, I use data from the Brazilian Demographic and Health Survey from 
1986 and 1996, and from the Pesquisa Nacional de Demografia e Saude of 2006. I analyze 
these sources to decompose and analyze fertility rates using a framework that explains 
fertility rates at the aggregate level, based on a measurement of the Desired Family Size 
based on six parameters: unwanted fertility, replacements for child mortality, sex 
preferences, tempo effect, involuntary infertility, and competing preferences. By outlining 
and operationalizing these components across time, the first chapter illuminates the factors 
that contribute to low fertility in Brazil, and describes how they vary by socio-demographic 
characteristics (race, religion, education, wealth, geographic macro-region, and place of 
residence).  For example, I find that unwanted pregnancies disproportionately affect the 
fertility rates for women of low education and low income. I also see that overtime, 
competing preferences are making women having fewer children than desired. The second 
chapter explores variations in gender preference for different socio-demographic groups 
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using responses to questions about the ideal number of children and their composition 
available at the same databases. I present evidence of a preference for balance, although 
indifference regarding the composition has also been gaining momentum. I also find 
evidence of a secondary daughter preference that is small, but pervasive. The third chapter 
investigates factors that compete with childbearing. In brief, I find that women who work, 
have a college degree and take longer to marry are facing more challenges when it comes 
to having the number of children they desire. I also find that although women are 
postponing their fertility, they still hope to achieve it. In sum, findings from this dissertation 
elucidate macro-level, structural elements that explain variability in fertility outcomes, and 
considers the conjunctures that lead a women to either have more or fewer children than 
her desired target.   
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CONTEXTUALIZING THE BRAZILIAN FERTILITY TRANSITION 
 
Until recently, policymakers in developing countries were concerned about the 
contribution of high fertility rates to rapid population growth and to poor urban and 
socioeconomic conditions (Bongaarts, 2001). Today, low fertility is a widespread phenomenon. 
More than half of the world’s population lives in a country where fertility is below replacement 
level (Morgan, 2003; Morgan and Taylor, 2006). Brazil is now one of them (Potter, 
Schmertmann, Cavenaghi, 2002; Carvalho and Brito, 2005; Potter et al. 2010). Total Fertility 
Rates went down from 5.8 children per women in 1960 to 1.91 in 2010 (Brasil, 2010). This 
decline in fertility represents a cultural change without any foreseeable return, instigating the 
convergence of all social groups to smaller family sizes (Carvalho, 1998)1. 
Aside from distal factors such as economic development, modernization, 
industrialization, urbanization, mass education, rural exodus, and increased participation of 
women in the labor market, researchers attribute the primary proximate determinant of the 
decline in fertility to an increased usage of contraceptive methods, especially female sterilization 
(Curtis and Diamond, 1995, Potter, 1999; Potter, Schmertmann, and Cavenaghi 2002). 
Sterilization helped women restrict fertility at higher orders (Bongaarts, 1999) and caused a 
rejuvenation in fertility rates, which would be even more important for women without high 
                                                          
1 Later, different requirements were put into practice to regulate sterilization, especially after research had shown how 
unnecessary C-sections were being used in order to obtain authorization and get the procedure and how in certain regions of 
Brazil, sterilizations were offered as an electoral good by politicians. For a complete review on sterilization in Brazil, see Caetano 
and Potter (2004). 
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school education (Alves and Cavenaghi, 2009). That, on top of the relative increase in the 
participation of low order births for the fertility rates caused a negative tempo effect inflating the 
Brazilian TFR (Miranda-Ribeiro, Rios-Neto and Carvalho, 2013). 
Researchers found that 75% of women engaged in a conjugal union before age 24; and 
75% of women who were sterilized did so before age 25. As a result, a significant percentage of 
women gave birth to all their children by age 30 (Miranda-Ribeiro, Rios-Neto and Carvalho, 
2013), a very early start that seemed nothing like the profiles observed in Europe (Alves and 
Cavenaghi, 2009). As Bonifacio (2011) points out, what makes Brazil unique is that it was 
possible to achieve low fertility even with adolescent childbearing and an early age at marriage.  
But a different phenomenon began to take place: the birth control pill gained traction as a 
method of contraception, and women no longer had to rely on irreversible methods to control 
their fertility, allowing women to wait longer to start having children and to space the births over 
time. They were also no longer tied to the obligation to have a minimum number of children 
before accessing contraception (Caetano and Potter, 2004).  
Surprisingly, around the year 2010, researchers started to notice changes to Brazilian 
fertility rates. First, a reduction in teenage fertility rates was observed (Silva and Surita, 2012). 
Second, the tempo effect got closer to zero suggesting the stabilization of the mean age at 
childbearing (Miranda-Ribeiro, Rios-Neto and Carvalho, 2013). A small postponement of 
fertility for upper class and high educated women was also recorded. The mean age at 
childbearing changed from 28.7 to 30 between the years 2000 and 2007 (Alves and Cavenaghi, 
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2009).2 The percentage of women having children by age 30 has been consistently decreasing 
ever since (Rosero-Bixby, Castro-Martín, Martín-García, 2009).   
In Brazil, important differences persist regardless of the low value at the aggregate level. 
The total fertility rate in 2006 in Brazil reached 1.8, below replacement level, and fell to 1.1 for 
women with at least 12 years of education (Ministério da Saúde,2008). Those with 0 to 3 years 
of education still had a TFR of 3.14 children but with downward trends3. This polarized behavior 
is also a reflection of the high levels of inequality, despite the recent improvements. Brazilian 
HDI has shifted from 0.557 in 1985 to 0.633 in 1995 and to 0.699 in 2005. The most recent is of 
0.730 in 2012 (UNDP, 2013). 
Variations by region, income level and race/ethnicity have also been reported in recent 
years. White women had a TFR of nearly half a child less than blacks (TFT=1.53 for whites and 
1.98 for blacks) in the year 2006. For the same year, women with a per capita income equal to 
1/4 of the Brazilian minimum wage had a TFR of 4.8 in 2006, while women with a per capita 
income equal to the minimum wage had a fertility rate below replacement starting in the early 
2000´s (Berquó and Cavenaghi, 2006). Other variations, such as regional disparities, are also 
pronounced. For example, inhabitants of the north region had a TFR of 2.28 while those of the 
south had a TFR of 1.69. Even controlling for socio-economic status, research indicates that 
regional differentials exist (Alves and Cavenaghi, 2009). The most recent census in the year 
                                                          
2 Alves and Cavenaghi utilized a more recent dataset (Census and PNAD) when compared to Bonifacio (2011), who used the 
same data I am using, the Brazilian PNDS.  
3 Demographers even started to suggest that Brazilian fertility might follow three distinct profiles: a South-European, with a late 
start and very low levels (followed by women in the labor force who belong to the upper income group), an American profile 
(earlier fertility and around replacement rate followed by women with low or medium education levels), and a French profile 
(composed of women of high education with late start and 2 children) (Alves and Cavenaghi, 2009).  
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2010 confirms that regional differences are still remarkable, although the gaps have been 
narrowing (Miranda-Ribeiro and Garcia, 2012)4. 
 
Importance 
 
That gaps between socio-demographic groups have been narrowing suggests that at the 
level of intention, fertility might not be as varied among social groups as outcomes are. It is 
possible that the degree of preference implementation is what has now been keeping women at 
different rates. While much descriptive analysis has explored fertility variation, other than 
unwanted fertility and tempo effect, little attention has been paid to what drives fertility 
differentials in Brazil and the mechanisms of these social influences. Thus, it is still unclear 
whether in Brazil younger cohorts seems to be having different aspirations and behaviors 
regarding marriage, family and career or if they are facing  obstacles to achieving their desires. 
By exploring fertility variation and its components across time in Brazil, this paper 
illuminates the factors that contribute to low fertility, how these factors combine to form the total 
fertility rate throughout the years and how they vary by socio-demographic characteristics (race, 
religion, education, geographic macro-region, and place of residence). This series of papers 
answer some questions that have remained open in the recent literature exploring the same topic 
(Bonifacio, 2011; Carvalho, 2014). Some of these questions pertain to socio-demographic 
differences in fertility (Paper 1), such as what makes less educated and rural women bear more 
children - do they still have higher fertility ideals or are there other factors influencing their 
                                                          
4 For more information on Brazil´s fertility decline, see Carvalho and Brito (2005) and Alves and Correa (2003). For more 
complete descriptive data on Brazil´s fertility in the last decade, see Miranda-Ribeiro and Garcia (2012) and Alves and 
Cavenaghi (2009). 
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fertility rates? Other questions relate to the degree of preference implementation when women 
are faced with mediators between her desired family size and her actual behavior (Papers 2 and 
3). The two factors that will be explored in depth in this work are gender preferences (i.e. the 
desired sex composition of your children) and competing preferences for motherhood (i.e. other 
life choices that compete with childbearing causing women to review her desired intentions 
downwards, such as prolonged education, career and lack of partner5).  
In the following paragraphs, I will briefly introduce the Theory of Conjunctural Action 
and the Bongaarts Proximate Determinants of Fertility, which are respectively the theoretical and 
methodological frameworks I use to explore the determinants of low fertility in Brazil.  
 
Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks  
The Theory of Conjuntural Action 
 
From a sociological perspective, the number of children a women will have during her 
lifetime is shaped by societal influences, but is also influenced by the individuality of 
biographies and the resources, or materials, through which women could successfully achieve 
their ideals. The Theory of Conjunctural Action (TCA) (Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011) explains this 
interplay. The mechanism through which the influences operate is defined as schemas, the 
expected ideas and behavior one learns by induction or direct exposure overtime through 
socialization and interaction. Characteristics such as religious affiliation or place of residency 
provide women with different ideal family sizes and compositions.  
                                                          
5 Morgan and Taylor (2006) also sees revising fertility upward as a possibility. One example I can think of is by joining a new 
religious group or falling in love with a man who wishes more children than yourself. 
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In Brazil, the ideal number of children seems to be contingent upon structural influences. 
For example, women in rural areas have higher desired family sizes when compared to urban 
women. In terms of gender preferences, schemas also help couples make reproductive decisions, 
for example, in rural areas sons are more useful than daughters, and so a couple might decide to 
continue childbearing until a son is born. 
But since fertility has been going down and differences in population subgroups 
narrowing, there are reasons to believe that the desired family sizes and compositions are more 
similar among all segments of society, demonstrating either a weakening of societal norms or a 
convergence of schemas toward low fertility targets or replacement level. Nonetheless, the 
number of children ever born, or the total fertility rates, continue to be different among the 
various segments, suggesting that materials resources (e.g. resources), such as access and 
implementation of contraceptive methods, could have been more important in defining fertility 
than the social structures that govern this ideals. This explains, for example, how women with 
higher income have much smaller unwanted pregnancy rates, although they might have desired 
family sizes that are similar to their less educated counterparts’.  
But the differences cannot be attributed solely to a variation in materials or schemas. The 
life course is embedded in a social context which brings about conjunctures that might affect 
existing plans and make, for example, women take different decisions than expected. While 
unemployment might delay fertility for some, it might be just the right excuse to start having 
children for others. “Demographic models of family change and variation have tended to assume 
that social actors have enormous freedom in choosing the form of their families (Becker, 1981; 
Bongaarts, 2001 in Johnson-Hanks, 2011 p. 17)”. Thus, circumstances may as well shape 
behavior and also need to be taken into account. Since fertility is a path-dependent decision, 
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what women imagine as an ideal number of children and how many children she ends up having 
can vary. It is their experiences prior, during and after each birth that will shape the final number 
of children ever born (Morgan and Taylor, 2006). 
For instance, a qualitative study of Brazilian women identified several situations in which 
life didn’t go as planned (Carvalho, 2014). In Carvalho’s sample, while some women took longer 
than expected to get married, others ended up with unwanted pregnancies. In both cases, fertility 
didn’t go as women had anticipated. Carvalho (2014) also finds, for example, that women 
changed their minds about the ideal number of children or ideal sex composition after having 
their first child or after getting married. 
 
The Bongaarts Proximate Determinants of Fertility 
Many theoretical and methodological models are available for researchers of low fertility 
(Morgan and Taylor, 2006). In 2001, Bongaarts6 described a theoretical model that aimed at 
explaining fertility rates at the aggregate level (TFR) as a result of the multiplication of six 
parameters by the Desired Family Size (DFS). The first group of parameters is composed of 
factors that enhances fertility related to desired family size: unwanted fertility (FU), replacements 
for child mortality (FR), and sex preference (FSP). The second group is composed of factors that 
decrease fertility related to desired family size: rising age at childbearing (tempo effect which 
would be the number of children that a women would have had if they had not waited, or the FT), 
involuntary infertility (which includes the inability to have a child and also an inability to find a 
                                                          
6 Bongaarts, J. (2001). Fertility and reproductive preferences in post-transitional societies. Population and Development Review, 
27(Suppl), 260–281 
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suitable partner, the FI), and competing preferences for child (set to 1 when childbearing is 
universal, the FC). Thus, 
TFR = DFS * (FU * FR * FSP) * (FT * FI * FC) 
If woman realizes her fertility intention, TFR=DFS. 
Different values for each parameter is what causes women that have the same fertility 
ideals to end up with different fertility outcomes. By exploring fertility variation and the 
different values for the above components across time it is possible to understand what has been 
driving fertility decline and how different socio-demographic characteristics (age, race, marital 
status, religion, education, geographic macro-region, and place of residence) behave in the 
presence of the same factors. Using decompositions and proximate determinant models has been 
proved to be a valuable tool to aide conceptualization, explore variations, revise theories and of 
course, produce what Morgan and Taylor (2006) call “what we know”, or what all scientists can 
agree on regardless of their theoretical stand point.  
By putting the TCA and the Bongaarts’ framework together, I am claiming that desired 
family sizes are influenced by different schemas and thus it can be unique to socio-demographic 
characteristics. However, materials, conjunctures and other schemas will clash producing 
biographies that are unique, yet part of a multitude of trajectories that represents women’s 
possibilities towards motherhood.  
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CHAPTER 1: AN APPLICATION OF THE BONGAARTS PROXIMATE 
DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY FOR BRAZIL 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Until recently, policymakers in developing countries were concerned about the 
contribution of high fertility rates to rapid population growth and to poor urban and socioeconomic 
conditions (Bongaarts, 2001). Today, low fertility is a wide spread phenomenon. More than half 
of the world’s population lives in a country where fertility is below replacement level (Morgan, 
2003). Brazil is now one of them (Carvalho & Brito, 2005; Potter et al. 2010). The total Fertility 
Rate (TFR) went down from 6.16 children per women in 1940 to 1.9 in 2010 (BRASIL, 2012). 
Some internal disparities exist, however, regardless of the low value at the aggregate level. For 
example, in 2010, while fertility was 1.24 children per women for those with more than 12 years 
of education, those who had between 0 and 3 years of education had a TFR of 3.14 children. Other 
variations by region, income level and race/ethnicity have also been reported recently. White 
women had a TFR of nearly half a child less than Blacks (TFT=1.53 for Whites and 1.98 for 
Blacks) in the year 2006. For the same year, women with per capita income equal to 1/4 minimum 
wage, had a TFR of 4.8 in 2006, while women with per capita income equal to minimum wage, 
already had fertility below replacement in the early 2000´s (Berquó and Cavenaghi, 2006). 
Regional variations are also pronounced. Inhabitants of the North region had a TFR of 2.28 while 
those of the South had a TRF of 1.69. Even controlling for socio-economic status, these regional 
differentials remain (Alves and Cavenaghi, 2009) moreover the most recent Census, in the year 
10 
 
2010, confirms that these persist, although the gaps have been narrowing (Miranda-Ribeiro and 
Garcia, 2012)7. 
Determining the causes and consequences of the fertility transition and the fertility 
decline below replacement has kept many generations of demographers busy (Mason, 1997). 
Nevertheless, it is for a good reason. Scholars need to know variations in desired fertility but also 
how often people are able to implement their fertility preference and the reasons why observed 
fertility departs from desired family size. In contemporary developed countries it is common to 
find that desired family size is higher than total fertility rates (Bongaarts, 2001). Besides, the 
unwanted long term consequences of fertility below replacement, such as population aging and 
decreasing rates of growth that turn negative with time, could be problematic in some countries. 
European and some Asian countries, for example, start to feel the first signs of an unbalanced 
age structure. Lutz et al (2003) demonstrate that the effects so far have been small in Europe, but 
each additional decade that fertility remains below replacement represents a decline from 25 to 
40 million people (in the absence of immigration or changes in current mortality rates). 
Much of the decline might actually be an effect of postponement of fertility, as argued by 
Bongaarts and Feeney (1998), the so called “tempo effect”. If this is true, one might see reversals 
in fertility rates in the future, when women stop further postponement (Morgan, 2003). However, 
some of these women might not have time (or the desire) to “recuperate” postponed fertility and 
others might decide to never have children at all. Thus postponement can generate a “quantum 
effect” (Caldwell and McDonald, 2006; Lesthaeghe and Willems, 1999). In fact, research shows 
that changes do not seem to be only a timing effect, but a reduction in the number of births, 
                                                          
7 For more information on Brazil´s fertility decline, see Carvalho and Brito (2005). For complete descriptive data on Brazil´s 
fertility in the last decade, see Miranda-Ribeiro and Garcia (2012) and Alves and Cavenaghi (2009). 
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which can have severe implications for the “lowest-low” fertility countries (Myrskyla et al. 
2012). 
Different from trends observed in Europe, Brazilian fertility remains early (Rios-Neto et 
al. 2005; Alves and Cavenaghi, 2009). In fact, Brazilian research suggests that any ‘tempo 
effect” might have been negative – a shift to younger ages at birth may have depressed the 
observed TFR (Miranda-Ribeiro et al. 2006).  According to the authors, the mean age of 
childbearing that was 29.5 in 1970 dropped to 26.5 in 1994. Part of this decline is due to a 
decline in higher parity births as can be seen in Table 1.1 (borrowed from Bonifacio, 2011). That 
means the mean age at childbearing would be higher if women were continuing to have children 
throughout her reproductive life.  
More than half of all women in the 20-25 age group were already mothers in 2006 
(BEMFAM, 1987 and 1997; Ministerio da Saude, 2008). The same data shows that 25% of the 
women who got sterilized, did so before the age of 25, putting an end to their reproductive period 
at ages before women in Europe were having their first child. The only signs of postponement in 
Brazil are found among women of higher education levels8 (Ministerio da Saude, 2008).  
The mean age of childbearing has increased modestly in the last decade (Miranda-Ribeiro 
and Garcia, 2012). Drawing on Lesthaegue and Willems (1999) and after observing 
postponements for the second child, Miranda-Ribeiro and Garcia (2012) suggest that Brazil is 
entering the second phase of the demographic transition, where after fertility levels decline for 
all ages and parities, women start postponing fertility. The authors also suggest that there is an 
                                                          
8 Among the more educated, the age decreased between the decades 1980 and 2000 and had a slight increase in the following 
decade, reaching 28.2 in 2010.  
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unexplored variation in fertility that should be understood if one wishes to predict Brazil’s future 
fertility.  
Factors associated with fertility decline could be different for each country, and the speed 
of the decline tied to each country’s internal disparities.  The substantial differences in the 
European transition makes studying low fertility in Brazil an opportunity to understand how 
interactions and changes in social institutions and in preferences shape Brazil’s fertility. Thus, 
this chapter explores fertility variation and its components across time in Brazil, shedding light 
on the factors that contribute to low fertility, how they vary by socio-demographic characteristics 
(race, religion, education, wealth, geographic macro-region, and place of residence), and how 
these factors combine to produce the total fertility rate and its variation across groups and time 
period. My work uses the Demographic and Health Survey data from 1986, 1996 and 2006 to 
decompose Total Fertility Rates into parameters that represent factors that enhance or reduce 
fertility in relation to the values of desired family size using the framework provided by 
Bongaarts (2001). I will decompose the TFR for each year separately, and also decompose the 
TFR by socio-demographic characteristics.  My work shows the usefulness of this method for 
understanding low fertility and its variation. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
The proximate determinants of fertility are the biological and behavioral factors through 
which social, economic and environmental variables, the so called “indirect” or ‘distal’ 
determinants, affect fertility (Bongaarts and Potter, 1983, p.1). Generally, these factors assess 
fertility in an environment where regulation is being deliberately practiced, thus the fertility rates 
depart from natural fertility. They were first described in a theoretical paper by Davis and Blake 
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(1956) and further developed by Bongaarts (1978) who was the first to introduce measurements 
to the proximate determinants.  
In their application of the framework, Bongaarts and Potter (1983) conceptualized the 
Total Fertility Rate as being a result of natural fertility, multiplied by four parameters that would 
decrease it. The first parameter is age at first marriage, which identifies the onset of exposure to 
the risk of socially sanctioned childbearing, which could also happen during cohabitation 
depending on the country. This rate is impacted by the mean age at marriage, existence of marital 
dissolution, and proportion of the population who ever marries. The second parameter is 
contraceptive use. The prevalence, type and effectiveness of the method will affect fertility 
because some are more effective than others, usually depending on the amount of human action 
needed before the sexual act9. Thus, changes in the pattern of contraceptive behavior with age, 
time, and cohort will likely have an impact. Rate of Induced abortion is the third parameter. Note 
that abortion will not only prevent birth, but will make women return to ovulation quicker, so 
abortions do not avert full birth at population level, but half a birth. Duration of Postpartum 
Infecundability is the fourth parameter, which is estimated based on the duration of 
breastfeeding. Summing up, in a context of high fertility, the TFR is expected to be equal to the 
natural fertility in the absence of any form of regulation, or in other words, in the absence of 
those parameters. Note how it is possible that two populations with the same TFR could have 
different values for the parameters, which could help policy makers identify priorities and make 
better informed decisions.  
                                                          
9 Condoms and spermicides, which requires action right before the penetration will have worse effectiveness when compared to 
sterilization, which is a once in a life time event, or the pill, which needs to be taken daily but it is not necessarily linked to the 
sexual intercourse. Intended fertility may also have an impact because choice of contraceptive may depend on the desire to have 
future children and in the desired birth interval, if any. 
14 
 
For contexts in which fertility is around or below replacement level, a new equation was 
put together in Bongaarts (2001). The reason why low fertility needs a separate model is because 
the main parameters of the Bongaarts and Potter (1983) proximate determinants are not as 
defining of fertility in a context of universal contraceptive use, abortion access, and 
disentangling of childbearing from marriage. So, when low fertility is a result of desire, factors 
such as marital fertility, natural fertility, and length of breastfeeding or biological maximum are 
crossed out from the vocabulary. This new approach and conceptual framework received the 
name of the Proximate Determinants of Low Fertility (Bongaarts, 2001). It is calculated in the 
same way as the one above, but its parameters are very different because they represent factors 
that enhance or decrease observed fertility relative to fertility desires.  
There are now six parameters of the Proximate Determinants10 that are responsible for 
fertility (TFR) being different from Desired Family Size (DFS) and for their variations over time. 
They can be divided into factors that enhance fertility relative to the desired family size and 
factors that reduce fertility relatively to desired family size (Morgan and Hayford, 2009).  The 
first group of factors is composed of additional or surplus fertility due to unwanted fertility (FU), 
replacements for child mortality (physiological replacement, volitional replacement, hoarding, 
the FR), and sex preference (FSP). The second group is composed of rising age at childbearing 
(tempo effect which would be the number of children that a women would have had if they had 
not postponed, or the FT), involuntary infertility (which includes the inability to have a child and 
also an inability to find a suitable partner, the FI), and competing preferences for child (set to 1 
when childbearing is universal, the FC). Thus, 
TFR = DFS * (FU * FR * FSP) * (FT * FI * FC) 
                                                          
10 For more information on what could affect each determinants and how they affect one another, see Bongaarts (2001). 
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If woman achieves her fertility intention, TFR=DFS. 
This new methodological model dialogues well with a theoretical framework presented 
by the Theory of Conjuncture Action (Johnson-Hanks et al, 2011) which postulates that the 
desired family size and the number of children a woman will have during her lifetime is shaped 
by societal influences. The mechanisms through which these influences operate are defined as 
schemas, the expected ideas and behavior one learns by induction or direct exposure overtime 
through socialization and interaction. They are also shaped by the materials, which are the 
resources that allow women to achieve their intentions.  
But the differentials cannot be blamed solely on the differences in materials or schemas. 
The life course is embedded in a social context which brings about conjunctures that might affect 
existing plans and make, for example, women take different decisions than a priori expected. 
Thus, in addition to schemas and intentions, circumstances may also shape behavior and as such 
should also to be taken into account.  
By putting the TCA and the Bongaarts’ framework together, I argue that desired family 
sizes are influenced by different schemas that value smaller family sizes and are unique to socio-
demographic characteristics. Thus, these major influences, when happen in regularity, can be 
conceptualized and measured at the aggregate level as the mean level of individual responses in 
order to understand what components of a society motivate behavior. Nevertheless, by 
understanding and conceptualizing a series of conjunctures that women cannot anticipate when 
reporting their Desired Family Size, the model is also useful to explain variability among social 
groups, or what “constrains” behavior, explaining fertility trends and differentials, shedding light 
on the fertility transition and explaining the mismatch between observed fertility and desired 
family size (Dharmalingan et al. 2014).  
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An article by Dharmalingam et al. (2014) applies the approach to Indian data. They used 
three waves of DHS to calculate rates and reconstruct family histories, desired family size, 
fertility preferences, contraceptive use and household economic conditions. In the case of India, 
the authors looked for factors that could account for the differences in desired and observed 
family size and the schemas that say that low fertility and small families are legit and desirable. 
While desired fertility has been decreasing over the years, unwanted fertility is still high and the 
use of reversible contraceptive is still low. They also found decrease in son preference, indication 
of transition from hoarding to replacement children mortality strategy - which could be a sign of 
mortality decline in general - , and strong tempo effect (increase of age at childbirth). As a result, 
largely cultural factors were blamed for the diversity in their TFR ranging from 4 to 1.8 births 
per women. 
In the case of Brazil, the ideal number of children seems to be contingent on these 
structural influences; for example, women in rural areas have higher desired family sizes 
compared to urban women. But since overall fertility has been going down and differences in 
population subgroups are narrowing, there are reasons to believe that the desired family sizes and 
compositions are much more alike among all segments of society, demonstrating either a 
weakening of societal norms or a convergence of schemas toward low fertility targets or 
replacement level.  
Some institutional changes that began to appear in the last decades could also have 
played a role in how women and couples plan their family schedules. For example, religious 
composition, such as increasing secularization and the decline of the influence of the Vatican11 
                                                          
11 The number of self-declared Catholics in Brazil has declined precipitously in the past half-century. According to the 2010 
Census, the percentage dropped from 95% in 1940 to 64.6% in 2010 (Brasil, 2012). The reduction in Catholics is attributed to an 
increase in the growth of Pentecostal churches, as well as an increase in the number of people without religious affiliation 
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could explain the increase in use of contraceptives which could lead to a decrease in unwanted 
fertility (FU). The increasing participation of women in the labor market and increasing 
participation of women as household heads (37.4% of them were females in the year 2010) 
(Itaborai, 2003; PNAD s/d) could have made motherhood more complicated, reflecting an 
increase in the competing preference (FC). Along with that, the possible effects of the expansion 
of the middle class and the relevant public policies such as cash transfers and increasing 
opportunities of college admission by means of education quotas for more social disadvantage 
youth (Rios-Neto, 2005) deserve further investigation. Increasing education and income might 
support new schemas that could decrease ideal family sizes.  Other changes might also improve 
access to resources (“materials” in the TCA framework) that guarantee that new preferences be 
acted upon, such as access to contraception. 
In the following paragraphs, I will present the TFR, the DFS and the six parameters 
contained in the Bongaarts (2001)’s Proximate Determinants of Low Fertility, as well as the 
methods I will use to estimate them. After decomposing the parameters, one will be able to 
understand how much of the decrease in TFR in Brazil is a change of preference possibly driven 
by ideational changes surrounding the meaning of childbearing (reflected in smaller DFS) or an 
inability of women to fulfill their reproductive expectations, possibly due to institutional changes 
or a lack of institutional change to accommodate new necessities of life.  
 
                                                          
(Coutinho and Golgher, 2014). In the same period, the proportion of Protestants increased from 3% to 22.2%, while those who 
self-reported themselves as without religious affiliation increased from 1% to 8% of the total (Brasil, 2012).  
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CONCEPTUALIZATION, DATA AND MEASUREMENTS12 
 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 
 
To measure Total Fertility Rate (TFR), I calculated the fertility rates of the last 3 years 
preceding the surveys – DHS and PNDS, (1986, 1996, 2006). The number of children born in the 
last 36 months is divided by the women-years lived of exposure age 15-49 by 5 year age group 
interval. Because in 3 years women might have been part of two different age groups, by using 
the technique of the Century Month Code, it is possible to take into account the contribution that 
women gave to each age group; for example, a women age 21 at the time of the interview had 
spent one year of her life at the age group comprised between 20 and 24 and two years in the 
group comprised of 15-19 years old, so she contributes with her “risk of having a child” to two 
different ages. 
 
Desired Family Size (DFS) 
 
Desired family size (DFS) is conceptualized as “target fertility” and is measured by the 
response given to the following questions, which are different for women who had and who had 
not had any children yet (includes current pregnant): “Se pudesse voltar atrás, para o tempo em 
que não tinha nenhum filho, e pudesse escolher o número de filhos para ter por toda a vida, que 
número seria este?”, which translates as “if you could go back in time to the time when you did 
not have any children and could choose the number of children you could have throughout your 
                                                          
12 Formulas were based on Dharmalingam et al 2014.Throughout the Results section, I will use footnotes to present new ways to 
calculate the parameters for future reference.  
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whole life, what number would it be?”, and “Se pudesse escolher exatamente o número de filhos 
que teria em toda a sua vida, quantos teria?”, which translates “if you could choose the exact 
number of children to have throughout your whole life, what number would it be?”. Women who 
answer “up to God” were excluded from the sample together with their births. Besides being a 
small fraction of the sample, they do not matter for the analysis since they do not have any target 
fertility. The desired number of children reported by all women will be averaged and the result 
will stand as the Desired Family Size (DFS). In the absence of longitudinal data that could 
capture preferences before the onset of pregnancy, it is important to keep in mind that target 
family size might be biased due to ex post rationalization, or women who adjust their preferred 
family size to the size of the family they have. However, if women were really rationalizing their 
responses, the DFS would equal the TFR. That is not the case. 
 
Unwanted Fertility (FU) 
 
Many women report having more children than they wanted, especially in midtransitional 
societies. In many developing, countries this is the main reason why observed fertility exceeds 
desired family size. In postransional countries, as couples are increasingly able to implement their 
fertility preferences, unwanted childbearing is less sizable (Bongaarts, 2001).  
Barros and Wong (2012) analyzed women of different union types in Brazil and found 
that the proportion that has ever used contraception is close to 100%. However, women in stable 
relationships have lower probability of using contraception, and for those who are low educated 
this proportion is even lower. Curtis (2012) evaluated Brazil´s contraceptive use and concluded 
that despite the near universality of contraceptive use, 29.7% of births in the five years before the 
2006 PNDS were reported as mistimed (wanted later) and 17.8% were reported as unwanted 
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(Ministerio da Saude, 2008), confirming that this would be an important proximate determinant. 
This pattern is commonly found in other low fertility countries, which is a sign of contraceptive 
failure and inconsistent contraceptive use.  
Lacerda et al. (2005) found evidence of unmet need for contraceptive in Brazil in the year 
2002. They used the methodology developed by Westoff and Ochoa (1991) in which the group 
who has unmet need for contraception is composed of sexually active women who were not 
using contraception at the time of the interview, but had demonstrated desire to postpone or limit 
their childbearing. That includes pregnant women or women with amenorrhea for which the last 
pregnancy was unintended or untimed.  
The first thing to have in mind when calculating unwanted pregnancy is the fact that the 
number might be underestimated because of ex post rationalization of children, and the stigma 
associated with reporting a child as unwanted (Dharmalingam et al. 2014). In the lack of 
longitudinal data that would allow for the capturing of ex post rationalization, the strategy used 
will be to consider as unwanted any birth of a living child in the last 36 months where the 
women responds that prior to getting pregnant she wished to have no more children. The 
question posed to the respondents is: “Quando ficou grávida do <nome da crianca>, estava 
querendo engravidar naquele momento,queria esperar mais, ou não queria ter (mais) filhos?”, 
which translates as “At the time you became pregnant with <name of child>, did you want to 
become pregnant then, did you want to wait until later, or did not want more (children) at all?”. 
The ratio of unwanted children born in the last 3 years to all children born in the last 3 years is 
added to 1 to be transformed into the first parameter Fu. 
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Replacement Effect of Child Mortality (FR) 
 
Parents “bear children not for the rewards accruing from the birth itself, but principally for 
the rewards expected to accrue from surviving children” (Preston, 1978, p. 9). Replacements for 
child mortality usually take three strategies: physiological replacement – refers to the rapid return 
to ovulation after death of child; volitional replacement – refers to having an additional child giving 
that one has died; and hoarding – having a high fertility due to the anticipation of a child loss). 
Preston (1978) discusses whether improvements in life expectancy and lower infant mortality 
contributed to the decrease in fertility given that the increase in the probability of survival 
motivated parents to control fertility. One of the possible mechanisms to improve survival was 
breastfeeding which delays return of ovulation, reduce environmental contamination, and increase 
birth spacing (Knodel and van de Walle, 1967).    
Following Dharmalingam et al. (2014), the Total Replacement Effect (FR) of child 
mortality on fertility is estimated by a technique proposed by Olsen (1980) and Trussell and Olsen 
(1983). First, they selected women aged 35-49 years, who, according to them, have already 
completed or are close to completing their fertility. Secondly, they selected the number of children 
ever born, in , and the number of children already dead id . Then, they estimated the proportion 
of dead children: iii ndp / . After this, they regressed id on ip  and estimated the predicted 
values  idE . Later, they regressed in  on this predicted values.  
The effect of the rate of replacement on fertility at the aggregate level is given by the 
replacement rate multiplied by the corresponding Infant Mortality Rate (IMR). The IMR was 
calculated by me using the same DHS and PNDS data for the years 1986, 1996 and 2006, for the 
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years preceding each survey, and applying the same filters as for the groups being studied. If the 
replacement of fertility takes on a number of 10%, for example, the Index of FR=1.10. 
 
Sex Preference (FSP) 
 
Parents may have a preference for a family of a particular size, and also of a specific sex 
composition. A commonly chosen family size is the one composed of two children, with one son 
and one daughter. If the number is achieved but the composition is not, parents may continue to 
have births, therefore leading to higher fertility (Bongaarts, 2001). Gender preferences are a 
tricky phenomenon because they usually make fertility higher in order to go toward one´s 
compositional goals. However, in contexts of low fertility, not many will endlessly have more 
births to realize a preferred gender composition. In some social contexts this “intensification” of 
sex preference might encourage sex-selective abortion.  Sex selective abortion could allow 
woman to realize low fertility and a preferred gender composition. 
According to Dharmalingam et al (2014), in traditional patriarchal institutions (e.g., India), 
sons are more valued than daughters for their greater economic utility and due sociocultural logic. 
In Latin America, as emphasized by Bongaarts (2001), this effect might be smaller, or even 
favorable to females or to a gender balance. Souza et al. 2011 found evidence that the probability 
of having a third child is higher for women whose first two children are the same sex, as described 
by Angrist and Evans (1998 in Souza et al 2011). For women who had two children of different 
sexes, the likelihood of having a third was 47.04% in 1990; while those who had two children of 
the same sex in the household had a 51.16% probability of having a third child. In 2000, the 
probabilities were 38.50% and 42.12%, respectively.  
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In the Brazilian DHS and PNDS, women reported the exact number of daughters and 
sons they would like to have in an ideal situation, the ideal sex composition of the household. 
They were asked: “Quantos destes filhos (as) você gostaria que fossem homens, quantos que 
fossem mulheres, e quantos não importaria o sexo?”, which translates to “how many of these 
children [desired number cited above] would you like to be male, how many to be female and 
how many of you would not care about the sex?”. Technically, this would be a good indication 
of sex preference; however, because desire does not always translate into accomplishments, and 
because there could be ex post rationalization, observed sex ratios at birth and parity progression 
are better indicators of the impact of sex preference on fertility (Bongaarts, 2013). Sex ratios at 
birth can tell whether women have been using any sort of sex selection mechanism, such as 
selective abortion. Parity progression, or Sex Ratio at Last Birth (SRLB), shows if the 
progression to the next birth depends on the sex composition of preceding births, a proxy for sex-
selective stopping behavior. They are estimated by calculating the probability of having a second 
child giving the sex of the first, and the probability of having a third child giving the sex of the 
first two.  
Although Bongaarts (2013) finds evidence of strong sex selection for male offspring’s in 
Asia, this is not the case in Brazil, where the only kind of abortion practice that is allowed by law 
is of those pregnancies due to rape or when they represent risk for the mother’s health. Besides, 
sex ratio at birth is considered at normal level, around 104 in 2010, so even if unsafe abortions are 
being practiced, which they are, they are not motivated by the sex of the child. Sex preferences in 
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Brazil can only be achieved through births of higher parity with the intention of household 
composition, reflecting in an increase of TFR when comparing with the DFS13  
Dharmalingam et al (2014) operationalized this enhancing effect on fertility using the 
following procedure, which was based on estimating the counterfactual, “What would happen to 
fertility if all sex preferences were to disappear suddenly?” The authors propose to estimate 
whether or not a respondent wants an additional child by parity and sex composition of existing 
children14. The measure is defined by the following relationship:


i
i
i
ii
P
PC
, where i
C
 is the 
lowest15 proportion of individuals among the different composition who do not want any more 
children at each parity i and sex composition, and Pi is the number of persons at each parity and 
sex composition. The result of this division demonstrates the percentage of increase in TFR due 
to sex preferences.   
 
Tempo Effect (FT) 
 
Historically, in the beginning of the twentieth century, the relative participation of 
women age 40 and over in childbearing was high since women continued to have children 
throughout her life. Thus, it was not unusual to see 45 year olds having babies, but those babies 
used to be of much higher parity. When birth control is intensified and fertility declines, women 
                                                          
13 Analysis indicate mixed balance preferences, followed by daughter preference in Brazil. This is the topic of my second 
dissertation chapter. 
14 I used all children born alive, disregarding that some might have died and the mother could be trying to replace a certain 
gender.  
15 The wording is incorrect in the original article. It says “highest”.  
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voluntarily stop childbearing because they have already fulfilled their reproductive goals 
(Morgan, 1991). So, births of women age 45 and over goes from 10% to 3-4% (Billari et al. 
2007) in the United States. Later, when women start to delay fertility, the rates of births at age 40 
more than doubled between 1971 and 2000, becoming even more common to have a late first 
birth (Billari et al. 2007).  
Menken (1985) discusses the issue of delaying childbearing. Women have been delaying 
entrance into marriage, or waiting until they have achieved their personal goals before having a 
child. However, some will have to change their intentions, voluntarily or in involuntarily because 
of union disruption (Menken, 1985). As discussed above, postponements of fertility (tempo 
effect which would be the number of children that a women would have had if they had not 
postponed) affect fertility rates negatively and the reason why this happens is because despite the 
apparent simplicity of the TFR, it is subject to misinterpretation. The indicator is estimated with 
data from a specific period, i.e., from women aged 15 to 49 in the same year. If there is a rising 
age at childbearing, the estimates decrease the TFR because births of successive cohorts are 
spread over a longer time period, the tempo effect (Bongaarts, 2001).  
The tempo (FT) effect on fertility is calculated with the Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) 
method. The result is an adjusted TFR without postponement of fertility and done by parity 
specific rates.  
)1/(' iii mTFRTFR  , 
Where 
'
iTFR  is the adjusted TFR for birth order i, i
TFR
 is the observed TFR by birth 
order, and i
m
 is the annualized rate of change in mean age at childbearing at order i between the 
beginning and end of the period. 
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The total fertility rate is the sum of the fertility rates by birth order (see below).  

i
iTFRTFR
''
 
The ratio between the TFR and the TFR’ will provide a percentage that represents the 
effect of postponing fertility (by pushing the mean age at childbearing) on the observed TFR. For 
the years 2006 and 1996, the rate of change in the mean age at childbearing were calculated 
using the previous survey. I used the 1996 to calculate the rate of those of 2006, and 1986 to 
calculate the rate of those of 1996. For the year of 1986, however, due to the absence of any prior 
survey from which I could derive the annualized rate of change, the change in the mean age at 
childbearing was calculated using the same DHS (1986), but investigating births occurred 
between 72 and 36 months before the survey.  
 
Involuntary infertility (FI) 
 
Involuntary infecundity stands for the effect of the inability to have a child (physiological 
or disease-induced) and the effect of union disruption or the inability to find a suitable partner on 
fertility.  Dharmalingam et al (2014) estimates this parameter by looking at the percentage of 
women in their last age group (45-49) who were childless (2%).  
Ideally, one could separate both effects in two different parameters.  
For the first parameter, one could easily evaluate whether a women is infertile by using a 
variable available in the DHS and PNDS surveys that inquired women about whether they did 
not have any child because they were infertile. It is equally easy to track if a women is old 
enough to be a mother, but have never been married or cohabited. A problem with the first 
measure is that perceived sterility might be higher than actual and the exaggeration of infertility 
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might be a myth one has to break. Menken (1985) explains how couples nowadays are not trying 
long enough before they consider themselves infertile. In fact, if they had tried for at least two 
years, a large proportion of them would have got pregnant.  
A problem with the second measure is that differently from India, marriage is not 
universal in Brazil, childbearing is often non-marital, and unmarried women are not expected to 
bear children, so many of them might not even know whether they could in fact bear children 
and their childlessness could be voluntary. Thus, this estimator might not fully represent the 
involuntary childlessness in Brazil and might not fully capture the socio-economic nuances that 
could impact involuntary infertility. 
So, I will estimate the involuntary infertility based on the proportion of women aged 40-
49 (or 40-44 in the case of 1986) who are or have been previously married or cohabiting and who 
have never had any child ever born. The proportion of women in the sample who fall into this 
category will be used as a parameter in the equation to decrease the value of TFR.  
Although biological infertility could be higher for some social groups as demonstrated by 
Tavares et al. (2013) disease-induced sterility would be small in more recent years, and would 
only kick in after women achieved a certain age, by the time she had already had many children, 
so the values for the parameters should not be very different for all women16. Any differences 
between social groups will be more a result of social sterility (for example, some social groups 
might be more exposed to union disruption).  
                                                          
16 Tavares et al (2013) analyzed the female Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALY) and concluded that there are many conditions 
(some of which are linked to childbearing) that could lead a women to have living or reproductive impairments. Some of these 
conditions are unsafe abortions, puerperal infection, and high blood pressure. Those could directly impact fertility rates in case a 
women acquired those conditions before setting an end to their reproductive life. Authors estimate that the incidence of 
infections, for example, is as high as 7.2% (usually set to 5% as it is common to perform C-section in Brazil where antibiotics are 
administered to patients as a prophylactic measure). Moreover, it is still difficult to measure the impact on fertility. Authors also 
found that those disabilities are worse for women who live in the most vulnerable regions of the state where the study was 
conducted, which confirms that biological sterility has social causes, such as poverty, lack of health care, among others. 
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Competing Preferences (FC) 
 
The article by Dharmalingam et al (2014) estimate that because marriage is universal in 
India, other life priorities should not influence fertility rates, so they set the value to the 
parameter to be equal to 1. However, I have enough evidence to believe that Brazilian women 
are feeling pressured by their other responsibilities and foregoing maternity more often than in 
the past. Following the suggestion of Dharmalingam (2014), a parameter Bongaarts (2001) called 
Competing Preferences will be measured as a residual of the equation TFR-DSF that cannot be 
explained by the other five parameters explained above:17.  
CITSPRU FFFFFFDFSTFR ******  , where unwanted fertility (FU), child replacement (FR), 
and sex preference (FSP) are above one, rising age at childbearing (FT) can be below or above one, 
and involuntary infertility (FI), and competing preferences (FC) are below one.   
Given  
CITSPRU FFFFFF
DFS
TFR
***** ,  
I estimate the Fc factor with the residuals of the estimate: 
 












ITSPRU
C
FFFFFDFS
TFR
F
****
1
. 
In other words, how much of the difference between TFR and DFS cannot be explained by 
the parameters estimated in the equation.  
Thus, competing preferences are conjunctures that will interfere with a women ability to 
have the children she desired and that will negatively impact her maternity prospects. For example, 
women who work and have to invest in their careers sometimes have to decrease their original 
                                                          
17 Exploring Competing Preferences more in depth is the topic of my third dissertation chapter. 
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desired family sizes in order to climb the ladder at work. Other factors such as higher education 
aspirations and the pursuit of life goals are also examples of situations women not always 
anticipate when planning their desired family size. Although the wording “preference” makes it 
sound like women are happily choosing a new plan over the old one, this is not always true. 
Prolonged singlehood, inflexible work schedule, lack of affordable childcare are other situations 
might make a women think twice before getting pregnant, representing conjunctures that will make 
a women revise her fertility goals.  
Competing Preferences seem to be an important factor shaping Brazilian fertility rates 
because motherhood is not universal and there are many factors that could compete with it. 
Several studies have documented the differences between mothers and non-mothers in terms of 
wage, type of occupation and labor force participation in Brazil. Paulo (2012) models the female 
hourly wage comparing mothers and non-mothers aged 22 to 34. Independent of education, non-
mothers have much higher wage in the three periods analyzed (1984, 1988 and 2009), and the 
difference is higher for women of high education which suggest that the penalties and cost of 
opportunities is higher for these women. Junior (2008) found associations between occupation 
and fertility. Women who worked in positions of direction and managerial, as well as women 
with bachelor degrees in general, postpone fertility and tend to control fertility by parity much 
more. Women with low skill occupations tend to have a more “flexible” relationship with work, 
with worse pay and no benefits or formal contract of work. In those types of work, wages do not 
improve with experience, so women can leave for maternity and return with apparently low 
penalty to their careers (England, 1991 in Junior 2008). Santiago also found that high educated 
women have lower odds of having three children when compared to low educated, suggesting, 
once again, that women might think about the costs of opportunities. 
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Interestingly, Souza et al. (2011) investigated the effect of having children on the female 
labor participation by parity (1, 2, and 3) and found that children impact participation at every 
order, but the negative effect of first and second child became weaker with time, and the effect of 
high birth order (3) increased. This demonstrates how women would have children regardless of 
her labor participation. It is her career that will dictate her final parity. 
 
Covariates 
 
The TFR and the DFS, as well as the 6 parameters utilized in the framework, were 
explored according to socio-demographic variable hereby called covariates. They come from the 
two waves of the DHS (1986, 1996) and the PNDS (2006) and are factors that shape fertility 
intentions and outcomes:  
a) Wealth Index: Continuous 5-level variable ranging from 0 to 4, being 4 the wealthiest 
category. See Appendix 1: Chapter 1 for details. 
b) Predicted final education level: 0 to 3; 4 to7; 8 – 10; 11; and 12 or more. Estimated 
based on the probability that a women aged 15 to 24 would finish her current 
education level and enter the next levels of education until college. See Appendix 1: 
Chapter 1 for details. 
c) Urbanicity or place of residence: 1=Urban, 2=Rural.  
d) Geographic macro-region  (North=1, Northeast =2, Southeast =3, South=4, Central-
West=5 – except for 1986 for which Central West is added to North). 
e) Religion (Catholic=1, Protestants=2, None=4). 
f) Achieved Years of Education: 0 to 3; 4 to7; 8 – 10; 11; and 12 or more. Refers to the 
years of education at the time of the interview.  
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g) Race (White=1, Black and Brown=2). The DHS 1986 did not have a variable for race. 
 
Data 
 
I used data from the two most recent waves of the Brazilian DHS of 1986 and 1996 and 
the Pesquisa Nacional de Demografia e Saude of 2006. These databases are nationally 
representative, cross-sectional, and have the following sample sizes respectively: 5892, 12612 
and 15575. Although the PNDS is not a DHS, it contains many of the same questions needed to 
decompose the fertility rates. I focus my analyzes on women (15-49) and their children born in 
the last 3 years. The DHS and the PNDS programs have developed standard procedures, 
methodologies, and manuals to guide the survey process and make countries and years 
comparable. Sample procedure for the DHS and the PNDS followed specifications of the equal 
probability of selection method (EPSEM) and the probability proportion to size (PPS).  
The DHS 1986 was coordinated by Sociedade Civil Bem-Estar Familiar no Brasil 
(BEMFAM), and was inserted in a research conducted by the Demographic Health Surveys 
(Macro International Inc) and the Center for Disease Control (CDD, US). The DHS 1996 was 
coordinated by BEMFAM with the help of the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 
(IBGE), Macro International Inc., Agência Norte Americana para o Desenvolvimento, UN 
Population Fund and UNICEF. The Pesquisa Nacional de Demografia e Saude (CEBRAP 2006), 
was coordinated by the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning, and the Brazilian Health 
Ministry and was funded by UNESCO. Data were collected in the five Brazilian geographic 
regions (four regions for 1986), in urban and rural areas, as well as urban slums. Original survey 
databases have already been published and are available at http://bvsms.saude.gov.br/bvs/pnds, 
and at http://dhsprogram.com/data/available-datasets.cfm.  
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I applied weights (v005) to expand the sample size when appropriate.  Missing data for 
covariates was treated as random and deleted from the analyses.   
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
General model 
A descriptive analysis of the sample can be found in Table 1.1. Although there are different 
sample sizes for the 3 DHS years and the socio-demographic groups, I opted for including all 
women in the analysis because of sample size and because missing values for the calculation of 
one parameter does not compromise the analysis of the others. 
The values for the Total Fertility Rate, the Desired Family Size and for the six parameters 
for the Bongaarts Proximate Determinants of fertility for each year and socio-demographic groups 
can be found in Table 1.2. When the factor helps to increase fertility, parameters will take the 
values higher than 1. When impacting negatively, they will take the value below 1. The most 
powerful the parameters are, the further from 1 their values are going to be.  
The box below (Box 1) presents the amount of variance explained, the value of the r-square, 
with the inclusion of each parameter by survey year. The unit of analysis is each socio-
demographic group studied. These were obtained by a step-wise regression of the TFR with 
forward selection of the remaining parameters in the following order: Desired Family Size (DFS), 
unwanted fertility (FU), replacements for child mortality (FR), sex preference (FSP), Tempo effect 
(FT), involuntary infertility, and competing preferences (FC). 
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Box 1: Explained variance with model parameters, 1986, 1996 and 2006 
TFR    1986  1996  2006 
DFS   0.573 0.387 0.459 
DFS x Fu   0.848 0.788 0.694 
DFS x Fu x Fsp 0.882 0.794 0.727 
DFS x Fu x Fsp x Fr 0.883 0.852 0.740 
DFS x Fu x Fsp x Fr x Ft 0.891 0.858 0.740 
DFS x Fu x Fsp x Fr x Ft x Fi 0.907 0.867 0.741 
DFS x Fu x Fsp x Fr x Ft x Fi x FC 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
As can be seen, a great deal of the variance can be explained by adding those parameters 
to the model (r-squares are 0.91 for 1986, 0.87 for 1996 and 0.74 for 2006) which suggest that the 
Bongaarts model works well for Brazilian data. All parameters seem to contribute well for the 
explanation of the TFR, however, after family size preferences, unwanted fertility adds the most 
predictive power to the model, followed by competing preference estimated as a residual. Note 
how the importance of this residual grows over time, suggesting the necessity of studying it more 
in depth and finding new ways to estimate it. 
Parameters 
The first thing to be observed with Table 1.2 is the fact that there is a reversal between 
fertility outcome and fertility intentions represented by desired family size, as predicted by 
Bongaarts (2001) and as expected, since this is a characteristic of a society undergoing fertility 
transition. Brazilian women start the period having more children than they desire, and finalize the 
transition having fewer children than they wish. In general, women in 1986 wanted 2.79 and were 
having 3.21 children, in 2006 they wanted 2.1 but were having 1.87. 
Below, I will discuss the main findings for each parameter separately. Graphs will be 
utilized to summarize each of them to facilitate the interpretation and illustrate the findings, 
shedding light on what might be behind the reversal between intentions and outcomes, and the 
disparities that have existed or persisted within social groups. 
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1 -Total fertility rates in Brazil 
 
In Brazil, between the years 1986 and 2006, the TFR dropped from 3.21 children per 
women to 2.49 in 1996 and to 1.87 in 2006 as can be seen in Table 1.2. 
By analyzing levels of TFR according to social groups, one can see that fertility is closely 
tied to wealth: the largest the wealth group, the lower the fertility. However differences have been 
narrowing. For example, women of the lowest wealth index had a TFR of 6.39 in 1986, but it was 
down to 2.84 in 2006. The richer group started with a TFR of 2.05 in 1986, and in 2006 are close 
to 1 child per women.    
The decline in time happened for all social groups, with the exception of Middle School. 
They declined from 2.33 to 1.85 followed by a small recuperation to 1.99.  
It is clear that those with the higher fertility in the beginning of the period are the ones for 
whom the rates have declined the most, showing a clear sign of convergence around replacement 
level. In spite of that, fertility continues to be higher for those with low education, low wealth 
index, those who live in rural areas, in the North and Northeast macro regions, and for Blacks. 
Those without religious affiliation used to have the highest fertility among religious groups (4.22 
in 1986), but then converged to lower levels.     
All four macro regions were above the replacement level in 1986 and slightly above in 
1996. In 2006, three of them were below replacement, and only the Central-West and North region 
showed values slightly above replacement.  
It is important to notice that although education and wealth are associated and many of the 
fertility trends are the same, the relationship is not perfectly linear, which produces different 
estimates for both when analyzing the parameters. In fact, the Kendall's tau-b measure of 
association is of 0.46 in 1986, 0.42 in 1996 and 0.37 (ASE<0.01), possibly reflecting the fact that 
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education has become less selective over the years with the increase in mean level of education for 
the Brazilian population. Because this is not a multivariate analysis, comparisons between two 
social indicators (for example, comparing high educated with high wealth) should be done with 
extreme caution because these might contain the same group of people.  So, I will only make 
comparisons within these groups. 
In the following paragraphs, the presentation of the results of the other parameters will help 
explain the differences in TFR among other social groups.  
 
2 - Desired family size   
 
There is a clear tendency toward decline regarding Desired Family Size (DSF), as can be 
seen in Table 1.2. It is easy to conclude that the most important driver of the decline in TFR is 
women’s desire to have smaller families. Although the value declined from 2.79 to 2.10, the most 
popular family size continued to be 2. The percentage who answered 3 children declined from 25% 
in 1986 to 15% in 2006. The percentage who desired 1 increased from 10% in 1986 to 15% in 
2006 (percentages not shown). This finding is consistent with evidence from other countries that 
shows that as TFR declines, DFS remains around replacement level (Bachrach, 2001; Morgan, 
2001).  
Desired family size declines steadily as education and wealth increase, and from year to 
year. For example, in 1986 it varied from 3.13 for the lowest wealth index and 2.70 for the higher. 
Put into a time perspective, DFS also seem to converge around replacement level: in 2006, 
women’s preference was for a 2.34 fertility for the lowest wealth index and 2.11 for the higher.  
An interesting phenomenon seems to occur for women of the highest levels of education 
(both predicted and achieved): while DSF decreases with education until High School (1.92 in 
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2006), women who have proceeded to higher levels of education (college or beyond) have the 
desire for more children (above 2.10). These could be related to expected improvements in income 
– highly educated women might know they could afford more children, so they want more 
children. However, when one looks at their fertility rates, these women are having fewer children 
than the other groups. 
A second hypothesis is that women who proceed to higher education levels have the desire 
for more children because they are part of a selected group who sees beyond the economic value 
and costs of children and could be motivated by other ideational reasoning surrounding 
motherhood, such as personal fulfillment. In this case, the schemas of motherhood being fulfilling 
could be more important than the schemas of smaller family sizes.  
 Another hypothesis does not explain why they would want more children, but explains 
why they end up having fewer. College women might face conjunctures that compete with 
childbearing, like career and prolonged education. The estimates for competing preferences (as 
will be explained later in this chapter), strengthens this hypothesis. High educated women have 
one of the highest values for competing preferences, which impacts the fertility rates.    
The relationship between DSF and urbanicity was as expected. Inhabitants of urban areas 
not only have fewer children than rural areas, they also wish smaller family sizes. These could be 
explained by the fact that rural areas might have fewer obstacles to have a larger family, such as 
more space, less violence, cheaper costs of living, agricultural and familiar work, among others. 
Paulo (2012) also had found that the motherhood penalty is more severe for mothers in cities. The 
values for competing preferences in the case of this chapter, for example, are much lower for rural 
areas.   
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Region does not seem to be an important source of variation for desired family size, with 
the exception of the Center-West for more recent years, a largely agrarian region.  
Some interesting fact is the difference for DSF regarding religion. People without religious 
affiliation have lower values for desired family sizes at every year. It is possible that the Christian 
doctrine “grow and multiply” is really making a difference regarding family formation by valuing 
schemas of bigger family sizes.  
Race does not seem to be an important source of disparities for ideal family size. Both 
Whites and Blacks wish to have the same number of children in 1996 and 2006, so the differences 
in TFR between the two groups have to come from some other parameter. Unfortunately, race was 
not contemplated by the survey in 1986.  
Once again, the most important findings is that the values for desired family sizes get closer 
to the value of the TFR in the year 1996 and then depart from it in the year 2006. The difference 
between the two in number of children can be observed in Figure 1.2. The main reproductive 
concern of Brazilian women, which used to be how to be able to regulate their fertility to meet 
their reproductive goals, have changed to being able to have all the children they have planned.  
 
3 - Unwanted fertility 
 
Although unwanted fertility has declined in every year for every social group, it is still very 
high, in accordance with the findings from Curtis (2012). The value declined from 34% to 19% of 
all children born in the last 3 years preceding the surveys. The different levels of unwanted fertility 
seem to be behind the different TFR of the social groups, representing the different levels of 
materials (resources) that each socio-demographic groups have available. 
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As expected and can be seen in Table 1.2 and Figure 1.318, this percentage is improving, 
but is higher for women of low education level (predicted and achieved) and low wealth index, 
also in agreement with what Barros and Wong (2012) had found. The lowest proportion of 
unwanted pregnancy is in the South (better averages in terms of economic development) and much 
lower for women of higher educational level and higher wealthy index. These numbers confirmed 
what the literature has demonstrated, that education and wealth can facilitate access and 
information about contraception. They are also important to show how sexual and reproductive 
health should continue to be a priority for governments and policymakers.  
No religious differences were found in unwanted fertility, so the theory that secularization 
has improved access to information and utilization of contraceptives cannot be supported. The 
existing differences in TFR according to religion must come from some other parameter.  
 Blacks’ and Whites’ rates of unwanted childbearing have declined and differences 
between the races have narrowed. This improvement, together with the improvements for low 
wealth and low educated could be a result of the reproductive health policies that were 
implemented in Brazil in the last decades such as free distribution of contraceptives, awareness 
campaigns and even the high rates of sterilization (Caetano, 2004). Some of these policies were 
specially design to target minorities and low income women in order to spread the knowledge that 
the smaller families are more successful (Amaral and Potter, 2015). 
                                                          
18 Note how the values for unwanted fertility hereby analyzed and available at Table 2 are actually underestimated. As stated in 
the Methods section, Dharmalingan et al (2014) utilizes the percentage of unwanted children as the Bongaarts Parameter because, 
according to them, the percentage unwanted should be added to 1. Suppose that 30% of children were unwanted: 
30/30+70=0.30 + 1= 1.3 
Thus, for Dharmalingan et al. (2014), if 30% of the children born in the last 3 years are unwanted, the Fu parameter that should 
be used to multiply DFS equals to 1.3. 
However, if 30% of the children is unwanted, that means that the proportion of unwanted children over the children who were 
wanted is actually much bigger: 
30/70= 42.8, 
So the DFS should be increased by 42.8%, not 30%, and the Fu parameter should be of 1.428. 
In addition, there are other measures of unwanted fertility that could have been used, such as Unwanted Fertility Rates. In order 
to keep comparability with Dharmalingan et al (2014), I utilized the same measurement. 
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Regarding macro region, unwanted childbearing has decline is all of them, with the 
exception of the North, where it has increased slightly from 1.16 to 1.21. As has happened with 
some states in the analysis of Dharmalingan (2014), it is common to observe a decline in unwanted 
births for places that are more advanced in the transition, but it is even more common that in a first 
moment, especially in the middle of the fertility transition, to observe an increase in unwanted 
pregnancies – since women need to feel the necessity of controlling fertility before actually 
beginning to control. The higher TFR for rural could also be explained by the larger value for 
unwanted fertility, an indication that they might lack access to contraceptives. 
These findings are of extreme importance for research because it shows Brazil still has a 
long way to go in regards to sexual and reproductive health. This finding is also relevant because 
as fertility is already low, further increases in economic development and education levels could 
reduce unwanted fertility by increasing access to materials (resources) such as information and 
access to contraceptives, and consequently, reduce fertility rates. Unless, of course, women of 
higher education level are able to have the surplus children they plan. Policymakers should be 
attentive to this findings, as this could be the hope for an aging country.    
Although Unwanted Fertility seems to be picking up the effect of Sex Preferences 
(because a women might be more likely to declare a birth as unwanted if it’s a different sex than 
she wished), the two parameters are not associated. The values for the Pearson correlation among 
them by year are: 0.17 (1986), -0. 20 (1996) and 0.37 (2006). 
 
4 - Child replacement 
 
The results for the effect of child mortality and replacement on fertility at the aggregate 
level for the three years and the social groups can be found in Table 1.2 and in Figure 1.4. The 
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value is in decline for all groups from 1.08 in 1986 to 1.03 in 2006, which means that mortality no 
longer plays an important role in the number of children ever born by women. In fact, infant 
mortality rates dropped from 69.18 per thousand in 1986, to 37.5 per thousand in 1996 to 24.9 per 
thousand in 2006. 
My findings thus suggest that mortality and subsequent replacement do not explain much 
variations in levels of TFR for the 3 survey years and most children are surviving. So the schemas 
that regulate fertility behavior and norms in case of high mortality (i.e.: by having extra children) 
will start to disappear from women’s minds soon, if haven’t done so. 
 
5 - Sex preferences 
 
At the country level, desired sex composition of the offspring does not seem to significantly 
impact the fertility rates of women. The estimates are around 1.04 in Table 1.219. However, the 
parameter might help explain variations within social groups. The numbers should be observed 
with caution due to the potential inflation effect caused by the small sample sizes certain 
population groups for each parity and composition. 
When they are analyzed separately, it is easy to perceive that the sex composition has 
helped to keep fertility at different levels, at least for some groups of women. This is the case for 
                                                          
19 Note how the values for Sex Preference hereby estimated and available at Table 2 are overestimated. As stated in the methods 
section, Dharmalingan et al (2014) estimated sex preference using the number of persons at each parity and sex composition. I 
argue that the formula utilized should be as follow: 



ijij
ijijii
PC
PCC
)1(
)(
where ij
C
 is the lowest proportion of individuals among 
the different composition who do not want any more children at each parity I based on the sex composition and ii
C
 is the highest 
proportion of individuals among the different composition who do not want any more children at each parity i. Therefore, 
)( ijii CC   is the proportion of children for each composition and parity that are only wanted due to unmet sex composition. If one 
adds those children who only are desired due to the sex composition of their previous siblings for each parity,   ijiiij PCC )( , one 
will observe that the total is the number of children that are wanted only because their parents did not achieve their desired 
composition. This number, divided by the total number of wanted children, will tell how much of the DFS is increased by sex 
preferences.  
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women without religious affiliation, for the Northeast region, for the lowest wealth group and for 
5-8 years of education in 1986, even though the effect seems to be reduced in the most recent 
years. In 1996, the effect of sex preferences seem to lower down, but women of the highest 
predicted education group pick up a large effect possibly due to small sample sizes at parity of 3 
children and because fertility is very well controlled for this group, so whatever children are being 
born in excess, it possibly has more chances of being due to sex composition than unwanted 
pregnancies. In 2006, the large values for low educated women are in evidence.  
 
6 – Tempo Effect 
 
Table 1.2 also brings the values for the parameters of Tempo. Due to its specificities, it is 
worth mentioning that that tempo effect in Brazil could help inflate or deflate the fertility rates as 
can be seen in Figure 1.6. When tempo is below 1, women are postponing fertility, which means 
the mean age of childbearing by birth order is increasing. When tempo is above 1, women are 
having children earlier when compared to previous decades. In average, the Brazilian population 
is anticipating their fertility, but it is important to notice that some groups of women, such as the 
low educated who have always had a very low age at the time of having their first child, are now 
beginning to postpone having children– or, to be more specific, they are moving their first child 
from adolescence to early adulthood. This could be reflecting new schemas being presented to 
them, such as the necessity of prolonged education, or simply, the attempt of authorities to make 
more resources available for teenagers to prevent pregnancies. 
It is also possible to see an inversion in the effects of education: in 1986 and 2006, increases 
in education meant early fertility, but in 2006, women of all levels of education started to postpone 
having children. 
42 
 
There are two explanations for this finding. The first is that women in Brazil, in contrast to 
Europe, have their children early and start to limit their fertility in their early adult years, instead 
of postponing their fertility. While highly educated would stop, poor women would continue to 
have children, giving the impression that fertility was early for high educated. The other 
explanation is that all women are stopping their reproduction at lower parities and not necessarily 
moving to the third or fourth child. This agrees with the findings from Ministerio da Saude (2008), 
and the relatively low mean age at childbearing for some groups means that there is potential for 
continuous decline. 
 
7 - Infecundity and Involuntary Childlessness 
 
Unable to estimate biological involuntary infertility, I estimate the proportion of women 
who are or have been previously married and never had children ever born. Table 1.2 show the 
results for the three years. Notice that the value of the parameters seem to be stable over time and 
without larger, significant differences when all groups are compared (around 0.95). This is a 
conservative estimate as it is assumed that all married women wanted to have children.  
While the parameters stay around 0.95 for all groups and years, for the highly educated it 
goes down to 0.83 in 1986 as can be seen in Figure 1.7, showing that this estimate is capturing the 
effect of another parameter besides biological infertility. This is because biological sterility should 
not be sensitive to any schema, resources or conjunctures. It should be equal in all groups or maybe 
higher for low educated and low wealth according to Tavares et al. (2013). I argue that this 
difference for highly educated is capturing the effect of social infertility (union interruption or 
inability to find a suitable partner), or even competing preferences. This certainly helps explain 
some of the differences in TFR for highly educated compared to other groups.     
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This fact alerts to a necessity of creating a different parameter to estimate involuntary 
childlessness in future works, especially because I have observed a decrease in fertility rates and 
it is possible that many couples who are married do not want any children. 
 
8 - Competing preferences  
 
So far, I have discussed six items in the equation proposed by Dharmalingam et al (2014) 
to explain the unexpected differences between actual TFR and DFS also described by Bongaarts 
(2001) with the exception of competing preferences. These parameters have helped to elucidate 
what the main sources of differences regarding TFR among social groups are, but some of the 
difference remains unexplored. 
The estimated values for the FC parameters can be found in Table 1.2 and observed in 
Figure 1.8. It is important to remember that because the Fc value depart from 1 on a negative basis 
(the higher the competing preference, the more negative the number is), higher values of competing 
preferences produce smaller Fc values. Note how this value is more negative for higher wealth 
index and high education. Recently, women have increased their rates of participation in the labor 
market, and have also been more responsible for households (Itaborai, 2003; PNAD s/d). Findings 
using data from the decades between 1990 and 2010 has found that children substantially decrease 
a women’s participation in the labor market (Souza et al. 2011). 
The same authors also found that the effect of the birth of the first child had a stronger 
effect on a mother’s labor market participation in 1990 than in 2000. They do not find much of an 
effect for the birth of the second child in 1990, suggesting that families would make an adaptation 
in order to foster an economy of scale. In 2000, however, the second child starts to have a 
significant impact..    
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Inhabitants of urban areas also have more competing preferences because having a child 
implies higher costs, and requires someone to stay home with the baby or provide childcare. In 
2006, however, the values become the same. It is also more negative for Whites and for members 
of Protestant religions in 1996 and 1986, but because this is residual in the Bongaarts model, there 
are other latent variables that could be playing a role in the competing preferences for these groups. 
Likewise, it is troublesome to compare values for the residual over time because the residual in 
1986 could be picking on the effect of other variable that do not exist in 2006, for example. 
 No significant trend can be observed by geographic region.  
While the exploration of Competing Preferences will be done in a future chapter, I finish 
this analysis by plotting the residual of the equation hereby called Competing Preference against 
common competing factors: years of education. In the graph below (Figure 1.9), the population 
mean values for years of education for each socio-demographic characteristic (i.e. Black, Catholic, 
Rural) were plot against their correspondent value for Competing Preference (Fc) available at table 
1.2 for the three survey years. 
One can see how plotting the residual (Fc) with their correspondent population mean of 
years of education produces a negative linear correlation. That means the higher the mean level of 
education of a certain socio-demographic group, the lower their Fc value (the higher the competing 
preference).  
Figures 1.10, 1.11 and 1.12 bring the Fc values plot against population means for the years 
1986, 1996 and 2006 separately.  
In Figures 1.10, 1.11 and 1.12, notice how the relationship between mean years of 
education and competing preferences has become more flat in 2006. This factor either means that 
education attainment has become less competitive with fertility over time (women of all levels of 
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education are able to maintain their desired fertility rates), or that education attainment has become 
less selective (more women are achieving higher levels of education). Future papers will illuminate 
competing preferences and look for better ways to measure and understand its influence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I analyzed fertility transition in Brazil using the low fertility model idealized by 
Bongaarts (2001), modelled by Dharmalingan et al (2014), under the lenses of the Theory of 
Conjunctural Action (Johnson-Hanks et al, 2011). In summary, fertility in Brazil is declining 
quickly and has been below replacement level since the first decade of year 2000. The desired 
number of children is also declining, but less remarkably, and can be considered the main factor 
behind the decline of the TFR representing an overall schema for smaller family sizes.  
In the period between 1986 and 2006, a qualitative change in fertility occurred in Brazil, 
as women used to have more children than desired and then they have fewer. While DSF 
decreases with education until High School, women who have proceeded to higher levels of 
education (college or beyond) have the desire for more children. 
The relationship between fertility and Tempo is a complex one. At the same time it is 
possible to observe postponements, especially for groups for which the fertility was very low, one 
observes a stopping behavior at low parities that might be the responsible for the negative tempo 
effect. For the first group, schemas of small family sizes and schemas that contribute to the 
importance of education and career might be causing women to put family plans after personal 
goals. For the second group, women who have their first child at a very early age (such as during 
teenage years) might face conjunctures that make them assertive regarding their fertility behavior 
and stopping fertility early.    
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Among the six factors proposed by Bongaarts (2001), unwanted fertility is still the factor 
that most contributes to a surplus number of children. Unwanted fertility, which reflects a lack of 
access to materials and resources that allow a woman to control her reproductive behavior, 
continues to be lower for the highly educated and for women in the highest wealth groups. This 
suggests that education and wealth are the most important parameters for fertility across various 
social groups. Further increases in economic development and education levels could reduce 
unwanted fertility, and drop fertility rates even more. Unless, of course, women of higher 
education levels become able to have the children they consider to be ideal.  
Competing preferences also seem to be an important factor behind women not achieving 
their desired number of children, especially women of higher education. Literature suggests that 
these trends are associated with socio demographic changes in Brazil, such as modernization, 
urbanization, increase in schooling levels, increase in the proportion of uniparental households, 
increase in the participation of females in the labor force, among others, which could be another 
sign that fertility could go even lower. Thus, policymakers should look at the necessities of 
different groups to make sure reproductive goals are met. In this paper, competition was 
measured as a residual of the equation, but future work should explore this parameter further, 
looking for better ways to measure it. Future work should also consider more deeply the 
conjunctures, or the reasons why women revise their goals, considering whether it refers to the 
pursuit of life goals (competition) or to systematic social constrains (constrains), such as lack of 
affordable childcare or discrimination against mothers in the workplace. In the lights of the TCA, 
research should also add another parameter, one that allows women to revise her goals upwards, 
such as the effect of a new relationship after a divorce, the use of reproductive technology that 
increases chances of having twins, etc.   
47 
 
Demographers could also use the Bongaarts’ (2001) model to predict how changes in a 
certain population parameter could affect fertility, for example, level of education. If the mean 
level of education increase, how much less unwanted fertility can we expect? On top of that, how 
would the Competing Preferences decrease fertility even more? The existing TFR is not only a 
change in preference in ideal family sizes, but an inability of women to fulfill their reproductive 
expectations. Nevertheless, it is somehow a relief to know that women continue to wish to 
reproduce around replacement level and solving the issues of fertility in Brazil is just a matter of 
reproductive rights and opportunities.  
As a conclusion, this useful framework has been proven valuable for understanding 
variation in transition and post-transition fertility. As reported by Dharmalingan et al (2014), the 
Bongaarts Proximate Determinants of Fertility posits that fertility is driven by a series of 
components and those different components could be responsible for different fertility rates. The 
model seems to be working well given that the parameters together account for between 70 to 90% 
of the observed variation in TFR across time. The results are also consistent with fertility trends 
observed in the literature, helping to tell a story of overall fertility, but with some specific 
differences according to social-demographic groups related to different levels of the specific 
parameters being measured.   
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TABLES 
Table 1.1: Characteristics of the Brazilian DHS 1986 and 1996 and PNDS 2006 samples 
utilized in this chapter. 
  1986 1996 2006 
    n % cum % n % cum % n % cum % 
                      
Wealth 
Index 
0 906 15.38 15.38 1,356 10.8 10.8 1,159 7.44 7.44 
1 976 16.56 31.94 2,883 22.97 33.77 1,972 12.66 20.1 
2 2,242 38.05 69.99 3,587 28.58 62.35 3,894 25 45.1 
3 935 15.87 85.86 2,317 18.46 80.81 5,743 36.87 81.98 
4 833 14.14 100 2,409 19.19 100 2,807 18.02 100 
Total 5,892 100   12,552 100   15,575 100   
                      
Predict 
final 
level of 
educatio
n 
0 a 3 1,787 30.33 30.33 3,052 24.21 24.21 2,076 13.34 13.34 
4 1,963 33.32 63.65 4,473 35.48 59.68 4,237 27.23 40.57 
5 to 8 781 13.26 76.9 2,085 16.54 76.22 3,048 19.59 60.16 
9 to 11 872 14.8 91.7 2,129 16.89 93.11 4,263 27.4 87.56 
12 or 
more 489 8.3 100 869 6.89 100 1,935 12.44 100 
Total 5,892 100   12,608 100   15,559 100   
Urbanici
ty 
                    
Urban 4,514 76.61 76.61 10,254 81.3 81.3 11,062 71.02 71.02 
Rural 1,378 23.39 100 2,358 18.7 100 4,513 28.98 100 
Total 5,892 100   12,612 100   15,575 100   
                      
Macro 
Region 
North 709 12.03 12.03 1,340 10.62 10.62 2,594 16.65 16.65 
Northea
st 1,792 30.41 42.45 4,772 37.84 48.46 3,166 20.33 36.98 
Southea
st 2,545 43.19 85.64 3,523 27.93 76.4 3,343 21.46 58.45 
South 846 14.36 100 1,571 12.46 88.85 3,310 21.25 79.7 
Center-
West       1,406 11.15 100 3,162 20.3 100 
Total 5,892 100   12,612 100   15,575 100   
                      
Religion 
Catholic 4,768 80.92 80.92 9,808 77.77 77.77 10,201 65.58 65.58 
Protesta
nt 521 8.84 89.77 1,832 14.53 92.29 3,478 22.36 87.94 
Other 190 3.22 92.99 380 3.01 95.31 730 4.69 92.63 
None 413 7.01 100 592 4.69 100 1,146 7.37 100 
Total 5,892 100   12,612 100   15,555 100   
Years of 
educatio
n 
0 a 3 1,803 30.6 30.6 3,094 24.54 24.54 2,094 13.46 13.46 
4 2,063 35.01 65.61 4,605 36.52 61.06 4,443 28.56 42.01 
5 to 8 915 15.53 81.14 2,264 17.96 79.02 3,726 23.95 65.96 
9 to 11 740 12.56 93.7 1,899 15.06 94.08 3,722 23.92 89.88 
12 or 
more 371 6.3 100 746 5.92 100 1,574 10.12 100 
Total 5,892 100   12,608 100   15,559 100   
Race 
 
White       4,890 38.82 38.82 5,987 38.8 38.8 
Black       7,674 60.92 99.75 8,638 55.97 94.77 
Other       32 0.25 100 807 5.23 100 
Total       12,596 100   15,432 100   
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Table 1.2: Values for the parameters of the Bongaarts Proximate Determinants of Fertility calculated for Brazil with the DHS 1986 and 1996 
and PNDS 2006. 
 
  
 
0 1 2 3 4 0 to 3 4 5 to 8 9 to 11
12 or 
more
Urban Rural North N.East S.East South C.West Cat. Prot. None 0 to 3 4 5 to 8 9 to 11
12 or 
more
White Black
TFR
1986 3.21 6.39 4.04 2.59 2.19 2.05 5.26 2.81 2.33 1.94 1.64 2.72 4.77 3.18 4.77 2.60 2.63 3.19 2.95 4.22 5.30 2.75 2.23 1.90 1.64
1996 2.49 4.91 3.31 2.17 1.94 1.69 3.93 2.75 1.85 1.68 1.51 2.30 3.37 2.54 3.03 2.22 2.32 2.27 2.56 2.19 2.88 3.93 2.69 1.80 1.69 1.58 2.23 3.06
2006 1.87 2.84 2.23 2.12 1.73 1.02 3.18 2.52 1.99 1.20 1.01 1.83 2.03 2.34 1.85 1.78 1.71 2.17 1.84 2.00 1.94 3.11 2.35 1.73 1.74 1.54 1.61 2.06
DFS
1986 2.79 3.13 3.03 2.64 2.73 2.70 3.13 2.79 2.55 2.48 2.57 2.70 3.09 2.96 2.83 2.69 2.94 2.83 2.82 2.43 3.13 2.77 2.55 2.48 2.58
1996 2.34 2.59 2.37 2.24 2.32 2.33 2.62 2.31 2.19 2.21 2.20 2.27 2.61 2.36 2.30 2.27 2.40 2.66 2.34 2.41 1.99 2.62 2.30 2.19 2.22 2.23 2.33 2.33
2006 2.10 2.34 2.19 2.03 2.07 2.11 2.60 2.11 2.05 1.92 2.11 2.05 2.35 2.25 2.12 2.02 2.15 2.25 2.12 2.11 1.78 2.60 2.11 2.01 1.93 2.16 2.11 2.10
Unwanted fertility
1986 1.34 1.44 1.41 1.31 1.23 1.15 1.44 1.30 1.26 1.22 1.16 1.32 1.39 1.40 1.43 1.30 1.22 1.35 1.28 1.38 1.44 1.29 1.26 1.22 1.16
1996 1.23 1.30 1.27 1.22 1.17 1.15 1.33 1.21 1.22 1.14 1.15 1.23 1.24 1.16 1.26 1.26 1.17 1.15 1.22 1.26 1.28 1.33 1.21 1.20 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.27
2006 1.19 1.28 1.18 1.20 1.17 1.15 1.28 1.30 1.15 1.10 1.13 1.21 1.18 1.21 1.20 1.20 1.05 1.06 1.19 1.22 1.23 1.26 1.30 1.18 1.12 1.15 1.17 1.22
Child Replacement
1986 1.08 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.08 1.06 1.04 1.00 1.02 1.06 1.07 1.03 1.09 1.05 1.02 1.09 1.03 1.06 1.08 1.06 1.04 1.00 1.02
1996 1.04 1.06 1.05 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.05 1.03 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.04 1.06 1.02 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.03 1.05 1.03 1.10 1.05 1.03 1.03 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.06
2006 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.05 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.03
Sex Preferences
1986 1.05 1.33 1.25 1.12 1.06 1.06 1.08 1.13 1.22 1.03 1.09 1.06 1.10 1.07 1.24 1.07 1.14 . 1.05 1.11 1.29 1.08 1.14 1.28 1.04 1.08 . .
1996 1.03 1.12 1.04 1.02 1.07 1.05 1.08 1.06 1.06 1.07 1.16 1.03 1.16 1.05 1.18 1.21 1.38 1.38 1.24 1.33 1.17 1.19 1.28 1.28 1.18 1.43 1.30 1.18
2006 1.05 1.07 1.13 1.15 1.11 1.07 1.24 1.10 1.06 1.10 1.09 1.05 1.10 1.06 1.11 1.05 1.11 1.14 1.08 1.10 1.09 1.25 1.11 1.06 1.11 1.09 1.09 1.05
Tempo
1986 1.08 1.06 1.17 1.10 1.18 1.18 1.06 1.03 0.84 1.04 1.22 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.18 1.03 0.95 1.06 1.19 1.13 1.05 1.04 0.86 1.14 1.37
1996 1.00 0.97 0.99 1.03 0.97 1.01 0.95 1.01 0.96 1.12 1.27 0.99 1.01 0.95 1.01 1.02 1.15 0.97 0.99 1.02 1.05 0.95 1.01 0.99 1.11 1.35 1.10 1.02
2006 1.05 0.95 1.01 0.98 1.03 1.12 1.08 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.84 1.09 1.02 1.06 1.05 1.02 1.01 1.07 1.06 1.03 0.99 1.08 0.98 0.95 0.92 0.84 1.06 1.05
Involuntary Infertility
1986 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.88 0.83 0.95 0.96 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.88 0.83
1996 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.89 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.91 0.96 0.97
2006 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.82 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.94
Competing preferences
1986 0.74 0.97 0.62 0.62 0.55 0.54 0.97 0.65 0.72 0.68 0.49 0.67 0.91 0.66 0.78 0.68 0.69 0.72 0.61 0.88 1.00 0.64 0.65 0.60 0.44
1996 0.84 1.31 1.06 0.76 0.70 0.62 1.08 0.92 0.69 0.58 0.45 0.80 0.87 0.94 0.87 0.63 0.54 0.54 0.72 0.53 0.89 0.98 0.75 0.54 0.52 0.34 0.58 0.84
2006 0.70 0.99 0.81 0.81 0.67 0.37 0.72 0.86 0.88 0.61 0.49 0.68 0.68 0.78 0.64 0.73 0.70 0.77 0.66 0.71 0.99 0.72 0.81 0.77 0.83 0.73 0.59 0.75
Religion
TOTAL
RaceUrbanicity Region Years of Education achievedWealth Index Predicted final education level
4
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Figure 1.1: Parity progression ratios by parity. Brazil, 2006. Borrowed from Bonifacio, 
2011 p. 18.  
 
 
Figure 1.2: Difference between Total Fertility Rates and Desired Family Size in number of 
children, Brazil (1986, 1996 and 2006) 
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Figure 1.3: Parameter for Unwanted Fertility, Brazil (1986, 1996 and 2006). 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Parameter for Child Replacement, Brazil (1986, 1996 and 2006). 
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Figure 1.5: Parameter for Sex preferences, Brazil (1986, 1996 and 2006) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Parameter for Tempo, Brazil (1986, 1996 and 2006)  
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Figure 1.7: Parameter for Involuntary Infertility, Brazil (1986, 1996 and 2006) 
 
 
Figure 1.8: Parameter for Competing Preferences, Brazil (1986, 1996 and 2006) 
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Figure 1.9: Scatterplot of the Competing Preferences values with the population mean 
values for years of education, all years, all socio-demographic groups, Brazil (1986, 1996 
and 2006). 
 
 
Figure 1.10: Scatterplot of the Competing Preferences values with the population mean 
values for years of education, 1986, all socio-demographic groups, Brazil. 
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Figure 1.11: Scatterplot of the Competing Preferences values with the population mean 
values for years of education, 1996, all socio-demographic groups, Brazil. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.12: Scatterplot of the Competing Preferences values with the population mean 
values for years of education, 2006, Brazil.
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CHAPTER 2: SEX PREFERENCES IN BRAZIL 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On a global scale, when one thinks about sex preferences, the first thing that comes to mind 
is the odd sex ratios that some countries are facing in recent decades due to the wide spread practice 
of sex selection20. In some countries in South Asia, the number of “missing girls” is reported to be 
close to 10%.  
Around the world, preferences for having a child of a certain sex or children with a 
particular sex composition has always existed due to economic, religious, social and psychological 
reasons. But because fertility rates were high, achieving common desired compositions was likely. 
Further, in the absence of sex pre-selection, sex ratios at birth remain at normal levels (around 
1.05) even if couples have additional children to achieve a sex preference (Arnold, 1997; Gupta e 
Bhat, 1997, Park and Cho 1995). 
When total fertility rates (TFR) declined, mostly as a result of a smaller desired family size 
and higher contraception use, many women were unable to achieve their desired sex composition 
                                                          
20 While in the neonatal period the mortality of boys are usually higher everywhere in the world, in countries with son preference 
and sex selection, the girls’ mortality surpasses the boys’ mortality in the post-neonatal period and remain higher during and after 
the first year of life. This shows that it is not the biological causes, but social causes, that are affecting girls’ survival. The 
mistreatment happens at any time, such as during breastfeeding, food allocation (quality and quantity), proper clothing, parental 
surveillance, and access to health facilities and immunization (Guilmoto, 2012, pg 24). Discrimination also reflects in smaller 
school attendance rates for girls, who have to sacrifice their education for their brother’s. In the same lines, sonless mothers tend 
to use less contraceptives and have shorter birth intervals causing their daughters to have more siblings and bigger families, 
making resources even scarcer (Brockmann, 1999). 
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of children. In the most notorious example in the literature, Asian women feared being sonless and 
experienced strong pressures to reduce their number of daughters (Das Gupta et al 2002). Initially, 
this pressure increased post-natal practices such as female discrimination, neglect and infanticide 
so that mothers could concentrate efforts and resources on their male offspring (Park and Cho, 
1995; Bongaarts, 2013). Later, in some localities, technology became available to act before birth. 
Prenatal sex selection through selective abortion became widely used, evidenced by high sex ratios 
even for low birth orders (Park and Cho, 1995; Bongaarts PDR 2013).  
In Latin America, the subject has not been studied in depth because it is believed to be 
irrelevant. In Brazil, any form of disclosed child neglect or violence based on sex would be 
condemned. Abortion is legally restricted to a few situations, such as rape or risk of death for the 
mother, otherwise, it brings penal sanctions for women and health care providers.  
Although sex selection might not exist in Latin America, sex preferences, which are the 
underlying sociological explanation for sex selection, remains unnoticed in the literature. Sex 
preference, is however one of the factors responsible for keeping fertility rates closer to 
replacement level. This is because in the absence of prenatal or postnatal practices, women who 
are unsatisfied with the sex composition of their children may progress to future births. So, sex 
preferences may increase fertility as women and couples pursue a desired sex composition.  
In Brazil, the TFR was 1.8 in 2006 and according to estimates presented in Chapter 1, it 
could be 5% lower in the absence of sex preferences. These results indicate that although women 
are not selecting their first child based on sex, some might be continuing childbearing in order to 
achieve a desired sex composition, a strategy that has long been described in international 
literature.  
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To my knowledge, for more than 20 years, only three articles (with a demographic focus) 
touched on this topic in Brazil, and only the first focused on sex preferences (Arnold 1992; Souza, 
Rios Neto and Queiroz 2011; Carvalho 2014). Based on parity progression rates and in-depth 
interviews, these studies suggest that there is a national predilection for a mixed-sex composition 
in Brazil. As a matter of fact, the preference for the dyad boy-girl or girl-boy is so typical that 
Brazilian demographers might have ignored the importance of that for fertility believing that only 
a radical preference for a certain sex deserves to be taken into consideration. It is important to keep 
in mind that even the desire for a balanced composition may substantially increase fertility. In the 
context of low fertility this factor may prevent fertility rates from falling even more. Therefore, 
this is a phenomenon that deserves to be further explored, particularly if put in a sociological 
perspective by stratifying the analyses by social groups.  
Most cross sectional studies use parity progression rates to analyze sex preferences. While 
these studies can show the impact of sex preferences on fertility, the DHS and PNDS offer a unique 
opportunity to understand sex preferences because the surveys include questions about size and 
composition of women’s ideal family. It is important to characterize the women with different 
preferences to understand how social structure has been shaping sex preferences and fertility 
ideals. It is also important to understand which women are pursuing their compositional goals in 
spite of the low fertility targets.  
In this chapter, I will first describe some of the seminal studies regarding sex preferences 
and then I will formulate hypothesis for the Brazilian case. To avoid the ex post rationalization 
apparent in the data, I will focus on women who have never had children but who intend to do so. 
Comparative analysis will explore differences between social groups (wealth, education, race, 
region, urban/rural, religion, church attendance, marital status and work status).  
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This chapter presents evidence that a balanced sex preferences exists among most 
Brazilians; some evidence of a secondary daughter preference is also found. The evidence comes 
from responses to questions about ideal number of children and their composition available in the 
Brazilian Demographic Health Survey of 1996 and 2006. Evidence also shows that “gender 
indifference” has become more pronounced as fertility declines, but Brazilian women, in their 
majority, still look for balance. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Mechanisms and explanations for sex preferences 
A woman or a couple may have desires for a certain sex composition for their offspring. 
When desires are deliberately enacted, they become sex selection, which is a rational and adaptive 
behavior to avoid children of the unwanted sex. These desires are linked to schemas that provide 
women with economic, religious, social and psychological reasons to have a son or a daughter 
(Guilmoto, 2012; Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011). It happens because society ascribes different roles 
and expectations to people based on their sex, which is defined as “gender system”. When gender 
roles and costs and benefits of each gender are different, people might have different motivations 
to have one or another because sons and daughters are not substitutable (Pollard and Morgan 2002). 
Preference may happen before or after birth and has historically been linked to a preference for 
males given the predominance of patriarchal societies. 
For example, the driver of son preference is the male role in the family and the lower value 
of women in society (Guilmoto, 2012; Wood and Bean, Das Gupta et al 2002). In traditional 
societies, men are considered to be more suitable for agricultural work and can acquire better paid 
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labor force positions. Men are necessary to perform religious ceremonies in some ethnic and 
religious traditions, and provide continuity of the family name in patrilineal households (Das 
Gupta et al 2002, Park and Cho, 1995). Further, sons are a primitive form of social security 
responsible for supporting the parents in old age (Wood & Bean, 1977). As a result, women who 
are born, raised and marry into these societies are embedded in these common norms about social 
roles that will shape her preferences for offspring. 
In the context of India, Dyson and Moore (1983) explain how female and gender 
differences in treatments can lead to different mortality and sex ratios. In the case of India, 
indicators of sex discrimination are higher in the northern states compared to the southern states, 
which also have lower fertility, lower infant and child mortality, and later age at marriage. These 
differentials are credited to regional sociocultural variation, or schemas, regarding family and 
kinship structure. In the North, there is a dowry system, women behavior is closely monitored, 
females leave their homes to join husband’s family, and there are weak emotional ties between 
husbands and wives. In the South, where women have much more freedom and social status, they 
are allowed to inherit property, marry at later ages and have more freedom picking their husbands 
and occupations. Besides that, the costs of the wedding are also shared between brides and grooms, 
women can maintain contact with their kin, daughters can help their old parents, and religious 
rituals are shared2122. 
                                                          
21 The description of these two different realities elucidates the necessity of increasing female empowerment and autonomy to 
promote gender equality (for complete review, see Guilmoto, 2012). Although financial incentives are interesting because they 
can counterbalance the expected returns in investing in sons21, literature considers that from all attempts to increase gender 
equality, the most successful are the aiming at a change of attitudes. Examples of that are allowing women to complete education, 
to have a valuable income, to exercise political influence, and to have more freedom. 
22 The Family Law of 1989 in South Korea, for example, established that women could be allowed to inherit property, contribute 
to their parent’s household, and get custody of their kids (Chung and Das Gupta, 2007). Government has also encouraged women 
to work and remain employed after marriage. In India, urbanization also changed women status because it reduced the centrality 
of sons in their parents’ lives. Industrialization also reduced the importance of family because one can live independent of their 
families based solely on their skills and qualifications. Female education and employment gave women greater ability to function 
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In places where family sizes are more flexible, having at least one girl is useful for company 
and household work. In a very psychological piece of work, Teichman, Rabinovitz and Rabinovitz 
(1992) suggest that women prefer daughters because they could be the caregiver for their parents 
at old age, but also because they can work out their own identity conflicts. In some societies, 
however, a daughter is a potential bride with a large cost for parents. Besides having to pay the 
dowry, they are not supposed to contribute to their parent’s house or even see them after marriage; 
they are expected to leave the home of origin to open space for their daughter-in-law and are also 
deprived from inheritance and expected to work for the husband’s family (Das Gupta et al 2002).  
In more developed societies where children are no longer a source of economic security or 
care during old age, and where the state have taken over some of the son’s responsibilities, 
preference for males is less tangible and important. A report (Arnold, 1997) and an article 
(Bongaarts, 2013) bring statistics of the status of discrimination in different countries. Girl’s 
prestige seems to be better in Europe and in the Americas, where daughter preference is more 
common, although it is rare and related to a preference for mixed composition (Arnold, 1997, page 
3). Modernization “undermines religious commitment, weakens male privileges, and enhances the 
status of women, thus eliminating the factors usually invoked to explain the son preference of 
traditional societies” (Brockmann, 1999, p. 3).  
Other studies also find preference for women, which are recent and linked to women’s 
social role and status (Teichman; Rabinovitz and Rabinovitz, 1992). Hank and Kohler (2000) 
found girl’s preference in the United States, Vietnam and Israel, this last one more embedded in 
                                                          
and contribute to their parental household (Das Gupta et al 2002).  Even radio and television have their role in boosting female 
autonomy and independence (Jensen and Oster, 2008).  
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military combat. As described in the international literature, boys suffer more threats during their 
lives, especially in a society that is exposed to wars and hostilities. In those localities, having girls 
could be a way of preventing the loss of children (Jacobsen, Moller and Engholm, 1999).  
As can be seen, gender preferences are “embedded in cultural and religious traditions and 
community norms shaping individual attitudes and behavior” (Hank and Kohler, 2000, pg.4). In 
more recent times, however, it is also common to find the rationality surrounding sex preferences 
to be more socio-psychological, such as the expansion of the self, a sense of affiliation and a feeling 
of accomplishment.  
Besides the large body of research covering reasons for sex preference, there is also 
growing evidence that a preference for balance has been giving way to a ‘gender indifference” 
(Pollard and Morgan, 2002). The declining effect of the first two children’s sex composition on 
the third birth is consistent with a convergence in the roles and gender norms of children and 
parents. Daughters and sons are increasingly likely to be given the same educational and 
professional opportunities and also to have access to the same types of activities. Their parents 
also present more similar rates of college attendance and more similar expectations.  
Gender indifference would reflect a major shift in society toward not only gender neutral 
legal and administrative regulations, but also attitudes that have converged regarding gender 
neutral roles in work and family spheres (Bianchi, 2000 in Pollard and Morgan, 2002 p. 603). 
According to the authors, the more rigid a gender system is, the more important the achievement 
of specific gender compositions will be – thereby represented by having the third birth. In societies, 
such as France (Marleau and Maheu, 1998), the percentage that do not have a preference is high 
because of the local context of greater gender equity.  
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Empirical evidence and hypotheses 
 
When schemas inform what is more advantageous, but life doesn’t go as planned, the only 
way to achieve sex preference is by continuing childbearing23. Around the world, evidence from 
17 countries suggests that in most European countries a couple is more likely to have three children 
if the first two are of the same sex (Hank and Kohler, 2000). In general, parents who have two 
children of the same sex have 1.3 times more chance of continuing (Waller, 2010). In a study for 
the American population, Wood & Bean (1977) calculate parity progression rates and find that 
Mexican Americans have a higher probability of progressing to higher birth orders than the Anglo 
Americans, but they both prefer mixed families and the probability of progressing decreases if you 
already have a sex mix. At lower parities, however, both populations appear indifferent to the sex. 
According to Hank and Kohler (2003), the proportion of people who wants a specific sex 
composition increases as you have your first child, suggesting that people might be actually aiming 
at a balance. 
Brazil seems to be following this pattern, but there are not many published articles on the 
topic. Preferences for a mixed composition were visible when a study by Arnold (1992) was 
published with 1986 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data. He found that the percentage 
of currently married, non-pregnant women aged 15-49 in 1986 who wanted another child was 
larger for the women whose children were of the same sex. While 23% of women who had a boy-
girl wanted more children, 31% of the women who had either a girl-girl or boy-boy wanted more 
children. Data shows how in the case of having two sons, parents are more likely to have another 
                                                          
23 In the absence of sex selection abortion and infanticide. 
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child than when they have one of each sex (Arnold, 1997). No other work has extended Arnold’s 
study for the more recent Brazilian data. 
Souza, Rios-Neto and Queiroz (2011) found mixed-preference using national household 
survey data (PNAD, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios) from 1990 and 2000. While 
47% of mothers with a mixed gender of two children would have a third birth, for those with either 
two girls or two boys, the percentage having a third birth would go up to 51%. Although they have 
this finding with more recent data, the focus of their research was not on sex preference, so no 
further exploration and explanation were provided. Given that preferences are embedded in social 
context, my first hypothesis is that, in general, as in Europe and in the United States, Brazilian 
preference will be largely for mixed composition, but different social groups will present different 
sex preferences.  
Carvalho’s (2014) qualitative study of gender preferences examined the voices of married 
upper class couples as they revised their reproductive goals and considered having one extra 
children. She also described the opposite outcome - couples reporting a new composition as ideal 
as they got used to the joys and challenges of having their non-preferred composition. This work 
demonstrates how life’s conjunctures lead to malleable fertility desires, as the Theory of 
Conjunctural Action suggests (Johnson-Hanks et al., 2011). But, on average, she found that while 
females tend to prefer daughters, men tend to prefer sons, which is in accordance with the 
literature. Although there clearly is a lot of material to be explored, this variable was not fully 
explored in Carvalho’s work given the focus of her research. 
Apart from these three studies, gender preferences has not been on the main research 
agenda in Brazil. Since fertility rates were generally higher than desired family size in 1986, I 
assume the majority of women were achieving their compositional goals by simply having a lot of 
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children since (in 1986, TFR was of 3.2, DSF was 2.79). In 2006, TFR fell below desired family 
size (1.87 vs. 2.1), women may still have their desired composition but due to lower fertility 
intentions, they cannot or are afraid of enacting their preferences. So, I expect that with the decline 
in fertility rates, women will be more realistic about possibilities of accomplishing a certain desired 
sex composition. Thus, fewer women in 2006 (compared to 1996) will demonstrate any preference 
at all, or more women declaring to be indifferent to their offspring composition.  
A number of factors may interfere with goals for a certain number of children. An important 
one is marital status. Teichman, Rabinovitz and Rabinovitz (1992) find that women, in general, 
prefer daughters for company and complicity, but when men’s preferences are considered, sons 
are preferred. Further, Bongaarts (2013) observed that the desired sex ratio for single females is 
105, while for married women is 123, as they are partially influenced by their husbands. Pollard 
and Morgan (2002) suggest that couples desire at least one of each based on the fact that each sex 
will have a different “trait, strength, leisure activities and interests (p. 602). For both man and 
woman, there might be a desire to watch the child grow and interact with that child in those 
particular activities that are gender driven. Because men and women generally desire more their 
own sex, especially for a first child (Jacobsen, Moller and Engholm, 1999), it could be the 
disagreement between the couple that could lead to higher birth orders because they will continue 
childbearing in order to achieve a mixed composition and satisfy both (Marleau and Maheu, 1998).  
While Beckman (1984 in Stein, Willen and Pavetic, 2014) says that each partner negotiate 
on the basis of individual intentions, von Rosenstiel et al. (1986 in Stein, Willen and Pavetic, 2014) 
argues that partners have multiple influence upon one another. Power is more symmetrical as 
women gain more education and increase their labor force participation, which also reflect on more 
daughter preference among this sub-group. Although male partners have greater relevance in 
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deciding whether to continue childbearing, females have a veto power because they bear the 
physical costs of pregnancy, birth and child raising (Stein, Willen and Pavetic, 2014).  
Women who are single, separated, divorced or without any partnership will be more likely 
to prefer girls because they will lack the male factor in increasing a desire for a boy. Raising a boy 
could also be considered harder without a masculine figure around, or it may be psychologically 
complicated to have a young boy that resembles his father, a man with whom the mother does not 
have a strong relationship. Currently, in Brazil, the number of young boys put to adoption is 30% 
higher than the number of girls according to the National Registry for Adoption (CNJ, 2015). If 
one assumes that single mothers are more likely to put kids up for adoption, it is easier to 
understand sex preferences as a driving factor for this differential. Younger poor unmarried women 
might also prefer to have a daughter to keep them company.   
In order to test the hypothesis that females tend to prefer daughters and this preference 
might change only when a man comes into the scene, women who have not had sexual intercourse 
and those unmarried will show greater preference for daughters. Married couples, on the other 
hand, will prefer a mixed composition. 
 Place of residence may also be the source of different sex preferences because rural and 
urban areas present different social divisions of labor based on gender over time. While rural men 
were expected to perform more arduous tasks, associated with the agricultural sector, rural women 
were expected to raise children and complement the income with “lighter” tasks such as handcraft 
(Paulilo, 1987). Thus, although sons have higher productivity, daughters are necessary for the 
household, which might have made families opt for bigger families with mixed compositions. In 
urban areas, both children usually have the same social functions and are thus more substitutable. 
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Due to the masculinization of the agricultural work, as has been described by Abramovay 
and Camarano (1998), modernization and urbanization changed the possibilities presented to the 
children and they started to migrate to the cities. Especially for the daughters, who had lower 
remuneration compared to man for the same rural work (Paulilo, 1987). While in agricultural and 
manual labor physical strength was an asset, most current jobs do not require this feature, but 
others such as patience and dexterity, in which females are not disadvantaged when compared to 
males (Blau and Kahn, 2000). Thus, in more recent decades, urban areas witnessed an increase in 
the labor market participation of females, while for men it was at most stable (Juhn and Potter, 
2006; Wajman and Rios-Neto, 2000). This indicates that the labor market has been progressively 
turned into a female locus, with a relative increase in female´s participation as workers and heads 
of households. Moreover, with an increase in the service sector, women gained access to many 
better paid types of occupations (Juhn and Potter, 2006). I thus expect that in rural areas, the 
preferences for mixed sex will be greater when compared to urban areas. In urban areas where the 
service sector provides equal work opportunities for males and females, there will be less gender 
preference (more indifference). 
There are some regional historical specificities that might also matter. Until the 60’s, land 
distribution among children in the macro-region of the South was called Minorato. It was a 
patriarchal schema that consisted of the last son inheriting the parental property with the 
responsibility of taking care of the parents at old age (Mello et al, 2003). The remaining sons 
were expected to acquire agriculture skills and to live in other land bought by the family. This 
system was possible due to the great availability of land and geographic mobility, the social 
pressure for young people to move away and become agricultural workers, the existence of a 
“agricultural dowry” (land and equipment), the exclusion of daughters from this process. 
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With time, modernization changed the role of the last children to stay in the land, and 
other possibilities were presented to the children, such as emigration to cities, and for the 
daughters, who began to receive the agricultural dowry. Nevertheless, daughter are still excluded 
from inheriting parental land, and they don’t seem to participate in the decisions regarding the 
work (Mello et al, 2003).  I then hypothesize that due to the historical existence of the Minorato, 
the preference for boys will be greater in the macro-region South. 
Religious affiliation may also matter (Marleau and Maheu, 1998; Pollard and Morgan, 
2002). Patriarchal and conservative religious institutions such as Catholicism and Pentecostalism 
(Gallagher, 1996) provide couples with schemas of higher family sizes and lower contraceptive 
prevalence. They also provide them with structural functionalist views on family in which 
husbands and wives have a complementary role within the ideology of the separate spheres (while 
men are the breadwinners, women are expected to do the domestic labor, take care of the kids, take 
care of their social networks and of their husbands). Although women are subordinate to men, their 
roles are harmonizing and equally important. This could be associated with a desire to have a 
balance composition or even indifference, if one is to comply with God’s plans. Thus, I 
hypothesize that women affiliated with Catholicism and Pentecostalism will show relative greater 
preference for balance when compared to people without religious affiliation. 
The frequency of attendance to religious services should also be taken into account as many 
people only nominally identify their religious affiliation, in specific Catholics, as it is the 
historically dominant religion in Brazil. I hypothesize that the preference of those who more often 
attend religious service will be even more salient, as in general these individuals hold more 
conservative views over reproduction. 
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Other important factors that might influence sex preferences is race. In the case of Brazil, 
black males aged 15 to 24 present very high homicide rates directly caused by their involvement 
in drug trafficking, criminality, gang violence, police violence and racial profiling (Waiselfisz, 
2013). For instance, their annual mortality rate (145.8 per one hundred thousand) was higher than 
that of white women as a whole (2.3) and surpasses the mortality rate of many countries under 
warfare (Waiselfisz, 2013). There is a number of missing boys in the Brazilian society that cannot 
be ignored, especially among the poor and black. Part of the underlying cause of the problem is 
lower socio-economic levels and negative ideological and cultural representation of black and poor 
individuals.  
  On top of poor males being more victims of violence, women are faring better than men 
in regards to education completion and university graduation in general and among the 
disadvantaged stratus (Wajnman and Rios-Neto, 2000; Whinter and Golgher, 2010). That means 
that having a daughter, more than having a son, might be more advantageous in the near future, 
when they will be then more effectively able to help support the household, in particular, among 
the poor. Thus, I also hypothesize that Black women and women of low socio-economic status 
will have a preference for girls, when compared to other groups in the population. 
Moreover, preferences in general might be more salient for poor women, because from all 
the possibilities that a middle class women have in life, such as career, marriage, children, and 
personal goals, having kids is many times the only thing a poor woman can have control over 
(Berquó, Garcia, Lima, 2012). So, their attachment to their offspring’ compositional goals might 
be something they cannot give in. Waller (2010) also shows how there is a higher tendency for 
lower-class couples to continue childbearing after having two children of the same sex. 
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The last factor to be tested will be education. Hank and Kohler (2003) find that more 
educated women have access to other sources of income, so they do not need to rely on their sons 
or husbands for economic support, which could increase their bargain power. The same reasoning 
could be behind women who work and thus have their own money. However, more educated 
women might have fewer preferences whatsoever because education tends to increase egalitarian 
views over life so their daughters and sons will be highly educated and live in an environment of 
much more gender equity than their low educated counterparts (Lameirao, 2011), which is not 
automatically true for all women who work. Finally, achieving a balanced mix composition might 
disturb the high educated women’s economic productivity, making her wish fewer children instead 
of certain children and making them be more concerned about the number of children than the 
gender. As a result, I expect more educated people to have less gender preferences, but women 
who work to have more daughter preference. 
 
DATA, LIMITATIONS AND EX POST-RATIONALIZATION 
 
Data comes from the Brazilian DHS of 1996 and the PNDS of 2006. These databases are 
nationally representative, cross-sectional and focus on women in reproductive age (15-49) and 
their birth history. Sample sizes were of 12,612 women in 1996 and 15,575 in 2006. Sample 
procedure for the DHS and the PNDS followed specifications of the equal probability of 
selection method (EPSEM) and the probability proportion to size (PPS)24. Information about the 
                                                          
24 More information about sampling procedure for the DHS can be found at 
http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AISM5/DHS_III_Sampling_Manual.pdf. 
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desired sex composition is present only in these databases. Thus, I could not use the database 
from 1986 in this chapter, as I did in chapter 1.    
The DHS 1996 was coordinated by BEMFAM with the help of the Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), Macro International Inc., Agência Norte Americana para o 
Desenvolvimento, UN Population Fund and UNICEF. The PNDS 2006, Pesquisa Nacional de 
Demografia e Saúde (PNDS) (Ministério da Saúde, 2008), was coordinated by the Brazilian 
Center for Analysis and Planning (Cebrap) and the Brazilian Health Ministry and funded by 
UNESCO. Data were collected in the five Brazilian geographic regions and in urban and rural 
areas, as well as in urban slums25.  
The DHS and similar surveys such as the PNDS are ideal to perform analysis of sex 
preference because the reproductive intentions data allow study of ideal family size and 
composition, and are the only nationally representative database with these information. Giving 
that these Brazilian surveys are not longitudinal and that some subsample sizes are not large, some 
limitations need to be addressed before proceeding with the analysis.  
The first is that ex-post rationalization, which is captured on retrospective surveys, 
attenuates the effects of sex preferences because women review their preference after giving birth 
(Wood & Bean, 1977, p. 130). Research also indicates that when parents fail to achieve the desired 
sex balance by the time they reach the number of children intended, they tend to revise their family 
goals upward (Wood and Bean, 1977).26 I will avoid this limitation by focusing on a sub-sample 
                                                          
25 Original survey databases have already been published and are available at http://bvsms.saude.gov.br/bvs/pnds, and 
at http://dhsprogram.com/data/available-datasets.cfm.  
26 Dissertation Paper 3 provides an analysis of ex post rationalization. 
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of women without any children ever born. I will also only use information from those who wish at 
least one child.  
Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 suggest that women’s desired family composition is heavily 
influenced by post-rationalization. When compared to the desires of women who did not have any 
child born alive but who wishes a certain parity, women who already had that parity tended to say 
they prefer what they already have. The differences are all statistically different at the level of 5% 
and this is consistent with a narrative of rationalization. 
As can be seen in Table 2.1, 71.4% women who had one boy said they wanted one boy 
71.4% in 1996. Among women without children, the percentage who desire a single boy is only 
of 29.5%. In the case of girls, 73.4% of women who had a single girl said that was their desired 
composition. Among the women without children, this percentage is much lower, of only 41.4% 
in 1996. Results for 2006 show the same strong pattern that is strongly suggestive of rationalization 
– respondents claim to want what they have. A second process could also contribute: those who 
strongly desire a girl, but have a first boy, go on to have a second birth. This process moves the 
most dissatisfied respondents from Table 2.1. 
Even for people who say that they are indifferent to the sex of their baby, post 
rationalization seems to be occurring. Table 2.1 shows how among the women without children 
who only want one child, 29% in 1996 and 43.6% in 2006 said they were indifferent. When it 
comes to women who started childbearing, the percentage who said they were neutral about the 
sex of the baby declines to 12.7% (had a boy) and 14.7% (had a girl) in 1996 and 31.7 (when 
women had one boy) and 20.4 (when women had one girl) in 2006. This difference of 11 points in 
2006 also indicates that there might exist a latent daughter preference as women tend to post-adjust 
toward neutrality more often when they have one boy than when they have one girl. 
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When it comes to women who have two children and those who wish to have two but do 
not have any yet, the suggestion of rationalization continues. Tables 2.2 shows the desired 
composition for families of two, for women who have two children or women who wish to have 
two children. 
Note in Table 2.2 how 2.6% (1996) and 2.2% (2006) of the women who did not have any 
children said they preferred two girls. When it comes to the women who really had two girls, 
47.8% (1996) and 49.1% (2006) said they really wanted this preference. While only 2.2% (1996) 
and 1.5% (2006) of women who did not have any children but wished to have two children say 
that they wanted two boys, for those who really had two boys 52.4% (1996) and 37.8% (2006) 
wanted that composition. As for balance composition, a boy and a girl, 91.01% in 1996 and 83.3% 
in 2006 who had this composition said this was what they wanted. That is even higher than the 
amount of balance wished by women who did not have children but wished to have a boy and a 
girl (70.9% in 2006 and 79.8% in 1996). Again these data are highly suggestive of rationalization. 
Lastly, Table 2.3 shows the distribution of desired family sizes for a parity of three for 
women who wish three children. The same trends can be observed. If we were to take the desired 
composition of women without children as a reference of intention, preferences for three boys or 
three girls would barely exist (less than 2.3% in all cases and years). But in 2006, 40% and 44% 
of the ones who had two boys and two girls, respectively, said that was their desired fertility. 
In sum, it is very risky to rely on the information about the ideal composition of women 
who have already started childbearing because as the numbers suggest, ex-post-rationalization is 
very common. But the lack of women who admit having an unmet composition (these small 
number can be seen on the Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 in the proportion of women who admit not 
having the sex they desired), could also be a sign of a behavior called continuation. It is possible 
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that the women who have an unmet DFC are no longer in those tables because they have already 
moved forward with their childbearing process in order to achieve their desired sex.  
The hypothesis of continuation, unfortunately, cannot be tested with cross-sectional data. 
One would need longitudinal data in order to resolve this conundrum27. Another possible analysis 
would be to use retrospective data to see if those who wanted a certain sex and had the opposite 
were more likely to continue childbearing, but this analysis would still contain a great deal of post-
rationalization. Thus, throughout this Chapter, I will analyze intentions of women who have no 
children.   
 For those who already have stared childbearing, a better indication of sex preferences 
would be real behavior (less influenced by normative response bias), which can be explored using 
parity progression rates by composition of previous children. Nevertheless, prenatal ideal sex 
preferences might not be translated into practice once these women start childbearing and are 
confronted with real sex ratios and the challenges of pursuing their initially desired sex 
composition at the risk of increasing too much their family sizes.  
Since the DHS and the PNDS also contain data on birth history (sex and parity of children), 
I have also looked at whether the proportion of women who wishes an additional child dependent 
on the sex composition of existing children (Table A2.2 and A2.3 in the Appendix 2: Chapter 2). 
But desires to compose their households might not translate into behavior either. So, I have also 
analyzed real sex preferences by analyzing parity progression based on sex and number of existing 
children (Table A2.4 and Table A2.5 in Appendix 2: Chapter 2). I will discuss these further in the 
Appendix, where it will be possible to see how some of the preferences stated in this Chapter at 
                                                          
27 Preliminary analysis show that in 2006, at the one child level, having a boy, regardless of the preference does not interfere with 
the likelihood of wishing to continue childbearing. Having a girl, on the other hand, when one wished a boy, doubles the odds of 
wishing to continue, but the significance of the statistical test if low (p=0.096)  Future work will stratify this analysis by socio-
demographic groups and explore this association. In this paper, I won’t focus on intentions of women who started childbearing. 
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the intentions level are different from the trends found in Chapter 1. The use of these three methods 
enabled me to see the degree to which women are sticking to their sex preferences. 
A third limitation of this paper is the timing of covariates. For example, women’s marital 
status may vary throughout her reproductive life. Unfortunately, I cannot avoid this problem 
totally, but this should not be a concern for women who never had any children since her 
reproductive intention – her ideal family size and composition – is being captured at the same time 
as her marital status: the time of the interview.   
Other confounding aspects are caused by age and birth cohort effects: due to the declining 
desired family size and declining fertility rates throughout time, older women and women in 1996 
usually had more children than younger ones and women in 2006, so they would be more likely to 
naturally achieve their preference. Besides, a childless 45 year old women in 1996 is probably not 
childless for the same reasons as a 45 year old in 2006. Neither is a low educated women who is 
childless at age 40, childless for the same reasons as a 40 year old college educated28. That is, 
context matters and due to this fact, I perform the analyses separately by year, by desired parity 
and with controls by age.  
Other factors associated with preferences can be found in the literature and are not 
addressed here such as occupation, full time employment, number of parental siblings, birth cohort, 
age at first birth, as well as interaction effects. Moreover, as much as I would like to guarantee that 
ideals of children compositions are stable or that fertility intentions are real, I recognize they are a 
dynamic sequential decision making process that should be modelled as such to really capture the 
effect of conjunctures. Unfortunately, the DHS and the PNDS are not longitudinal and dos not 
allow one to study change over time in  actual living conditions, personal goals, and the interactions 
                                                          
28 Next chapter will shed light on factors that make a woman revise her fertility preferences. 
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that might happen before conception, or even during pregnancy and after birth, as suggested by 
Stein, Willen and Pavetic (2014). 
 
VARIABLES, METHODS AND RESULTS 
 
In order to investigate ideal sex preferences, a variable hereby called Desired Family 
Composition (DFC) was formulated using the women’s answer to two different questions. The 
first question asked women about her ideal family size: “if you could choose the exact number of 
children to have throughout your whole life, what number would it be?”(translations are mine). 
Women who answer “up to God” were excluded and since they are a small part of the sample, 
they will not significantly affect the results. I also dropped the women who did not want any 
child but might have reported an ideal composition by mistake of the interviewer. 
The second question asked women about ideal sex composition for their offspring: “How 
many of the desired number of children, asked in the previous question would you like to be 
male, how many would you like to be female and for how many you do you not care about the 
sex?”(translations are mine). The answers for both questions were grouped so as to form 
combinations of ideal number and sex of desired children. Over 30 combinations were found for 
the surveys, as Box 1 shows.  
For those who wanted one child, there are three options, hereby coded as one boy (“b”), 
one girl (“g”) or one and the sex does not matter (“x”). For those who wanted two children, there 
are six possibilities: bb (two boys), bg (a boy and a girl), gg (two girls), xx (two and the sex 
doesn’t matter), xb (one boy and other whose sex doesn’t matter), xg (one girl and one whose 
sex doesn’t matter). In 2006, higher parities were less cited than in 1996, and the variety of 
compositions were also smaller.  
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Box 1: Desired family compositions (DFC) that were found in the DHS 1996 and the PNDS 
2006, all women, Brazil.  
 
   Family size  
   1 2 3 4 Other 
S
ex
 c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 
 b bg bgg bggg bbggg 
 g bb bbg bbgg bbbgg 
 x gg bbb bbbg bgggg 
   xx ggg bbbb bbgggg 
   gx xxx gggg bbbbg 
   bx ggx xxxx bgxxxx 
     gxx bgxx bbbggg 
     bbx gxxx bbbbgg 
     bxx bgxx bbbbggg 
     bgx   bbbbgggg 
 Note: b - boy, g - girl, x - indifferent 
 
Three analytical strategies were employed to investigate sex preferences at the intention 
level, for women who have not had children but intend to do so. In the following section, I will 
specify the analysis, the methods and I will present the results for each of them separately. 
For every analyses, I selected explanatory variables that are used as a controls and also to 
address the proposed hypotheses. These are mostly women’s socio-demographic characteristics 
available at the surveys. The selected covariates utilized are as follows (reference categories are 
underlined): Marital status (Married or in Union=1, Separated or Divorced=2, Single and Never 
married=3); virginity status (no=0, yes=1); place of residence (0=urban, rural=1), macro-region 
(North=1, Northeast=2, Southeast=3, South,=4, Center-West=5), religious affiliation 
(Catholic=1, Protestant=2, Other=3, No-Religion=4), church attendance (no=1, yes=1), race 
(White=1, Black=2, Brown=3), wealth index (5 levels 0 to 4, being 4 the highest)29, achieved 
education (5 levels, ranging 0 to 4, being 4 the highest),labor market participation (no=0, yes=1). 
Because the influence of this variables might change from year to year, I ran each regression 
                                                          
29 Refer to the Appendix 1: Chapter 1 for explanations on the construction of the Wealth Index. 
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separately by survey year. Some covariates, like wealth index and education, were treated as 
continuous in the regressions.  
 
Descriptive analysis 
 
Descriptive analyzes of DFC show the relative distribution of the most preferred 
compositions according to selected covariates by year. A complete distribution can be found in 
Appendix 2: Chapter 2 where it can be seen that that the most preferred sex composition in 
Brazil is the dyad boy-girl for almost every social category (47.39 in 1996 and 40.89% in 2006). 
But the percentage of women who report this preference has declined in almost every social 
group. The second most preferred composition continue to be of 2 children indifferent to sex, 
which grew from 9.1 to 14.3% in ten years and is the second most prevalent in most social 
categories. One can also see that the third, fourth and fifth most preferred compositions in 2006 
are to have one indifferent to sex, one daughter, or not have children at all: preferences for zero 
children slightly increased from 6 to 7.3%. In Appendix 2: Chapter 2, one can also see that it is 
also much more common to find compositions of four children in 1996, as well as more diversity 
in compositions. 
In Table 2.4, the two most preferred compositions of each socio-demographic group, are 
analyzed separately: balance and indifference. With a few exceptions, the proportion of women 
who mention balance - bg (one boy, one girl) as preferred composition has declined between 
1996 to 2006, while the proportion of women who are indifferent to their composition - xx 
(indifference) has been increasing.  
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I then performed 
2  tests to check whether these differences in proportions are significantly 
different from one year to another. The p values can be found in the last column of Table 2.4. For 
example, Catholics in 1996 prefer to have a balance 48% of the times in 1996, but that changes 
to 40% in 2006. They are also indifferent for 9% of the population in 1996 changing to 15% in 
2006, and those differences are statistically significant with a p<0.000. On the other hand, for 
people without religious affiliation, those percentages are not statistically different: while 43% 
want to have a balance in 1996 and 9% are indifferent, 39% wants to have a balance in 1996 and 
6% are indifferent in 2006 – which are not statistically different (p<0.561). 
 
Desired Sex Ratios 
 
Secondly, sex ratios of the Desired Family Composition were calculated for each socio-
demographic group for each separate year and also for each separate groups: women without 
children and women with children. For each social group, the total number of desired sons were 
divided by the total numbers of desired daughters using the “collapse” command on Stata. 
Women who reported “indifferent” were not counted, unless they provided a number for a 
certain sex, for example, by saying that she desires three children, being 1 female and 2 
indifferent. In this case, she would contribute with 1 female for the whole, and nothing else. The 
sex ratios reported can be seen in Table 2.530.  
The assumption for Table 2.5 is that in the absence of preferences, most values had to be 
equal to 1 (same number of sons and daughters) or 1.05 (naturally occurring sex ratios). The 
                                                          
30 Although sex ratios are usually reported by 100 females, the numbers on Table 5 are still ratios. This is the number of sons for 
each one female. 
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second assumption is that in the absences of preferences, values would have to be the same 
across socio-demographic groups and across time.  
Two things can be noticed with Table 2.5.  
First, analyzing the two groups of women portrayed in the Table (women without children 
and women with children), the ratios show how in Brazil, in general, a slightly but pervasive, 
daughter preference is consistently more prevalent than son preference. Notice how most ratios 
are below 0, sometimes reaching values as low as 0.89. I performed 
2 tests of the same groups 
over time (for example, comparing the ratio for Black women without children in 1996 with the 
ratio of Black women without children in 2006) and the tests did not point that the proportions 
are different from one year to another. For example, the ratio for women without children who 
go to work in 1996 is 0.99 and that is not statistically different from the ratio of women without 
children who go to work in 2006: 0.95. Likewise, the ratio for women with children who go to 
work in 1996 is 0.98 and that is not statistically different from the ratio of women with children 
who go to work in 2006: 0.99. So, whatever has happened to the DFC in the 10 years period, it 
has not affected the desired sex ratios which have not changed significantly from one year to 
another for any of the variables (p values not shown). 
Second, notice how some exception also exist across the two groups of women without 
any apparent tendency: Region South, Protestants and High School graduates present a slighter 
son preference in several moments that can also be interpreted as a search for balance when 
compared to their counterparts (other regions, other religious groups and other levels of 
education). In order to tests the significance of these ratios within groups, I performed 
2 tests 
of the in-group differences, which can be seen in the column named “p value of in-group 
differences” on Table 2.5.  
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The results show that none of the ratios are statistically different within group (for 
example, by education level) when looking at the women without children in both years. But 
when it comes to women who have started childbearing, important in-group differences are 
found in the year 2006: look in Table 2.5 how rural areas compared to urban have more son 
preference (desired sex ratio for rural area in 2006 is 1.03 compared to 0.96 of urban). 
Differences are also found for Education Level, where a clear difference between High school 
graduates (whose desired sex ratio is 1.07) compared to college educated (ratio is of 0.83) 
emerges. Apparently, education increases son preference, but at the college level, the sign 
reverses: daughters are preferred.   
 
Multinomial Logit Regressions 
 
Thirdly, in order to investigate the specific hypothesis of this Chapter, further analysis was 
performed. Using multinomial logistic regression models and logit regressions, I investigated what 
would explain the different preferences by social groups controlling for important covariates and 
by parity. In order to do that, I built, for all women without children and for each desired family 
size, a variable that represents the combinations of ideal composition. These categories, when 
grouped, became the dependent variables in the models.   
The multinomial variables created using sex preferences are:  
 Balance - preference for balance 
 Indifferent - no gender preference 
 Daughter preference - preference for girls 
 Son preference - preference for boys 
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The sample distributions into these four categories can be seen in Tables 2.6 for 1996 and 
2.7 for 2006. Notice how I classify the sample into different desired family sizes, because I have 
reasons to believe that a women who wishes to have only one child is different from one who 
wishes three children even if their sex preference is the same, and that difference is not 
necessarily correlated with her sex preferences. Also, because the objective for this analysis is to 
study sex preference and not ideal family size.  
In Tables 2.6 and 2.7, women who want only one child as desired family size do not 
possess the category “balance” for her desired composition, so the dependent variable at the 
multinomial logit only has three options: indifferent, boy or girl. The categories x, g, b have 4%, 
5.7%, and 4.1% of the sample in 1996 and 7.7%, 6.2%, and 3.7% in 2006, respectively. 
Also, notice in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 how bgg and bbg were considered a preference for 
balance, instead of a preference for male and female as some could argue. For family size of 3 
children, also notice how the categories for pure daughter and son preference (ggg, gxx, bbb, bxx) 
have very small sample sizes (24 cases in 1996 and 19 in 2006). So, instead of running a 
Multinomial Logit, for parity three, I will ignore daughter and son preference and run a Logit 
Regression of Balance compared to Indifference31.  
 Also notice in both Tables 2.6 and 2.7 how “other sizes” represent a multitude of profiles, 
making it difficult to discern whether there is a preference for mixed or a more indifferent 
person. Thus, no analysis was conducted separately for women who wish more than 3 children. 
It is also important to notice that although pure daughter or son preference (gg, ggg, bb, bbb) is 
only a small part of the sample, compositions that contains more girls than boys, but are still mixed, 
                                                          
31 I have run the analysis using multiple options of categories and references and the results do not alter significantly. So, for this 
chapter, the most parsimonious model was chosen.  
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such as ggb, are a big part of the sample. So, they could be helping keep the sex ratios low on 
Table 2.5 (because it is contributing with more girls at the denominator of the sex ratio) at the same 
time that it increases the preference for balance at the multinomial logits because this is where they 
were classified in Tables 2.6 and 2.7.  
On Tables 2.8 through 2.11, I use multivariate analysis to observe how ideal sex 
preferences behave in the presence of multiple selected covariates. Multivariate models also allow 
to capture variance that cannot be captured with univariate regression (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 
2000). In order to control the fact that older women were under a high fertility schedule most of 
their reproductive lives, and due to the fact that poor and low educated women without children 
might be a selected group, age was kept as a control. It has been suggested that the 
representativeness of the sample would be affected once I selected only women without children, 
thus I should try to limit my sample to women age 15-25, who are very close to the beginning of 
her reproductive life. A problem with that approach is that by selecting young women I am losing 
important variability in education levels and marital status that only happens later in life. Apart 
from that, I am losing the power of comparing my results of this Chapter with my results from 
Chapter 1, where all women were used. I am also not solving the problem of bias because among 
the poor, age at the time of the first child’s birth is much lower than 25. Thus, I opted to include 
all ages, as long as no child was ever born, and keep the appropriate control for age.32  
The models can be seen in Table 2.8 (all desired family sizes), Table 2.9 (women who want 
to have one child), Table 2.10 (women who want two children) and Table 2.11 (women who want 
three children). The results are described in relative risks (RRR), which are a comparison between 
                                                          
32 I did, however, perform the regressions just for young women. The results are basically the same given the fact that 75% of the 
women without children are below 25 years old. While the mean age of the sample is 30.8 in 2006 and 29.7 in 1996, for the 
women without children, this number falls to 22.8 in 2006 and 21.9 in 1996.  
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the response category and its reference category. Stata releases the risks, but it is calculated by 
dividing the cumulative incidence in exposed group by the cumulative incidence in the unexposed 
group. The reference category is Indifference, unless otherwise specified at the additional columns 
to the right.  
Below, I will analyze the findings in light of my hypothesis. I will first discuss Table 2.8, 
which is the Multinomial Logit of all desired family sizes, and then I will discuss the results for 
the subsequently subsamples in Table 2.9 (one child), Table 2.10 (two children), and Table 2.11 
(three children, logit regression). 
 
Marital Status 
 
Analysis of Table 2.8 show how, in general, married women seem to have higher risks of 
being indifferent because, consistently, other marital status such as singles and divorced show 
increased risks of preferring balance or any gender over indifference. Take, for example, single 
women in 1996. They have higher risks (3.18 and 2.7 times more risks) than married women of 
preferring daughters and sons compared to indifference, respectively. They also have a 68% higher 
risk of preferring balance over indifference compared to marriage. The same thing happens for 
divorced/separated women, who had in 1996 more than twice the rate of married women of 
preferring balance over indifference, and 3.72 and 4.85 times the risks of preferring daughters and 
sons. In 2006, singles continued to prefer more balance over indifference compared to married and 
the gender preference continue to be salient for divorced/separated. 
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For women who only want one child, as can be seen on Table 2.9, marital status becomes 
less important. Singles have higher risks (2.15 times the risks of married) of preferring a girl over 
indifference when compared to married. 
In Table 2.10, for women who wish two children, the coefficients for marital status mimic 
those of Table 8 going in the same direction. For women who want even bigger family’s sizes, 
however, the relationship reverses as can be seen in Table 2.11 for women who want 3 children: 
now, singles and divorced/separated have fewer odds of wishing a balance compared to married 
women. When I consider a bgg a girl preference and bbg a boy preference instead of balance, the 
single’s preference for daughters becomes evident (not shown). 
 
Age 
 
Women’s age consistently contributes to an increase in indifference. That means younger 
women, in general, have more preferences. Notice in Table 2.8 that with each additional year of 
age, the relative rate for balance compared to indifference would be expected to decrease by a 
factor of 0.91 in 2006 and 0.97 in 1996 given the other variables in the model are held constant. 
More generally, if a women increases her age, they are expected to fall into Indifference instead 
of Balance. 
Same tendency is found for women who wants only child (Table 2.9), two children (Table 
2.10), but not for three children (Table 2.11).  
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Virginity 
 
Analyzing all family sizes in Table 2.8, virginity used to be associated with more 
indifference in 1996 (the relative risks for virgins relative to non-virgins would be expected to 
decrease by a factor of 0.48 and 0.60 of preferring daughters or sons over indifference). For women 
who only want one child, the same trend is observed on Table 2.9. But in 2006, virgins start to 
demonstrate more daughter preference. In the same table, the coefficient shifts to 1.6 the risks of 
non-virgins of being in the daughter preference category when compared to son’s preference. And 
in Table 2.8, the coefficient changes to 1.53 in 2006.  
 
Place of residence 
 
In 1996, coefficients for place of residence are non-significant, which means both rural and 
urban areas behave the same way in relation to sex preferences when controlled by other 
covariates.  
In 2006, however, in both Table 2.8 and Table 2.9, inhabitants of rural areas have lower 
risks of having a gender preference whatsoever when compared to indifference and urban areas. 
Take, for example, Table 2.8: for rural relative to urban, the relative risks for daughter and son 
preference would be expected to decrease by half (0.57 for daughter and 0.50 for sons) compared 
to the risks of urban areas given the other variables in the model are held constant.  
When analyzed together with the Desired Sex Ratios of the Table 2.5, this means that the 
sex ratio above 1 that is reported for rural women is probably associated with being indifferent, 
not with a balance.  
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Geographic Region 
 
One of the greatest surprises of this Chapter is the great importance of geographic region 
for the findings. Although only the South region was contemplated in the hypothesis, regions North 
and Northeast consistently appear as having a gender preference when compared to the Southeast, 
a fact that deserves further exploration in future papers.  
In Table 2.8, North and Northeast tend to have more preference for balance than having a 
preference for indifference when compared to the Southeast Region. The chance of the North and 
Northeast being in the Balance category is 60% and 70% higher than the chances of the Southeast 
being in that category in 2006. In 1996, the coefficients are even stronger: the risks of the North 
reach 3.65 times the risks of the Southeast and the Northeast has 1.68 times more risk. Both regions 
also have higher risks of preference for girls over indifference, especially in 1996. In that year, 
changing the reference category to sons (as can be seen in the last column of Table 2.8), also 
reinforced the Northeast strong preference for daughters: they have 47% higher risks of preferring 
daughters over sons than the Southeast. The region Center-West also shifts from a behavior of 
being more indifferent (lower chances of having a gender preference whatsoever in 1996) to having 
a preference for Balance in 2006.  
 For women who wants to have one child on Table 2.9, the coefficients follow the same 
trend as the Table 2.8, but the Center West, in 1996, appear to have more daughter preference 
relative to son preference (4.28) compared to the Southeast. This preference loses strength in 2006. 
In 1996, northeast have 71% more risks than the Southeast of choosing girls compared to boys.  
For women who want to have two children, as can be seen in Table 2.10, the only novelty 
is the South’s and Center-West’s strong son’s preference. Notice how women in those two states 
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have only 28% and 19%, respectively, the risks of women in the Southeast of preferring daughters 
over sons in 1996. Those coefficients are not consistent over time, but seem more associated with 
the patterns in Table 2.8, than for other desired family sizes. 
These regional preferences can be related to the patterns found in the sex ratio table (Table 
2.5) for 2006. For all women, the South have much higher sex ratio (more balance or male 
preference) than the Southeast. The Northeast have much lower sex ratio (more daughter 
preference) than the Center-West.  
 
Religion and frequency of religious service 
 
Religion is much less influential in sex preferences than I previously thought. Because no 
clear statistically significant tendency is observed, the coefficients won’t be commented on in 
detail.  
When it comes to church attendance, however, there is more indication that attendance 
increases indifference (Table 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10). For family sizes of one child, however, as can be 
seen on Table 2.9, when compared to people who don’t go to church, church goers have 65% more 
risk than non-church goers of preferring one girl over one boy in 1996. 
 
Race  
 
When looking at all desired family sizes (Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11) Blacks compared 
to Whites, in 2006, demonstrate a strong preference for balance or for each of the sexes 
individually when compared to indifference. That means whites are more indifferent, in general. 
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Take Table 2.8, for example. Blacks not only have 30% higher risks than White in being 
in the Balance category (other than indifference), but they also have 71% and 82% higher risks 
than whites of being in the category Daughter or Sons.  
It seems that for the cases of Black women, gender preferences are extremely salient for 
their reproductive goals, especially toward balance.  
 
Income, Education and Work 
 
Wealth level, education achievement and work did not seem to matter as much as I 
previously thought. But in the rare occasions when it was significant, it was in the direction of 
increasing indifference, which was expected.  
In Table 2.8, for each additional year of education, the relative risk for daughter or son 
preference compared to indifference, respectively, would be expected to decrease by a factor of 
0.82 and 0.88 in 2006 and 0.84 and 0.87 in 1996. Wealth level behaves the same way, but with 
much less significance. Only for women who want three children, wealth slightly increases odds 
of preferring balance over indifference (as can be seen on Table 2.11).  
Also as expected, in 2006, women who work have more daughter preference when 
considered all family sizes in Table 2.8 (36% higher risks of preferring daughter over sons 
compared to women who don’t work). 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the empirical results above. The first is that the 
dominant Brazilian preferences are for a balanced composition, which is in accordance with the 
findings from Souza, Rios-Neto and Queiroz (2011).  
The second conclusion is that fewer women in 2006 than in 1996 demonstrates a clear 
gender preference or even a balance preference, with increasing preference toward indifference, 
in accordance with the findings from Pollard and Morgan (2002). This finding suggests that in 
Brazil, women has been increasingly more likely to base their fertility preferences on size other 
than quality of their offspring, possibly driven by the decline of fertility. Brazilian women are 
aware that sticking to a favorite composition might mean they will end up with more children than 
they planned.  
The decline in the search for balance might also mean that in Brazilian society, gender 
divisions might be getting less rigid and daughters and sons have the same value and fulfill their 
mothers’ expectations the same way. As Pollard and Morgan (2002) state, when benefits of each 
gender are different, people might have different motivations to have one or another because sons 
and daughters are not substitutable.  
 Another sign that women are more likely to value size over quality is the fact that a large 
number (and bigger in 2006 compared to 1996) makes changes to their reported desired family 
composition based on the children they already have. The findings that Brazilian women’s reports 
of intentions might be contaminated by their current parity and composition is one of the most 
important of this paper and raises awareness for the necessity of considering post-rationalization 
in every work on fertility intentions. This finding is in accordance with what Carvalho (2014) 
found, that Brazilian couples might change their minds about what is ideal after they start 
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childbearing. In her qualitative study, she could not see the dimension of this factor, but with my 
analysis, one can have an idea of the amount of post-rationalization.  Likewise, the same analysis 
also alerts us to the fact that women who are unhappy with the composition of their offspring might 
not even be considered in the analysis above: it is possible that those have moved toward their 
fertility goals by continuing childbearing in order to achieve them. 
I also need to mention that future work should shed light on other factors that might play a 
role in intentions that were not analyzed in this paper due to data availability, such as partner’s 
preference, siblings relationship, low self-esteem, parenting style, etc. Future work should also 
investigate whether not having a desired composition influences decisions regarding contraceptive 
use, sterilization, and remarriage in case of divorce.  
As for the specific hypothesis testing the influence of schemas on fertility intentions and 
compositions, several hypothesis were confirmed, but also rejected:  
Being single being separated or divorced are consistently associated with a daughter 
preference or with balance. Married, on the other hand, contrarily to what I expected, seem to be 
more indifferent regarding the sex than looking for a balance. The virginity hypothesis is also 
partially held. Virgins seem to be more indifferent in 1996, but changes to a daughter preference 
in the recent years.  
The hypothesis related to the geographic region is confirmed. The South has consistently 
more son preference than the Southeast while the North and especially the Northeast, have 
daughter preference. Future work should investigate the reasons for this consistent daughter 
preference in the North and Northeast regions. Reasons could be related to higher levels of female 
migration to urban areas in the decades prior to both survey years possibly caused by the expansion 
of the demand for domestic labor. This mass migration altered the sex ratio in both urban and rural 
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areas and was responsible for a process named “masculinization of the rural area” in Brazil 
(Camarano, 1997). So, a preference for daughters could be associated with a women’s 
empowerment in this new environment or her attempt to respond to the societal forces that drove 
them away from the rural areas. It could also be related to the fact that in those areas where the 
major proportion of work available consists of strenuous manual work, young women have better 
educational outcomes than their male counterparts. Although the interaction between geographic 
region, place of residency and education level has not been explored here, this certainly deserves 
future study.  
Nevertheless, women who live in rural areas are more indifferent when compared to urban, 
who prefer balance, which is not consistent with the hypothesis. However, when looking at the 
desired sex ratios, urban areas have lower ratios (more daughter preference) while rural areas have 
a sex ratio of around 1. The difference seem small but is statistically significant. It is also possible 
that this social group (rural) do not see a difference between a balance and an indifference. 
Contrarily to what I expected, Blacks do not have very high rejection of males. But the 
opposite: this social group tend to have very strong preferences for both genders – or balance. That 
means that although the literature gives reasons to believe black boys are rejected by society, they 
are not being rejected inside of their own household. Future work should try to explore how gender 
roles in Brazil might vary by race how rigid this gender system is since according to Pollard and 
Morgan (2002), the more rigid a gender system, the more important the achievement of specific 
gender compositions. 
  I did not find that the patriarchal religious affiliations are an important predictor of child 
preference, but future studies should look into religious traditions that were not considered in this 
paper, such as the ones with African heritage that respect matriarchal authority.   
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Last but not least, as predicted, education level and wealth increases indifference while 
work increases daughter preference. It seems that for the lower class and lower educated, 
preferences are in fact more salient.  
In conclusion, this chapter presents evidence that a balanced sex preferences exists among 
most Brazilians; evidences of secondary daughter preference are also found and deserve further 
consideration in future studies. Evidence also shows that “gender indifference” has become more 
pronounced as fertility declines, but Brazilian women, in their majority, still look for balance and 
that search is responsible for the effects of gender preferences on fertility.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 2.1: Actual composition by ideal composition for women who only want one child, 
Brazil, 2006 and 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideal composition Boy Girl No children Boy Girl No children
Boy 152 26 171 247 27 176
71.36 11.93 29.53 59.81 6.8 21.15
Girl 34 160 240 35 289 290
15.96 73.39 41.45 8.47 72.8 34.86
One neutral 27 32 168 131 81 363
12.68 14.68 29.01 31.72 20.4 43.63
Total 213 218 579 413 397 829
100 100 100 100 100 100
Note 2: Percentages shown below sample size.
20061996
Note 1: For 2006, Pearson chi2(2) = 387.3934   (p<0.000) for women with children. Ignoring neutral, Pearson chi2(1) = 375.0451 (P 
= 0.000). Adding boys to girls and comparing with neutral, results in Pearson chi2(1) =  13.4147 (p = 0.000). For 1996,  Pearson 
chi2(2) = 171.4149  (p<0.000) for women with children. Ignoring neutral,  Pearson chi2(1) = 171.0261   (P= 0.000). Putting them 
together to compare with neutral, comes out non significant  Pearson chi2(1) =   0.3658   (P= 0.545). Comparing no children 
between years, Pearson p<0.000.
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Table 2.2: Actual composition by ideal composition for women who want two children, 
Brazil, 2006 and 1996. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideal composition Two boys Boy & Girl Two girls no children Two boys Boy & Girl Two girls no children
Boy & Girl 161 597 94 2,001 201 995 129 1,927
52.44 91.01 34.31 79.82 37.78 83.33 27.8 70.87
Two boys 102 5 3 56 213 6 3 42
33.22 0.76 1.09 2.23 40.04 0.5 0.65 1.54
Two girls 3 6 131 64 3 9 228 61
0.98 0.91 47.81 2.55 0.56 0.75 49.14 2.24
Two neutral 41 48 46 385 115 184 104 672
13.36 7.32 16.79 15.36 21.62 15.41 22.41 24.71
Total 307 656 274 2,506 532 1,194 464 2,702
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note 2: Percentages shown below sample size.
1996 2006
Note 1: In 2006, Pearson chi2(6) =  1600 (p<0.000) for women with children. In 1996, Pearson chi2(6) = 810.3734  (p<0.000) for women with children, (p<0.000). 
Comparing no children between years, Pearson p<0.000.
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Table 2.3: Actual composition by ideal composition for women who want three children, 
Brazil, 2006 and 1996. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideal composition three boys
Two boys, 
one girl
One boy, 
two girls
Three girls no children three boys
Two boys, 
one girl
One boy, 
two girls
Three girls no children
One boy, two girls 4 31 192 31 223 7 20 234 31 174
3.81 10.44 72.18 37.35 37.99 5.38 5.05 66.48 28.44 31.18
Two boys, one girl 39 211 14 1 187 41 251 14 4 125
37.14 71.04 5.26 1.2 31.86 31.54 63.38 3.98 3.67 22.4
three boys 47 3 5 0 13 52 6 1 0 0
44.76 1.01 1.88 0 2.21 40 1.52 0.28 0 0
Three girls 3 4 4 37 9 2 5 1 48 8
2.86 1.35 1.5 44.58 1.53 1.54 1.26 0.28 44.04 1.43
Three neutral 12 48 51 14 146 28 114 102 26 229
11.43 16.16 19.17 16.87 24.87 21.54 28.79 28.98 23.85 41.04
Total 105 297 266 83 578 130 396 352 109 411
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note 2: Percentages shown below sample size.
Note 1: In 2006, Pearson chi2(12) =  1100 (p<0.000) for women with children. In 1996, Pearson chi2(12) = 841.8934 (P<0.000). Women without children who wanted to have 3 children also said 
that they wanted one girl, two neutral (0.17%), one boy, two neutral (0.17%) and one boy, one girl, one neutral (1.19%). Comparing no children between years, Pearson p<0.000.
20061996
Actual composition
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Table 2.4: Decline is the proportion of women who report bg (balance) as ideal composition 
and increase in the proportion who report xx (indifference) as ideal, all women without 
children, Brazil, 1996 and 2006 (CONTINUE) 
 
1996 2006 1996 2006
Total  bg 2,001 1,927 47 41 0.000
 xx 385 672 9 14
Others 1,836 2,114 43 45
Total 4,222 4,713 100 100
White  bg 773 734 47 39 0.000
 xx 175 336 11 18
Others 696 802 42 43
Total 1,644 1,872 100 100
Black  bg 1,220 1,037 48 42 0.000
 xx 210 284 8 11
Others 1,134 1,169 44 47
Total 2,564 2,490 100 100
Wealth (0)  bg 154 91 45 37 0.000
 xx 18 32 5 13
Others 168 120 49 49
Total 340 243 100 100
Wealth (1)  bg 441 230 51 45 0.001
 xx 52 54 6 11
Others 378 229 43 45
Total 871 513 100 100
Wealth (2)  bg 580 448 46 41 0.000
 xx 115 174 9 16
Others 558 464 45 43
Total 1,253 1,086 100 100
Wealth (3)  bg 386 679 46 41 0.048
 xx 100 230 12 14
Others 347 767 42 46
Total 833 1,676 100 100
Wealth (4)  bg 428 479 47 40 0.000
 xx 98 182 11 15
Others 376 534 42 45
Total 902 1,195 100 100
Urban  bg 1,707 1,453 48 40 0.000
 xx 333 484 9 13
Others 1,509 1,670 43 46
Total 3,549 3,607 100 100
Rural  bg 294 474 44 43 0.000
 xx 52 188 8 17
Others 327 444 49 40
Total 673 1,106 100 100
Catholic  bg 1,560 1,454 48 40 0.000
 xx 306 535 9 15
Others 1,405 1,627 43 45
Total 3,271 3,616 100 100
Protestant  bg 293 375 49 44 0.002
 xx 44 103 7 12
Others 255 365 43 43
Total 592 843 100 100
Non-religious  bg 98 43 43 39 0.561
 xx 21 7 9 6
Others 111 59 48 54
Total 230 109 100 100
North  bg 247 311 54 43 0.000
 xx 12 89 3 12
Others 201 315 44 44
Total 460 715 100 100
Northeast  bg 815 443 49 42 0.000
 xx 123 114 7 11
Others 742 496 44 47
Total 1,680 1,053 100 100
Southeast  bg 548 375 45 36 0.000
 xx 129 179 11 17
Others 533 498 44 47
Total 1,210 1,052 100 100
South  bg 216 381 45 39 0.002
 xx 60 181 13 19
Others 201 413 42 42
Total 477 975 100 100
Center-West  bg 175 417 44 45 0.116
 xx 61 109 15 12
Others 159 392 40 43
Total 395 918 100 100
%n
bg vs. xx
p values for X2Women without children
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Table 2.4: Decline is the proportion of women who report bg (balance) as ideal composition 
and increase in the proportion who report xx (indifference) as ideal, all women without 
children, Brazil, 1996 and 2006 (FINAL). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 2006 1996 2006
Cohabitation  bg 86 262 51 42 0.005
 xx 12 91 7 15
Others 69 264 41 43
Total 167 617 100 100
Married  bg 153 204 37 40 0.451
 xx 69 106 17 21
Others 195 201 47 39
Total 417 511 100 100
Separated/Divorced  bg 41 67 40 36 0.173
 xx 5 17 5 9
Others 57 104 55 55
Total 103 188 100 100
Single  bg 1,721 1,393 49 41 0.000
 xx 299 458 8 13
Others 1,515 1,545 43 45
Total 3,535 3,396 100 100
Don't go to church  bg 381 297 46 38 0.000
 xx 66 103 8 13
Others 382 385 46 49
Total 829 785 100 100
Goes to church  bg 1,521 1,630 48 41 0.000
 xx 298 569 9 14
Others 1,343 1,729 42 44
Total 3,162 3,928 100 100
Virgin (no)  bg 684 1,220 44 41 0.000
 xx 154 442 10 15
Others 726 1,285 46 44
Total 1,564 2,947 100 100
Virgin (yes)  bg 1,317 707 50 40 0.000
 xx 231 230 9 13
Others 1,110 829 42 47
Total 2,658 1,766 100 100
Work (no)  bg 1,091 1,098 50 42 0.000
 xx 185 359 8 14
Others 922 1,175 42 45
Total 2,198 2,632 100 100
Work (yes)  bg 910 829 45 40 0.000
xx 200 313 10 15
Others 914 939 45 45
Total 2,024 2,081 100 100
Note: The P values for the Pearson correlations have the purpose of showing how the decrease in 
balance and the increase in indifference are statistically important, with a few exceptions. 
Women without children p values for X2
n % bg/xx 
over time
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Table 2.5: Total Desired Sex Ratios for women without children and for women with 
children, Brazil, 1996 and 2006. 
 
 
 
 
1996 2006 1996 2006
DSR DSR DSR DSR 
TOTAL 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.98
Race
White 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.99
Blacks and Brown 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.96
Religion
Catholic 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.98
Protestant 1.01 0.96 0.99 1.03
Non Religious 0.97 0.96 1.01 0.91
Urbanicity
Urban 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.96 0.019
Rural 0.99 0.95 1.00 1.03
Region
North 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.96
Northeast 0.97 0.89 0.96 0.93
Southeast 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.96
South 1.05 0.94 1.00 1.06
Center-West 1.00 0.95 1.02 1.02
Education Level
None 0.99 0.89 0.99 0.95
Elementary 0.97 0.93 0.98 0.99
Some high school or middle 1.01 0.94 0.97 0.97
High School Graduates 1.00 0.97 0.99 1.07
College 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.89
Wealth Index (percentile)
0 0.98 0.85 0.98 1.01
1 0.98 0.93 0.99 0.94
2 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.99
3 0.97 0.93 1.01 0.98
4 0.98 0.96 0.97 1.01
Church attendance
No 0.96 0.91 0.98 0.94
Yes 0.99 0.95 0.98 0.99
Virginity Status
No 0.98 0.96
Yes 0.99 0.93
Work Status
No 0.98 0.96 1.00 0.99
Yes 0.99 0.92 0.97 0.98
Marital Status
Married 0.99 0.94 0.98 0.99
Separated/Divorced 0.96 0.90 0.98 0.93
Single 0.99 0.95 0.97 1.01
Age
15-19 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.97
20-29 1.00 0.94 0.97 0.97
30-39 0.96 0.99 0.97 1.00
40-49 1.00 0.85 1.00 0.97
Women without children Women with children
Note: I performed Pearson Chi2 tests. Pairwise comparisons of categories within social-groups (i.e. White, Black) that are significant are 
shown in parenthesis, followed by their p value. I also compared if the proportions in 2006 are statiscally different than in 1996. None of the 
tests were significant, which means that the proportion of daughter and sons (the desired sex ratio) doesn't change from one year to another 
(not shown).
(3 vs 4) 0.052 
(1 vs 4) 0.036  
(2 vs 4) 0.006 
(2 vs 5) 0.034
(1 vs 4) 0.016 
(2 vs 4) 0.064 
(3 vs 4)  0.037 
(2 vs 5) 0.089 
(4 vs 5) 0.005
p value of 
in-group 
differences
p value of 
in-group 
differences
p value of 
in-group 
differences
p value of 
in-group 
differences
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Table 2.6: Desired composition sample distributions by desired parity, women without 
children, Brazil, 1996 (n=3935) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Categories in the 
multinomial logits n % n % n % n %
One child Two children Three children More than three children
bg 2,001 47 bgg 223 5.3 Same amount and some indifferent 1 0.0
bbg 187 4.4 bgxx 1 0.0
bgx 7 0.2 bbgg 151 3.6
same amount, no indifferent 23 0.5
Indiference x 168 4.0 xx 385 9 xxx 146 3.5 xxxx 16 0.4
Indifferent more than others 14 0.3
Daughter g 240 5.7 gg 64 2 ggg 9 0.2 women more than men or indifferent 23 0.5
gxx 1 0.0 bggg 7 0.2
gggg 2 0.1
gxxx 1 0.0
Son b 171 4.1 bb 56 1 bbb 13 0.3 men more than women and indifferent 15 0.4
bx 1 0 bxx 1 0.0 bbbg 2 0.1
bbbb 6 0.1
Total 579 2,507 587 262
Note: 251 (5.95%) does  not want chi ldren, 22 (0.52%) doesn't know and 14 (0.33) had non-numeric responses .
Balance
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Table 2.7: Desired composition sample distributions by desired parity, women without 
children, Brazil, 2006 (n=4263) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Categories in the 
multinomial logits n % n % n % n %
One child Two children Three children More than three children
bg 1,927 40.9 bgg 179 3.8 Same amount and some indifferent 1 0.0
bbg 127 2.7 bgxx 1 0.0
bgx 7 0.2 bbgg 75 1.6
same amount, no indifferent 6 0.1
x 365 7.7 xx 672 14.3 xxx 229 4.9 xxxx 31 0.7
Indifferent more than others 14 0.3
g 290 6.2 gg 61 1.3 ggg 8 0.2 women more than men or indifferent 16 0.3
gx 1 0.0 gxx 2 0.0 bggg 1 0.0
b 176 3.7 bb 42 0.9 bbb 7 0.2 men more than women and indifferent 14 0.3
bx 2 0.0 bxx 2 0.0 bbbg 7 0.2
Total 831 2,705 561 166
Note: 342 (7.26%) does  not want chi ldren and 100 (2.12%) doesn't know. 
Balance
Indiference
Daughter
Son
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Table 2.8: Multinomial logistic regression of desired composition, women without children, Brazil, 1996 and 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Balance 
(indifference)
Daughter 
(indifference)
Sons 
(indifference)
Daughter 
(sons)
Balance 
(indifference)
Daughter 
(indifference)
Sons 
(indifference)
Daughter 
(sons)
RRR RRR RRR RRR RRR RRR RRR RRR
Region (Southeast)
North 1.60 *** 0.86 1.08 0.80 3.65 *** 3.23 *** 2.02 * 1.60
Northeast 1.71 *** 1.41 + 1.19 1.18 1.68 *** 1.52 * 1.04 1.47 +
South 1.14 0.88 0.92 0.96 0.88 0.53 * 0.72 0.74
Center-West 1.67 *** 1.00 0.94 1.06 0.76 + 0.50 * 0.42 ** 1.21
Religion (Non-Religious)
Catholic 0.74 0.86 1.24 0.69 1.12 1.87 0.90 2.08
Protestant 1.01 1.44 1.92 0.75 1.45 2.22 1.51 1.46
Race  (White)
Black 1.30 ** 1.71 *** 1.82 *** 0.93 0.93 1.20 1.01 1.19
Rural 0.93 0.57 ** 0.51 ** 1.12 0.83 0.75 0.80 0.94
Years of Education 1 1.01 0.82 ** 0.88 + 0.94 0.94 0.84 * 0.87 + 0.98
Wealth Index 1 1.00 1.00 1.03 0.97 0.92 + 0.95 0.87 + 1.08
Attends church 1.02 0.52 *** 0.64 * 0.83 1.00 0.82 0.71 + 1.15
Work 0.94 1.17 0.87 1.36 + 1.02 1.00 1.06 0.94
Marital Status
Separated/Divorced 1.30 2.41 ** 2.88 ** 0.84 2.62 * 3.72 ** 4.85 ** 0.77
Single 1.18 + 1.06 1.33 0.80 1.68 ** 3.18 *** 2.70 *** 1.18
Age 0.91 *** 1.01 0.97 1.04 0.97 *** 1.00 0.99 1.00
Virgin 0.90 1.28 0.84 1.53 * 0.88 0.48 *** 0.60 ** 0.81
_cons 2.22 * 0.86 0.42 2.05 6.07 *** 0.31 + 0.76 0.40
Note: reference category in parenthesis.
19962006
1
02
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Table 2.9: Multinomial logistic regression of desired composition, women without children who want one child, Brazil, 1996 and 
2006. 
 
 
 
 
One daughter 
(x) One son (x)
One Daughter 
(one son) 
One daughter 
(x) One son (x)
One Daughter 
(one son) 
RRR RRR RRR RRR RRR RRR
Region (Southeast)
North 0.99 1.27 1.01 3.28 ** 2.16 + 1.52
Northeast 1.44 1.17 1.19 2.35 ** 1.38 1.71
South 0.79 0.93 1.33 0.63 0.48 + 1.30
Center-West 1.00 0.79 1.02 0.90 0.21 * 4.28
Religion (Non-Religious)
Catholic 1.30 2.00 0.77 1.74 0.85 2.05
Protestant 2.06 2.50 0.53 1.60 1.09 1.46
Race  (White)
Black 1.42 + 1.92 ** 1.52 1.56 + 1.12 1.39
Rural 0.57 * 0.46 ** 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.97
Years of Education 1 0.94 1.05 1.01 0.88 0.90 0.97
Wealth Index 1 0.98 0.96 0.83 1.00 0.93 1.08
Attends church 0.70 + 0.83 0.75 1.28 0.78 1.65
Work 1.22 0.82 1.30 1.12 1.04 1.08
Marital Status
Separated/Divorced 1.37 1.84 1.07 1.83 3.46 0.53
Single 0.79 0.94 0.75 2.15 * 1.83 1.17
Age 0.87 * 0.83 ** 1.01 0.88 0.88 1.00
Virgin 1.60 * 0.89 1.06 0.58 + 0.69 0.84
_cons 2.31 1.27 2.62 0.57 2.29 0.25
Note: reference category in parenthesis. X=one child, indifferent to sex. 
19962006
1
03
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Table 2.10: Multinomial logistic regression of desired composition, women without children who want two children, Brazil, 1996 
and 2006. 
 
 
Balance 
(xx)
Two 
daughters 
(xx)
Two sons 
(xx)
Two 
daughters 
(Two sons)
Balance 
(xx)
Two 
daughters 
(xx)
Two sons 
(xx)
Two 
daughters 
(Two sons)
RRR RRR RRR RRR RRR RRR RRR RRR
Region (Southeast)
North 1.49 * 1.04 0.62 1.67 4.55 *** 1.28 0.00 10.00
Northeast 1.73 *** 1.40 1.31 1.07 1.48 * 0.99 1.08 0.91
South 1.10 1.43 0.70 2.04 0.95 0.39 1.39 0.28 +
Center-West 1.74 *** 1.41 1.01 1.40 0.67 * 0.26 * 1.34 0.19 *
Religion (Non-Religious)
Catholic 0.39 * 0.26 0.99 0.00 1.15 0.97 0.84 1.16
Protestant 0.52 0.36 0.99 0.00 1.70 1.51 1.50 1.00
Race  (White)
Black 1.45 *** 1.95 * 1.26 1.55 0.92 1.02 1.24 0.83
Rural 0.90 0.63 0.52 1.22 0.92 0.89 1.26 0.70
Years of Education 1 0.95 0.88 0.97 0.91 0.86 * 0.90 0.86 1.04
Wealth Index 1 1.05 0.88 1.28 0.68 0.90 + 0.96 0.87 1.11
Attends church 0.99 0.64 0.56 1.14 0.87 0.46 * 0.60 0.76
Work 0.93 1.57 1.01 1.56 0.93 0.93 1.35 0.68
Marital Status
Separated/Divorced 1.53 6.23 ** 2.87 2.17 3.40 * 11.09 * 6.31 1.76
Single 1.23 + 1.77 1.11 1.60 2.04 *** 6.49 ** 6.63 ** 0.98
Age 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.90 * 1.04 1.01 1.03
Virgin 0.90 0.99 0.98 1.01 0.80 0.71 0.69 1.03
_cons 5.37 ** 0.55 0.00 10 7.73 *** 0.11 0.05 * 2.14
Note: reference category in parenthesis. xx=two children, indifferent to sex. 
19962006
1
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Table 2.11: Logistic regression of desired composition, women without children who want 
three children, Brazil, 1996 and 2006. 
 
 
 
Balance 
(Indifference)
Balance 
(Indifference)
OR OR
Region (Southeast)
North 0.57 + 0.28 ***
Northeast 0.59 + 0.60 ***
South 0.98 1.14
Center-West 0.65 1.33 +
Religion (Non-Religious)
Catholic + 1.28 0.88
Protestant 0.99 0.68
Race  (White)
Black 0.87 1.07
0.36
Rural + 1.29 1.22
Years of Education 1 * 1.15 1.08
Wealth Index 1 1.14 1.09 *
Attends church 1.09 0.99
Work 1.03 0.99
Marital Status
Separated/Divorced 0.47 0.37 **
Single 0.53 * 0.59 **
Age 1.01 *** 1.03 ***
Virgin 1.42 1.14
_cons 0.26 0.17 ***
Note: reference category in parenthesis.
Table 11: Logistic regression of desired composition by 
selected variables, (women without children who want three 
children), 1996 and 2006. Results in odds ratio.
19962006
For the logit regressions of women who want three children, ggg, gxx, bbb, 
bxx weren't considered. 
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CHAPTER 3: SHEDDING LIGHT ON COMPETING PREFERENCES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The number of children a woman will have during her lifetime is shaped by societal 
influences, such as her cultural and ethnic background, her place of residency and her socio-
economic status. These factors shape not only what is on her mind about ideal family size, but also 
her opportunities for achieving those goals. For instance, chapter 1 has shown how a woman living 
in an urban area is not only more likely to report smaller family sizes as ideal, but is also less likely 
to have unwanted children. 
In the path to motherhood, unanticipated circumstances, such as not having found a suitable 
partner or attending school, might turn a woman who dreamed about having two children into a 
childless one. On the other hand, other situations such as an unwanted pregnancy might cause a 
woman to bear a child in spite of her plans33. As a result, some women end up with fewer than 
desired while others end up with more children than were planned.  
Due to the persistent gender roles for women in Latin American (LA) countries, often those 
unmarried and without children are seen as abnormal. Nevertheless, childlessness is not a new 
                                                          
33 Unwanted pregnancies accounted for 30% of births in Brazil in 2006. Curtis (2012) suggests that fertility intentions vary 
throughout the life time and respond to circumstances. Although 45% of births in Brazil were unwanted or mistimed, 80% of 
women were using contraception, a pattern which is consistent with an ambivalence about using contraception and waiting 
another child.   
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phenomenon in the world (Morgan, 1991), and even less in Brazil where the quote ficar pra titia, 
which literary means “to become an aunt”, has historically referred to unmarried old women 
without children. Little is known about the trends, distribution and motivation for titias in the 
Brazilian population although everyone has one in the family. No one knows, for example, if have 
the titias been married, they would be much more likely to have a big family size. 
Based on the assumption that the desire for children is universal, for the women who have 
married, childlessness has been attributed to involuntary infecundity. Nowadays, given that it has 
become more common, married women without children are sometimes labeled as “post-modern”, 
“living the Second Demographic Transition (SDT)”34 when in fact, these women might have 
fertility ideals that are higher, but due to circumstances of life that compete with motherhood, they 
are unable to realize it.  
Although high educational attainment is the most influential factor predicting 
childlessness, postponement, and low fertility among women in LA, the inability to have the 
children one planned is not consistent with the SDT. It is possible that many women with zero or 
few children are facing situations that constrain or compete with motherhood plans, regardless of 
marital status. Having fewer children, or none at all, does not automatically allow the inclusion of 
these women in a “post-materialistic” category in terms of values and preferences35. It is important 
                                                          
34 Having a child disturbs autonomy and the framework of the SDT understand postponement of childbearing and smaller family 
size as part of an ideational change in which emphasis is given to individual self-realization and autonomy, recognition, 
expressive work, educational values, the rejection of institutional control, the rise of values associated with the satisfaction of 
individuals’ ‘higher-order needs’, and gender equality (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004; Van de Kaa 2001 in Billari, Liefbroer, 
Philipov, 2006; Lesthaeghe, 2014).  
35 It is not part of the second demographic transition to wish kids and not have them (Lesthaeghe, 2014). The SDT is a complex 
framework but it does not postulate that women wish a replacement family size (around 2 children) but cannot accomplish them 
due to life conjunctures. It is part of the STD to wish and achieve smaller families or even zero but they do so voluntarily, not 
because of constrains. 
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to understand the desired fertility of women with no or few children and unveil the possible factors 
competing with motherhood and making her revise her goals.  
In 2001, Bongaarts36 described a theoretical model aimed at explaining fertility rates at the 
aggregate level (TFR), as a result of the multiplication of six parameters by the Desired Family 
Size (DFS). The first group of parameters is composed of factors that increase fertility related to 
desired family size: unwanted fertility (FU), replacements for child mortality (FR), and sex 
preference (FSP). The second group is composed of factors that decrease fertility related to desired 
family size: rising age at childbearing (tempo effect which would be the number of children that 
a women would have had if they had not waited, or the FT), involuntary infertility (which includes 
the inability to have a child and also an inability to find a suitable partner, the FI), and competing 
preferences for child (set to 1 when childbearing is universal, the FC). Thus, following this author: 
TFR = DFS * (FU * FR * FSP) * (FT * FI * FC) 
Notice that if woman realizes her fertility intention, TFR=DFS.  
With the exception of the last parameter, all others have been proved to be well measured 
and reliable37. The Competing Preferences parameter (FC), however, was calculated indirectly in 
the Bongaarts’ Framework, by first estimating all the parameters in the equation, then getting the 
residual from what could not be explained of the TFR38 by the equation above assuming that all 
factors have been measured correctly. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I estimated the values 
                                                          
36 Bongaarts, J. (2001). Fertility and reproductive preferences in post-transitional societies. Population and Development 
Review, 27(Suppl), 260–281 
37 Dharmalingam, A. Rajan, S. Morgan, S.P. (2014). The Determinants of Low Fertility in India. Demography. August 
2014, Volume 51, Issue 4, pp 1451-1475 
38 In the case study of Dharmalingan et al (2014), childbearing was nearly universal, so the Competing Preference parameter was 
set to 1. The authors suggested, however, that new reliable ways to measure Competing Preference had to become available to be 
used in countries where motherhood has competition.   
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of FC to range between 0.34 and 1
39, and I found that they vary by social groups consistently with 
what the literature has pointed as having more barriers to fertility, for example, high education 
level or living in more urban areas.  
But such an important factor as the FC deserves to be better explored because it is 
responsible for substantially lowering the TFR, net of the influence of Desired Family Size.   
As explained in Chapter 1, the Theory of Conjuncture Action (Johnson-Hanks et al, 2011) 
postulates that the desired family size and the number of children a woman will have during her 
lifetime is shaped by societal influences or resources named respectively, schemas or materials. 
They interact with a woman’s agency to produce an Identity, a woman’s distinctive and consistent 
behavior, ideas, meanings, inclinations, and aspirations--such as the dream of becoming a mother, 
or the dream of being a successful professional. People form life goals and follow long term plans 
accordingly to their identity. However, work from Gerson (2011) shows that it is possible that 
women have a family, career or a mix of the two profiles, following different schemas. 
A life’s course is embedded in a social context which brings about conjunctures that might 
affect existing plans and make, for example, women take different decisions than a priori expected, 
or make her priorities clash within one’s identity (Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011). This is because the 
TCA also allows the life course to be dynamic, absorbing the impact that conjunctures and new 
experiences will make on the individual. While long term goals can be predictive, people 
constantly reassess their goals making choices that are distinct from their long term intentions.  
By using this framework to interpret competing preferences, I am arguing that desired 
family sizes are influenced by different schemas that value smaller family sizes and are unique to 
                                                          
39 A FC of 1 means that no competing preference can be detected as a residual. Estimation errors on the part of the other factors 
caused FC to be higher than 1 in few cases.  
110 
 
socio-demographic characteristics. These major influences, when happen in regularity, can be 
conceptualized and measured at the aggregate level in order to understand what social components 
motivate behavior. By understanding and conceptualizing a series of conjunctures that women 
cannot anticipate when reporting their ideal family size, the model explains variability among 
social groups, by explaining what “constrains” behavior, fertility trends, and differentials. This 
sheds light on the fertility transition and explains the mismatch between observed fertility and 
desired family size (Dharmalingan et al. 2014). 
The TCA and the Bongaarts frameworks are also useful because a women’s identity can 
fit more than one schema or life goal that are apparently contradictory, such as being career 
oriented and an excellent mother. While some women are able to make adjustments to fit both, 
some have to make choices about what to pursue first or what dream to give up on. How exactly 
women decide by different schemas when faced with life conjunctures might tell what schemas 
seem more salient or strong and which schemas will define the relationship between a women’s 
DFS and her CEB.  
Given its dynamic nature, fertility intentions have only been explored in literature thus far 
using longitudinal data, which allows visualization of fertility accommodations. The expectations 
and revisions of fertility intentions are then better analyzed at individual level data. Unfortunately, 
no such data is available for Brazil. Besides, the focus of this analysis is on the Bongaarts 
framework, which was written as a decomposition procedure for fertility at the aggregate level. At 
the aggregate level, the investigation of the imbalance between DFS and CEB has been explored 
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in the literature, in relation to the percentage of women in a certain population who are missing 
their target fertility40. 
Because of the variety of profiles and social groups in Brazil, it is important to understand 
the motivations surrounding fertility outcomes and the complexities of growing old as a woman. I 
will make use of different methods of analysis to shed light on factors that compete with fertility 
using two consecutive Demographic and Health Survey data from Brazil (DHS 1986 and 1996) 
and one Pesquisa Nacional de Demografia e Saude (PNDS 2006). I analyze the impact of career 
attainment, extended education and lack of partnership41 on fertility, ideal family size, and fertility 
postponement and forego. I also analyze socio-demographic groups who were more likely to have 
a deficit in fertility (fewer children than they believe is ideal) and who are more likely to revise 
their goals at the mid-end of their reproductive life. Finally, I propose a different and robust way 
to estimate Competing Preference Scores at the aggregate level that fits the original Bongaarts 
equation. At the limitations section, I finalize with a brief discussion about the stable nature of the 
DFS component.  
 
What competes with motherhood? 
 
Literature shows that prolonged education, career and work, and extended singlehood can 
compete with motherhood, although the desire for personal goal achievements co-exist with a 
desire for children. The reasons are many, but basically, because the pursuit of life goals put into 
                                                          
40 In the past, it was more common to find women having more children than wished because rates of unwanted pregnancies 
were high. Women have, however, increasingly having fewer children than they wished. 
41 According to the parameters, “lack of partner” would be better suited inside “Involuntary Infertility” instead of “Competing 
Preference”. But because it needs to be accounted for and because it is not being accounted in the Infertility parameter, I decided 
to include “lack of partner” as a competing preference factor. 
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practice by women with preferences other than motherhood consequently increase one’s mean age 
at childbearing and delaying childbearing may reduce the quantum. More importantly, those 
competing factors also may cause women to revise their goals, translating into a fertility foregone. 
On top of that, those women usually have smaller desired family sizes to start with. In the 
paragraphs below, I will discuss these variables further. 
 
Education 
 
Countless studies have explored education’s importance for fertility and its mechanisms 
(Brand and Davis, 2011). Kreider (2009) finds that countries facing declining fertility have 
increasing trends in women’s educational attainment (Kreider, 2009). In the work of Rosero-
Bixby, Castro-Martín,   and   Martín-Garcia (2009), the higher odds of being childless are found 
among those with college degree and working women (for more recent cohorts). Differently, 
Cohen, Kravdal and Keilman (2011) tested for reverse causality and found that having a child at 
an early age caused very detrimental effects on a women’s education attainment.  
Three main explanations associating education with fertility stand out. First, as a source of 
social norms, education provides women with ideal family sizes. Second, it increases the resources 
women have to stick to their plan and implement their preference. And three, it provides women 
with life course roadmaps that make education compete with childbearing, thus society reserves 
the place for education prior to marriage. More details are found in the paragraphs below. 
First, education attainment models ideal family size because it provide literacy skills, 
information and cognitive changes that broaden a women’s knowledge about her own body and 
reproductive potential reducing her fatalistic approach to life and increasing her trust in science 
and technology. Information gained at school or throughout mass media also changes attitudes by 
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exposing women to nontraditional life styles and making her questions traditional beliefs and 
values held by their family of origin, their religious affiliation, and other social structure (Martin 
and Juarez, 1995; Heaton, Forste, Otterstrom, 2002).  
Secondly, education foster a women’s achievement of her ideals by leading to higher 
socioeconomic advantage which increases her access to contraceptive means and reduces her 
reliance on the existence of public family planning programs, decreasing her proportion of 
unwanted births. Around the world, the difference between wanted and unwanted is bigger for 
women with poor education (Bongaarts 2003). Brazil is not different, and 20 years ago, a gap in 
contraceptive use was responsible for different TFR among social groups. Unwanted fertility reach 
30% of pregnancies although desired family sized was much more similar among groups 
denouncing a very low level of preference implementation, especially among the low educated 
(Ibisomi et al. 2005; Bongaarts 1993; Martin and Juarez, 1995).  
Testa and Toulemon (2006) call preference implementation “planning capacities”, and also 
find that highly educated have better odds to stick to their 5 year reproductive plans. Other authors 
have also found that development and positive changes in socio-economic conditions increases 
implementation and decreases unwanted fertility (Potter, Schmertmann and Cavenaghi, 2002). 
Lastly, education competes with motherhood because it increases social and economic 
mobility, “raising the opportunity costs of children by enhancing women’s opportunities to pursue 
wage-earning activities, which are likely to compete with domestic and childrearing 
responsibilities” (Martin and Juarez, 1995; Heaton, Forste, Otterstrom, 2002). Put in a life course 
perspective, education attainment is reserved to the first decades of life. Females who pursue 
higher levels of education and for which the levels of return of education are higher, are 
encouraged to postpone marriage and family formation, which affects the quantum and tempo of 
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fertility (Kohler and Ortega, 2011). Although educational improvements in Latin American at the 
primary and secondary level affected fertility in the past, the differences are now more pronounced 
among women with or without college education (Rosero-Bixby, Castro-Martín, and Martín-
Garcia, 2009).  
Education also provides women with alternative plans to marriage and a family life that 
ultimately may not include children, for example, leading a career oriented life that may be equally 
satisfying. Rosero-Bixby,   Castro-Martín,   and   Martín-Garcia (2009) discuss the role of tertiary 
education in the retreat of childbearing in Latin America. They find that an increasing proportion 
of women are childless by age 50. 
Women with different levels of education show not only very different levels of fertility 
but also different timing. Women with only one child ever born at the end of their reproductive 
life tended to be the last ones to become a mother, last ones to marry and to have the longest 
intervals between marriage and first child. It is important to notice that women having their first 
child at older age also have fewer odds of having high parity births due to an age effect – it is 
simply more difficult to get pregnant at older ages, so there is a decline in fertility caused by 
women who cannot catch up on childbearing (Bonifacio, 2011; Ortega and Kohler, 2002). It is 
unknown whether this behavior has been increasing over time.  
Although fertility in Brazil has a young pattern, with mean age at childbearing around 26.5 
in 2007 (Alves and Cavenaghi, 2009), the differentials by education and income are important to 
be considered. For women with lower income and low education the mean age at childbearing is 
25.6, while for the upper income with high education the same number is 30. A teenage with fewer 
than eight years of study is twice more likely to have a child than an adolescent with at least a 
secondary education level (Gupta and Leite, 1999). In the work of Rios-Neto and Guimaraes 
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(2013), women with tertiary education present lower fertility level and older mean age at 
childbearing. Bonifacio (2011) also finds that the proportion of highly educated becoming a 
mother was already smaller in 1996 for the highly educated compared to the low educated. 
Moreover, while only 30% of the highly educated progressed for the 4th birth, 70% of the low 
educated did so.   
In Brazil, access to higher education is largely determined by social origin and race, thus 
in order to analyze the potential effects of education on fertility, it is necessary to control for 
income or other SES, and also for race, because education is selective and might have different 
gain for different women. “The observed disparity in reproductive behavior among educational 
strata, thus, may be partly a reflection of this polarized social structure (Martin and Juarez, 1995)”. 
Alves and Cavenaghi (2009) finds that for the more educated women, income does not matter, but 
for the less educated, income does. Interestingly, Brand and Davis (2011) find evidence that the 
effect of college attainment in decreasing fertility is stronger for initially disadvantage women than 
for those whose biography were predictable to attend college showing that low educated have 
higher gains from college completion. 
In conclusion, among the competing preferences for motherhood, education stands out as 
one of the most important. I do not expect primary education to be much relevant nowadays, as it 
is close to universal in Brazil, but higher levels of education, such as having a college or BA 
education, might affect at a great extent fertility levels and fertility plans. More remarkably, 
women who attend college or graduate courses tend to postpone childbearing and further focus on 
work/career, also influencing fertility. Next subsection discuss the role of work and career on 
fertility.    
 
116 
 
Work/Career 
The influences of career and work for fertility rates are less straight forward than those of 
education. In fact, Martin and Juarez (1995) found that the impact of education is often reduced 
when economic controls are applied. That means there is a substantial difference between women 
according to their income or work status regardless of her education. On top of that, both educated 
and low educated women tend to work in Brazil and women of low SES have historically worked 
(Leme e Wajnman, 2000). Work status are also historically contingent on race, with 50% more 
chance of a Black women being a worker than a White (Itaborai, 2013). 
 Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) shows how the relationship between work and fertility can 
be either positive or negative depending on the context and on the women’s ability to combine 
work and family. Her ability to combine, on the other hand, is subjected to the family policies 
available, her necessity for income, and the salience of her career for her Identity.  
The importance of family policies to determine fertility rates in Brazil has not been studied 
extensively. Most research so far has been concerned with public policies for fertility control 
(Wong and Perpetuo, 2006). Although mothers are granted a 4-6 months of paid maternity leave 
and free childcare are available only in selected cities, middle class have been outsourcing their 
infant care to nannies, family members, or private daycare, while their poorer counterparts have 
been primarily counting on family and friend’s network, especially grandmothers, to be able to 
conciliate work and family (Marteleto and Noonan, 1998).  
A women’s necessity of income also correlates with her ability to conciliate work and 
fertility. That is because women might work for different reasons. Poor and low educated many 
times work to improve their economic conditions and get out of poverty. These women are the 
ones most likely to have higher fertility rates and higher unwanted fertility, promoting a vicious 
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cycle of poverty and fertility. Richer and highly educated, on the other hand, have higher odds of 
keeping their wages for themselves (Martin and Juarez, 1995). 
Work and careers are also associated with childlessness. Smock and Greenland (2010) 
show how voluntarily childless women have higher incomes, a higher percentage in managerial 
and professional occupations, and most extensive past work experience in comparison to the 
temporarily and involuntarily childless. The authors also show that childlessness is much more 
common among women with high human capital, managerial positions, highly compensated and 
time-intensive careers reaching 50% in some subgroups (Crittenden, 2001 in Smock and 
Greenland, 2010). Because of that, evaluating occupation dynamics might give better insights in 
how fertility is being negatively affected by work and vice versa. The higher the “degree of skill 
depreciation” coming from a time away of the labor market, the less likely this women will be to 
have children. Because the skills of highly educated are usually difficult to obtain and are easily 
lost if not practiced compared, for example to a domestic worker or a secretary, the first may be 
more tempted not to leave the labor market when having children or not to be absent from it for 
too long. They also might be more likely to not have children at all, focusing on their career. 
Data for Brazil shows that the type of occupation could definitely interfere with her 
reproductive behavior. Dias Junior (2010) finds that the mean number of children ever born for 
administrative workers is two children. Manual workers have at least 1 more child if they are urban 
and domestic workers, or 2 more children in case of rural workers.  
In an analysis considering separate effects for each new parity, Souza, Rios-Neto and 
Queiroz (2011) find that the children, in general, reduce the probability of labor market 
participation of women, especially children of high parity, such as the third.  
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Working outside the home reduces by 12% a woman’s chance of wishing to have children, 
even controlling for important socio-demographic variables (Itaborai, 2013). It is not clear whether 
this influence comes from a feeling of competition with motherhood or simple because working 
outside the home has similar effects as education, of exposing women to different ideas and smaller 
family sizes. 
Lastly, harsh economic conditions has been linked to delayed marriage and childbearing 
(Morgan, 1991). As for unemployment, it might have different effects on fertility according to the 
literature. Temporary unemployment might reduce women’s opportunity cost of time without 
affecting long-term income so it makes it a good time for childbearing. On the other hand, 
permanent unemployment decreases future income and increases uncertainty, impacting the 
marriage market and consequently, fertility (Becker 1972; Becker 1981, Adsera 2005, Leone and 
Hinde, 2007).  
Adsera and Menedez (2011) also find that fertility rates are reduced when urban and more 
educated women face economic uncertainty. It is important to say that both income and work status 
are time varying variables, so it is difficult to investigate the reverse causality that could possibly 
exist. For example, women might be unemployed because they got pregnant, or they might have 
got pregnant because they were unemployed. It is also impossible to know whether a women had 
a child because she is working in a blue collar job or she is working a blue collar job because she 
need to support a child she had. 
Apart from that, women might work from home, making it more challenging to observe 
the impacts of career on motherhood, increasing the possibility of combining the demand of labor 
market participation and child bearing.  
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The pursuit of a higher level of education associated with career/work demands are two 
factors that may have an impact on fertility levels and plans. Another one that may be linked to 
these factors is the women’s acknowledgment that she has not found a suitable partner, which is 
the next topic addressed. 
 
Lack of partner  
 
The lack of a partner and late marriage reduce fertility by limiting the opportunities and 
the amount of time women have to bear children.  
Data from the 90’s reveal that by age 50, 13% of women in Latin America have not married 
(Heaton, Forste, Otterstrom, 2002). Because childhood is not tied to marriage in Brazil, this does 
not mean they do not have any children or they do not want any children. Limited data is available 
on the percentage of women who arrives in mature life single and without children in Brazil. 
Bonifacio (2011) suggests the main reasons are involuntary, such as infertility or involuntary 
celibacy. 
Another complicating factor of studying the influences of marriage on childbearing is that 
among 25 to 29 years old, 50% were in cohabitation in 2010 and this number has been increasing 
(Esteve et al. 2012; Covre-Sussai et al. 2015). That is why in the case of Brazil, one has to use data 
on sexual activity rather than marriage to indicate exposure to pregnancy (Stover, 1998). Some 
unions follow the birth of a child or immediately precedes it. In some cases, the interval between 
the marriage and the first child is 0.7 years, proving that it has become more common to get 
marriage pregnant (Alves and Cavenaghi, 2009). Brazilian cohabitants also have bigger fertility 
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and is associated with more social disadvantaged people who cannot pay for the costs of marriage, 
and persons with African and Native Indian heritage (Merrick, 1986; Rosero-Bixby 1996).  
More recently, cohabitation has been used by more educated counterparts (Castro Martin 
2002; Esteve, Lesthaeghe, and Lopez-Gay, 2012) which made authors suggest that this could be a 
sign of the Second Demographic Transition in Brazil (Verona et al, 2015). As Castro-Martin 
(2002) points, the high prevalence of cohabitation could be a sign of modernity or tradition, 
depending on the social group (Castro-Martín 2002).  
In addition, Brazilian unions have become more dissolvable (Leone and Hinde, 2007). If 
divorce and separation reach females before the onset or the end of childbearing, these could 
decrease their cohort fertility because they would not have a partner with whom have children. 
Leone and Hinde (2001), however, indicate that union instability has a positive effect on the overall 
level of fertility because women might have more children with the new partner or because women 
with more unions have more exposition to sex and more liberal behavior which also make them 
more prone to having children.  
 
Late transitions 
 
The traditional path into adulthood in Latin America was composed of starting to have sex 
during teen years, enter a union a year later and have a child a year later, but Latin America women 
with higher levels of education are less likely to follow this rule. "Normative patterns or cultural 
expectations about the appropriate timing of life events and transition contains and shape the life 
course of individuals. Within the life course framework, age expectations mark appropriate times 
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for major life events and transitions such as initiating sexual activity, getting married and having 
children” (Hogan 1981, Elder 1985 in Heaton, Forste, Otterstrom, 2002). 
The delay in transitions probably reflects societal changes (Smock and Greenland, 2010, 
579). In Italy and Portugal, where young adults don’t have economic or emotional conditions to 
leave their parents’ house and establish their own, they continue to live with their parents 
prolonging young adulthood and delaying childbearing until they achieve higher educational 
degree, establish themselves in the labor market and increase economic security. They also wait 
until they find a suitable husband, marry them, move from their parents’ house and enjoy married 
life before having children (Billari, Liefbroer, and Philipov 2006). 
According to Blossfeld and Huinink (1991) being dependent on one’s parents economically 
has negative effects on fertility. In fact, in the United States, 36% of young adults aged 18 to 31 
live in their parents’ home, a number that is much higher than before (Fry, 2013). Rising college 
enrollment, delayed marriage and declining employment could be the reasons (Fry, 2013). 
In Brazil, research has pointed to the existence of the same phenomenon. It is possible that 
men and women age 30 are not ready to leave their parental home and establish their own. But as 
seen earlier, for the low educated counterparts, continuing to live in the parental household does 
not seem to prevent the transition to parenthood because they can establish their parental home as 
their own.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS 
  
Women having fewer children than they want are a source of concern due to the direct 
demographic consequences of low fertility, such as population aging, and also because the degree 
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to which they are able to implement their preferences characterizes the sexual and reproductive 
rights of women. 
Extensive literature has covered the conjunctures of life leading to unwanted fertility 
(Bongaarts, 1997; Adetunji, 1998; Hakkert, 2001; Chackiel, 2004). Alternatively, some women 
planned to be mothers, but the conjunctures of life made them childless or with fewer children 
compared to their ideal family size. Because reasons to postpone or to forego fertility might be 
different, women with fewer children than desired or women with zero children form a 
heterogeneous group who deserve to be studied and explored in order to understand their 
motivations and the level of competition that impacted their motherhood plans. 
What competing factors seem to be more important in defining a women’s fertility related 
to her ideal family size? For which reasons are women having fewer children than they wish over 
the years? Do I have evidence to suggest that some women are foregoing fertility while others are 
just hoping to delay? How different are the two groups? How well does the residual of the 
Bongaarts’ equation calculated at Chapter 1 represent the competing factors that make a women 
revise their fertility goals or simply having fewer children than they wish?  
Unfortunately, longitudinal data on fertility intentions and outcomes is not always 
available, as in the case of Brazil. On top of that, as already mentioned, the Bongaarts equation 
decomposes fertility rates into parameters that uses aggregate level data to model fertility 
parameters that drive disparities between what is desired and what is achieved. So, I will use the 
Brazilian Demographic Health Surveys of 1986, 1996 and 2006, the most recent at the time of this 
research, to answer the four specific objectives of this chapter: 
1 - Evaluate the impact of career attainment, extended education and lack of partner on 
actual and desired fertility. 
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2 - Understand the characteristics of women who have fewer children than they wish and 
who have more children than they wish. Understand what explains a women intentions of 
postponement or foregoing of their fertility. 
 3 - Evaluate the applicability of the Competing Preference factor estimated at the Chapter 
1 as a residual of the Bongaarts equation. 
4 – Evaluate how well the parameter of Competing Preference (FC) represent a fertility 
depletion/revision downwards. 
In the following paragraphs, while introducing the four objectives of this chapter, I will 
also present the methodology I chose to address them and their results. Data cleaning, variable 
recoding, and data analysis were done using Stata 12. The specific statistical commands and filters 
utilized will be detailed further individually. 
 
First objective 
 
First, at the individual level, I am interested in evaluating the impact of career attainment, 
extended education and lack of partner on actual and desired fertility. In order to do that, I 
Performed Poisson regressions of number of Children Ever Born (CEB) and Desired Family Size 
(DSF) to clarify which of those covariates are associated with lower values for both fertility 
measures at the individual level. The categories for those variables of interest are: Marital status 
(Cohabiting =0, Married =1, Separated or Divorced=2, Single and Never married=3); Years of 
education continuous), labor market participation (no=0, yes=1), BA level (no=0, yes=1). 
Covariates will be used to control for the fact that socio-demographic groups are more 
likely to have or wish fewer children over time: place of residence (0=urban, rural=1), macro-
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region (North=1, Northeast=2, Southeast=3, South,=4, Center-West=5), religious affiliation 
(Catholic=1, Protestant=2, Other=3, No-Religion=4), church attendance (no=1, yes=1), race 
(White=1, Black=2, Brown=3), and wealth index (5 levels 0 to 4, being 4 the highest)42.  
For CEB, as usual in demographic research, only women age 40 and plus were considered, 
as they are close to the end of their reproductive life. Age is kept as a control in the DFS regression.  
The dependent variable are both count data at the individual level represented by a 
distribution of non-negative integers that resemble a Poisson distribution. The logarithm of the 
expected value of both independent variables (DFS and of the CEB) conditioned on the exogenous 
variable is linked to a linear function on their predictor variables, which are the characteristics 
investigated in this study:  
XXYE '])[log(    
where:    is a parameter,   is a vector of parameters and  X  is a matrix with the explanatory 
variables.  
The coefficients and p values for the Poisson Regression of the CEB can be found on Table 
3.1, while the Poisson Regression of the DFS can be found on Table 3.2. The results displayed are 
showed in Incidence Rate Ratios. It is obtained by exponentiating the Poisson regression 
coefficient. 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 Refer to the Appendix 1: Chapter 1 for explanations on the construction of the Wealth Index and the Predicted Level of 
Education. 
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Poisson Regression of Children ever Born 
 
After controlling for important covariates such as race, religion, church attendance, 
urbanicity and geographic region, the coefficients on Table 3.1 show that the number of children  
born is dependent on one’s wealth index, level of education, work status and marital status as 
predicted by the literature review. Notice how for each additional wealth level, the risks of 
having a child decreases. In 1986, for example, the RRI of 0.89 means that each additional 
wealth level decreases the risks of having an extra child by 11% (1-0.89). The proportions are 
consistent across survey years. 
Having a BA decreases fertility much more in 1986 than 1996 and much more in 1996 
than 2006. Notice that having a BA in 1986 decreases the risks of having a child by 38% (RRI is 
0.62) and in 2006, by 19% (RRI is 0.81). 
Women who work behave the same way, but the relative risks are slightly more 
consistent over time: 0.88, 0.95 and 0.95. 
By far, the most important predictor of fertility is marital status. Being married, 
cohabiting or being separated/divorced are associated with much higher risks of having 
additional children than being single, varying from 25.86 times the risks of singles in the case of 
married in 1986 to 4.56 in the case of cohabitants in 2006. One can also notice that throughout 
time, marital status has been losing importance, as can be seen in the decline of magnitude in 
those risks. 
In sum, consistently, at the multivariate level, women who work, have a Bachelor degree, 
and have higher socio-economic status (measured using Wealth) have fewer children. Singles 
also have fewer children than married, cohabitants and separated/divorced and marital status. 
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Poisson Regression of Desired Family Size 
 
When it comes to desired family sizes, which is not supposed to be contingent on 
competing preferences, the roles of wealth, work and education are unaltered as can be seen in 
Table 3.2, although their effects are very small yet significant. 
Notice, for example, that each additional wealth level contributes for a decrease in DFS 
by 1.5% (in 1996, RRI is 0.99) to 3% (in 2006, RRI is 0.97). 
Women who work follow the same tendency, but the only significant coefficient is in 
2006 when working gives women a 4% decreased risk of wishing additional child as can be seen 
in Table 3.2. 
 BA, however, changes from being associated with smaller desired family sizes in 1986 
and 1996 (coefficients are smaller than 1 on Table 3.2), to be related to larger family sizes in 
2006 (larger than 1), but this last is not statistically significant. So, this basically means that BA 
no longer matters for DFS in 2006 probably because of the expansion of the tertiary education, 
suggesting that the deterrence effect of holding a BA is diminishing. 
Since this regression was performed for women of all ages, the coefficients of age also 
indicates that the older a women, the higher her DFS. In fact, each additional year of age 
contributes for an increase in 1% of her risks of having more children.  
Another important thing to notice on Table 3.2 is that both married and cohabiting have 
higher DFS than singles (higher DFS represented as a higher risk), but not separated/divorced. 
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That means that if divorce is not selective of women with smaller family sizes, it could 
contribute for a decline in DFS. With this database, however, it is difficult to evaluate the 
causality and selectivity of that.  
It is also important to notice from Tables 3.1 and 3.2 together that women who cohabited 
or were separated/divorced desired less children that their married counterparts, but had similar 
CEBs (changes in reference category not shown). These results indicated that being 
separated/divorced is not a competing preference for fertility. Altering the reference category it is 
also possible to see that even controlling for all covariates, all marital status wish fewer children 
than married women. Again, it is impossible to suggest a causality here implying that women 
change their minds once they get married because this is a cross sectional database. 
In order to see whether having had a child changes the desires, I also included “had a 
child” in my controls (not shown) and the biggest finding is that having a child increases the 
desire for bigger family sizes, as expected for a population with higher levels of rationalization. 
 
Second objective 
 
The second objective is twofold. First, I want to understand what the characteristics of 
women who have fewer children than they wish are compared to women who have more 
children than they wish (Multinomial regression of fertility status). Second, I want to understand 
who the women who are revising their fertility goals are, trying to understand the association 
with postponing or foregoing motherhood for women age 30 and plus (Odds of wishing to stop 
or continue for women who have fewer children than desired family size). 
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Multinomial logit regression of fertility status 
  
Using women’s response to their CEB and DFS utilized in the previous question, I built a 
3 category variable called Fertility Status. Using the following calculation, I determined which 
category a women age 30 and plus belong: 
1 - If her DFS=CEB, women were categorized as Neutral because they currently have the 
same number of children as their ideal43.  
2 - If her DFS<CEB, women were categorized as Surplus because they already had more 
children than she was desired.  
3 - If her DFS>CEB, women were categorized as Deficit, because women had fewer 
children than she considered ideal. 
Thus, the three category variable of Fertility Status stands as follows (0=neutral, 1=surplus, 
2=deficit). I performed a multinomial logit regression of Fertility Status because Multinomial logit 
are used to model discrete variables with more than two possible outcomes given a set of 
independent variables. The coefficients for the Multinomial logit regressions, showed in Log Odds 
and having Surplus (1) as the reference category, can be seen in Table 3.3. 
The independent variables are the same applied in Objective 1 - Marital status (Cohabiting 
=0, Married =1, Separated or Divorced=2, Single and Never married=3); Years of education 
continuous), labor market participation (no=0, yes=1), BA level (no=0, yes=1). The controls are 
also the same. 
                                                          
43 It is impossible to know whether they could be just rationalizing. 
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For this analysis, women who did not have a DFS were classified as neutral and those who 
were pregnant were dropped.   
Who are the women who have fewer children than they wished at age 30? Who are the 
ones who have more children than desired? 
As can be seen on Table 3.3, controlling for all covariates, the women who have higher 
chances of having a Deficit fertility compared to a Surplus are the women of higher Wealth 
Level, those who work, those with a bachelor degree and the singles. Notice in Table 3.3, for 
example, that the odds of being in the Deficit category (having Surplus as a reference) tend to be 
more positive the wealthier the women is and in case or has a BA degree. In 2006, women with 
college education have more 1.41 log odds of being in the deficit group as compared to the 
surplus. Exponentiating the coefficient would result in 4 times higher chances of being in that 
group. In the same year, each additional wealth level would increase a women’s odds of being in 
the Deficit group by 23% (Exp 0.215). Because this is a multinomial logit, those variables also 
present higher chances of being in the neutral category when compared to Surplus, but these 
coefficients won’t be commented.  
In 2006, those who work have higher chances of being neutral, but not higher chances of 
being in the Deficit group. In fact, in both 1986 and 1996, women who work have higher chances 
of being in the surplus (log odds are -0.02 and -0.03, respectively), but these numbers are non-
significant. 
The strength of marital status compared to the other variables seem to be decreasing over 
time, which suggest that either childbearing has become equal across marital status or that 
single-motherhood has become more acceptable and people are no longer getting married after 
an unwanted pregnancy. Take the odds of married people over time, for example: on Table 3.3, 
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their log odds vary from -3.68 in 1986, to -2.70 in 1996, and -1.86 in 2006. Since this is an 
analysis of fertility deficit, it is also possible that both groups are either having fewer children or 
wishing more. 
 
Odds of wishing to stop or continue for women who have fewer children than desired family size 
 
As a second step for this Objective 2, I selected only the women for whom their number of 
children ever born (CEB) is smaller than her desired family size (DFS) for women age 30 and plus. 
Within this group of women with deficit fertility, I look at what percentage of women answered 
“no” and “yes” to the following question: “would you like to have an additional child/any child? 
(Translations are mine)”. Women who answered “yes” are women who are possibly postponing 
their fertility and they were coded as 0 (zero). Women who answered “no” are women who are 
foregoing fertility; in other words, these women have revised their fertility intentions downwards, 
possibly due to competing preferences, and they were coded as 1 (one). 
 
 DFS>TFR  would you like to have an additional child/any child?  
Yes (0), she is postponing.  
No (1), she is foregoing.  
 
A logistic regression on selected covariates clarifies the factors associated with answering 
no (0) compared to answering yes (1). The coefficients in this case are the log odds that a person 
with a certain characteristic will have marked the option no, or foregoing one’s fertility (Hosmer 
& Lemeshow, 2000). Thus, a positive coefficient means that this social group has higher odds of 
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wishing to stop fertility by not having more children. This is the group making a downward 
revision of their fertility intentions. A negative coefficient means the social group is more likely 
to delay fertility (by saying that wish to have children at a later time).  
Although competition depletes fertility rates related to ideal family size, postponing 
fertility might temporarily decrease period fertility rates or even cause a tempo effect that 
ultimately leads to a quantum effect. The coefficients can be seen in Table 3.4. 
The independent variables are the same applied in Objective 1 - Marital status (Cohabiting 
=0, Married =1, Separated or Divorced=2, Single and Never married=3); Years of education 
continuous), labor market participation (no=0, yes=1), BA level (no=0, yes=1). The controls are 
also the same. In 1986, women who were not married or cohabiting did not get asked the question 
about intention for additional births. 
 For the two years, women who were pregnant, sterilized or infecund at the time of the 
interview or who said they didn’t know their intention for additional births, were dropped from the 
analysis. The coefficients for the Logit Regression, in log odds, can be found on Table 3.4. 
Within the women who have fewer than desired, who are the ones who are postponing 
their fertility (with an additional child later) and who are the ones who are revising (do not want 
more children)?  
Notice, on Table 3.4, that positive and significant coefficients are associated with 
foregoing fertility, while negative and significant are associated with fertility postponement. 
Additional wealth levels are associated with increasing odds of revising fertility. That 
means, when richer people are facing a deficit fertility, they are more likely to say that they do 
not want more children (revise their fertility downwards), but only in 1986 that coefficient is 
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significant (log odds are 0.34 which translates into a 40% increase in the odds of revising fertility 
compared to postpone). 
In that same year, women who are working or who have Bachelor degrees are more likely 
to say that their deficit is temporary (or that they are postponing their fertility). This is because 
their odds of being in the foregoing group is negative (-0.35 for Work in 1986 which translates 
into being 70% the odds of people who don’t work of being in that same category and -0.81 for 
BA in 1986, which translates into 44% the odds of people without BA in being in that category). 
The results are consistent over survey years, but work is only significant in 1986. 
As expected, singles have much higher odds of just being delaying fertility.  
In this bivariate models, I did not control for the number of children ever had, but they all 
have fewer than wished. It is possible, though, that the married women are much more likely to 
stop because they already have some children, while the single might have none. In both cases, 
they could have fewer than wished.  
The results presented in this subsection suggest that wealthier, the more educated 
individuals, those who work and the singles had a greater propensity to belong to the group with 
deficit fertility. It also shows that, with the exception of the wealthy, they suggest their fertility is 
a matter of postponement. 
 
Third objective 
 
After understanding the determinants of the number of CEB and DFS, and of the 
differences between both variables, I intend to relate the findings of this chapter with those of 
chapter 1. More specifically, I will relate the Competing Preference factor estimated at the Chapter 
1 as a residual of the Bongaarts equation with the deficit in fertility examined here. It is important 
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to mention that under the Bongaarts (2001) assumption, the residual can only be accounted for 
Competing Preferences if all factors are measured perfectly, something I know is unattainable.  
My third objective is to evaluate the applicability of the Competing Preference factor 
estimated at the Chapter 1 as a residual of the Bongaarts equation. How well does that represent 
women’s revised intentions?  
As seen in the last pages of Chapter 1, plotting the coefficients for Competing 
Preferences (FC) calculated as a residual against the population mean values of level of education 
produces a consistent straight line showing that education is highly associated with Competing 
Preference. The finding is consistent across years. Would that still hold true for other indicators 
of Competing Preferences? In order to test that, I plot the Competing Preference factor estimated 
at the Chapter 1 against population values of mean age at first union and proportion of women in 
the labor force to investigate if those factors are indeed associated with higher values of 
competing preferences. I do it separately by each survey year, using the same socio-demographic 
groups of Chapter 1. The rationale driving this analysis is that if people are making decisions and 
revising their fertility based on concrete situations such as not finding a mate or having to work, 
populations with higher age at first union and major proportions of women in the labor force are 
expected to have more competition (or lower values for FC) than those population with low age 
at marriage and low proportion of women in the labor force (remembering that lower values for 
this parameter means higher levels of competing preferences). That is, I expect a negative slope.  
The crude values for the population means can be found on Table A3.1 in the Appendix 3: 
Chapter 3. The plots can be visualized in Figures 3.1 through 3.6. It is important to keep in mind 
that the FC is a multiplicative model, which makes values depart from 1. Thus, the stronger the 
Competing Preferences, the more it negatively departs from 1. 
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As a result, plotting the residual (Fc) with their correspondent population mean value of 
mean age at marriage (Figures 3.1 through 3.3) and proportion of women in the labor force 
(Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6) also produce a negative linear correlation. The respectively coefficient 
of determination (R2) are 0.6207 for 1986, 0.5468 for 1996 and 0.3621 for 2006 in regards to 
mean age at marriage and 0.4052 for 1986, 0.4959 for 1996 and 0.4316 for 2006 for proportion 
of women working. 
Contrarily to education (Figures 1.10, 1.11 and 1.12 in Chapter 1), the relationship hasn’t 
become flatter over the years, neither has it become stronger, but they seem to be more correlated 
in 1996, with higher values of R2.  
 Although these statistics are not very high, they certainly show how those socio-
demographic indicators have some value in explaining the variability in FC. Besides, I did not try 
to improve the model fit but it could be that the relationship between the variables are not linear, 
but follow other relationships, such as exponential or logarithmic.  
In conclusion, this socio-demographic indications of competing preferences seem to be 
working well, and it is possible to say that the higher the proportion of women in the labor force, 
and the higher the mean age at first union of a certain socio-demographic group, the lower their 
Fc value (the higher the competing preference).  
 This finding suggests that the residual of the Bongaarts equation does reflect competing 
preference (it would be a perfect measure if all other factors could have been measured perfectly), 
but the residual likely contains other unexplained variance in regards to fertility. It is necessary, 
however, that this residual, if it is to be called Competing Preference, represents a revision of 
fertility intention downwards.  
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Fourth objective 
 
In the analysis above, I learned that FC is correlated with social indicators of competition, 
but how well does the parameter of Competing Preference (FC) represent a fertility depletion? In 
order to check this fact, I decided to plot the residual (FC) against another measure of fertility 
depletion: the number of children who were not born in calculated by the difference between the 
women’s CEB and their desired family size. I calculated this deficit fertility for each social 
demographic group in each survey year.  
Using People without religious affiliation in 2006 as example, the calculation was as 
follows: 
First, I tabulated the difference between the women’s DFS and her CEB to see how many 
women shared the same number of missing or surplus children:    
DFS-CEB Frequency (DFS-CEB)* frequency 
-11 1 -11 
-7 1 -7 
-5 1 -5 
-4 3 -12 
-3 12 -36 
-2 24 -48 
-1 18 -18 
0 82 0 
1 54 54 
2 62 124 
3 17 51 
4 4 16 
5 1 5 
   
Total 280  
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As can be seen above, 82 women are Neutral, or DFS-CEB=0. 
Then, I multiply the difference by the frequency in each row to see how many children, in 
each line were born in excess or were not born at all. Then, at the last column, summing the 
negative numbers will result in the total number of children who were born in excess (Surplus: 
137) while summing the positive numbers will result in the total number of children who were not 
born (Deficit: 250). Table 3.5 brings the total count of children who were born in excess (Surplus), 
who were not born (Deficit) and born according to their mother's CEB (Neutral), for each socio-
demographic characteristic and survey analyzed on Chapter 1.  
With these numbers of Table 3.5 at hand, I calculated a new parameter of competing 
preference, called Adjusted Deficit, which is the proportion of the CEB given the number of 
children who were not born: CEB/CEB+Deficit. 
In the case of non-religious in 2006, the CEB was of 445. So, the Adjusted Deficit was of: 
445/445+250=0.64. Table 3.6 brings the Adjusted Deficit for each of the socio-demographic 
groups and survey year.  
Likewise, I also produced a new parameter (Adjusted Surplus) to account for the children 
who were born in excess. In the same example, 445/445-137=1.44. The only difference in this case 
is, obviously, the mathematical sign. Here I need the Adjusted Surplus to reflect the CEB born in 
relations to what the CEB would be in the absences of surplus. The estimation of Adjusted Surplus 
can be seen on Table 3.7 for each of the socio-demographic variables and survey year.  
On Table 3.6 I also present the estimates of the original value for FC as a residual of Chapter 
1 and also the result of the multiplication of the Competing Preferences, Involuntary Infertility and 
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Tempo (FC*FI*FT)  estimated at Chapter 1. These three factors are responsible for depleting the 
TFR in relation to the DFS. 
To be consistent, I also present the estimates of FU calculated at Chapter 1 and also the 
coefficients of Unwanted Fertility, Sex Preference and Replacement Rate altogether (Fu*FSP* FR) 
on Table 3.7. These three factors are responsible for increasing fertility in relations to DFS. 
The Pearson correlations and the values of the Coefficient of Determination (R2) between 
the coefficients in the columns can be seen on the bottom of Tables 3.6 and 3.7. Correlations higher 
than 0.6 will be considered strong. R2 higher than 0.5 will be considered a good fit. 
To illustrate the relationships, the same coefficients were plotted against one another. The 
corresponding plots of the relationships can be observed in Figures 3.7 through 3.18 as indicated 
on the bottom row of the Tables 3.6 and 3.7.  
In sum, expect that my new measure of Adjusted Deficit will be positively correlated both 
with the FC as a residual of the Bongaarts in Chapter 1 and with the multiplication of FC *FI*FT. I 
also expect that the new measure of Adjusted Surplus will be positively correlated with FU and the 
FC*FI*FT of Chapter 1.  
 
Adjusted Deficit  
At Table 3.6, Adjusted Deficit Fertility is found to be positively correlated with the 
estimates of FC*FI*FT of Chapter 1. The Pearson correlations of both columns at the bottom of 
table shows how the correlations is slightly lower in 2006 (0.71) compared to 1996 (0.75) and 
1986 (0.79). The estimates of Adjusted Deficit Fertility are also correlated with the estimates of 
FC but at a lower rate (0.44 in 2006, 0.78 in 1996 and 0.73 in 1986), except for 1996. Notice how 
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the curves for 2006 (Figures 3.7 and 3.8) tend to be much flatter than the other years, especially 
on Figure 3.7.  
There are two explanations for the values of the correlation not to sum in 100%. The first 
explanation is that the factors of the Bongaarts equation might not have been measured perfectly 
on Chapter 1 due to measurement errors or simply due to the limitations of the techniques, which 
disturbs the residual. On Chapter 1, those limitations have been extensively discussed. 
The second is that even if it was possible of perfectly measurement all the factors stated 
on Bongaarts (2001), there would still be a lot of unexplained factors surrounding what is 
considered Competing Preferences. As has been suggested in Chapter 1 and as I cannot highlight 
enough, other techniques should be created and utilized in order to explain bigger portions of 
what is driving women to revise their fertility goals. Nevertheless, the correlations are clear and 
in the directions expected. The fact that the relationships have becomes more flat over the years 
probably means that in 2006 there more things playing a role in regards to competition than in 
previous years. 
 
Adjusted Surplus 
The correlations for Adjusted Surplus fertility available on Table 3.7 are also positive and 
strong as can also be seen in the Figures 3.13 through 3.18. The Pearson correlations of both 
columns at the bottom of table shows the correlations to be 0.73, 0.89 and 0.94, for 1986, 1996 
and 2006, respectively when correlating Adjusted Surplus with FU. When correlating Adjusted 
Surplus with FU*FSP*FR, correlations are slightly smaller for 1996 and 2006, of 0.74 for 1986, 
0.64 for 1996, and 0.85 for 2006. The fact that the correlations are smaller for the aggregated 
measure (FU*FSP*FR) when one would expect the opposite is because although this factors have 
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been estimated directly, they might still contain errors or technique limitations (and I have 
reasons to believe that the sex preference measurements might be causing this44). By multiplying 
a very robust indicator (such as FU) by others that contain measurement errors of limited 
techniques, such as the FSP, one is adding error and disturbing the correlations, just like 
competing preferences in the previous example. I have no doubts that unwanted fertility (FU) is a 
very good indicator of surplus fertility, especially after seeing them correlated at the level of 94% 
in 1986 as can be seen on Table 3.7 and observed on Figure 3.17. Unwanted fertility alone 
explain 88% of the variation in Surplus fertility. 
Nevertheless, comparing the correlations on Table 3.7 with Table 3.6, the Adjusted 
Surplus, in general, have higher correlations than Adjusted Deficit. This serves to strengthen the 
point stated in the previous paragraphs that when one is not correlating residual (as the case of 
unwanted fertility, sex preferences and replacement for mortality which are all estimated 
directly) the measurement errors are much smaller and this produces more reliable estimates. 
This fact urges for the necessity of creating an indicator of FC that is reliable and that can be 
estimated directly.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44 On Chapter 1, the coefficients of Sex Preferences are shown to be highly sensitive to small sample sizes in certain sex 
compositions, disturbing the overall estimate of this factor when it comes to more sensitive analysis. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
The results of this chapter indicates that at age 30, women who are single, work, have a 
Bachelor degree, and have higher socio-economic status (measured using Wealth) have fewer 
children than their counterparts: the married, cohabiting or separated/divorced, the women without 
a bachelor degree, the women who don’t work and women of low socio-economic strata. These 
finding are in accordance with the literature as previously explored (Kreider, 2009; Rosero-Bixby, 
Castro-Martin, and Martin-Garcia, 2009; Martin and Juarez, 1995; Heaton, Forste, Otterstrom, 
2002; Smock and Greenland, 2010; Dias Junior, 2011; Itaborai, 2013; Souza, Rios-Neto and 
Queiroz, 2011). 
At the intention level, these women also wish fewer children, especially younger women. 
College degree, however, changes from being associated with smaller desired family sizes in 1986 
and 1996 and loses its effects in 2006. This could be related to the less selectivity of education 
over time. 
Even though it is no longer significant in 2006, the difference between what highly 
educated desire and what they end up having represent a negative number, meaning that they have 
a deficit fertility. This finding suggests that schemas that prioritize college education might not be 
easy to combine with schemas for marriage.   
Deficit fertility is also found for women who work and the higher one’s wealth level. 
Nevertheless, being single is the most important predictor of having fewer than desired at age 30. 
The signs of the relationships found above are consistent. The only difference found in the 
associations is for women who work, who move from having surplus children in 1986 and 1996 
(more than they wish) to being neutral in 2006. This possible means that women who worked in 
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1986 and 1996 were already wishing to have fewer even thought they could not completely achieve 
it (which inflates the proportions of surplus).  
Within the group with deficit fertility, when asked if they have the desire for an additional 
child, both people with Bachelor degree, singles and people who work mention they are willing to 
do so. So, with the exception of the wealthy (who revise their fertility down saying that they do 
not wish to have more), low fertility is, at least theoretically, a matter of postponement. It is 
impossible to know, however, if these women who are already 30 years old, will be able to catch 
up on the fertility they are missing.  
My analysis also showed that being single is highly associated with having fewer children, 
but this was more important in the past, where women might have been more likely to get married 
following an unwanted pregnancy, remaining single only the ones who did not get pregnant. 
Nowadays, singleness after age 30 have become more alike compared to marriage when it comes 
to childbearing behavior (odds of CEB are more alike), which is probably caused by a decline in 
stigma surrounding single motherhood or decline in marital fertility. In terms of intentions, 
however, singles do not differ much from other marital status (even though they do have smaller 
intentions). 
At the aggregate level, I also find that the Competing Preference factors calculated as a 
residual from Chapter 1 (FC) is highly associated with education, age at marriage and proportion 
of women in the labor force. That is, the higher the proportion of women in the labor force, the 
mean years of education and the higher the mean age at first union of a certain socio-demographic 
group, the lower their Fc value (the higher the competing preference). This finding, together with 
the regressions in objectives 1 and 2 are enough evidence to suggest that competing preferences 
are indeed correlated with factors that set women into two different paths: maternity and career.  
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In sum, these findings are consistent with claims that schemas of low fertility are more 
present for highly educated, women who work, and of higher wealth, but they co-exist with a desire 
for motherhood as those are exactly the same groups that present a deficit fertility. However, when 
it comes to decide whether to revise one’s goal, the first two groups (high educated and women 
who work) do not see the necessity of revising their plans downwards, but they hope they can 
make accommodations to fulfill first their human capital investments and then their role as 
mothers. But these women are already 30 and have fewer years ahead of them – with declining 
chances of conceiving. 
Given that postponement is being driven by women with BA and who work, policies such 
as affordable childcare and paid maternity leave which have been successfully implemented in 
some European countries could make a difference for the fertility recuperation in Brazil. It is 
important to learn what is necessary, in terms of public policy and institutional arrangements, to 
allow them have the children they wish because it might be easier to help a women have the 
children she is missing than fostering policies to increase incentives for childbearing in women 
who do not want to have any children.  
Further, the higher the wealth, the more odds a women have of revising her fertility down. 
This suggests that revising fertility is not a matter of not having enough money. That is possible, 
unless the costs associated with having children grows in different magnitude than the wealth of 
the women. Research for the United States has shown how the costs of raising children gets more 
expensive the richer the parents are. This happens because wealthy parents might have the desire 
to spend on their children whatever it takes to stay ahead in “this world of uncertainty” (Cohen, 
2015). So, the costs of children escalate. If this is also true for Brazil, this could explain why 
wealthy women revise their fertility down: it could be their strategy of maximizing their 
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investments. Future studies should investigate the levels of wellbeing of women and if they are 
somehow disturbed for having to revise their fertility downwards.  
As Alves and Cavenaghi (2009) find that income does not seem to affect fertility for highly 
educated, but do so for low educated, future work should also look more attentively to interactions, 
such as this effect of low socio-economic status when interacted with college education, and also 
interacted with work and marital status.  
It is also important to notice that Competing Preference might not be the best way to call a 
factor that embraces both things that depends on women’s will – such as career and college 
education – and things that might reflect women’s lack of choices, such as not having a partner 
with whom she would like to have children with. Although childbearing happens outside of 
marriage for many Brazilian women, those are usually of low socio-economic strata and at very 
early ages. When women are more empowered and are able to make choices that expands their life 
opportunities, such as the college attainment, both marriage and childbearing are postponed. So, 
remaining single while marriage is a condition sine qua non for childbearing cannot be simply be 
defined as a choice, but as constraint. The new parameter, if any, should be named Competing 
Preferences and Constraints. Future studies should explore how different socio-demographically 
are the groups who have deficit fertility due to the pursuit of life opportunities and those who have 
it because simply did not find a suitable partner. It would also be interesting to see the differences 
in wellbeing for both groups. 
Although this analysis suggests that the residual of the Bongaarts equation reflects 
competing preference (it would be a perfect measure if all other factors could have been measured 
perfectly), the residual might contain other unexplained variance in regards to fertility. In that case, 
after observing high correlations in the previous analysis and that the FC is indeed a good approach 
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to estimating deficit fertility but not a perfect one, I conclude that there are room for improvements 
in the empirical estimation of competing preferences. Current work is being done on a new and 
robust way to calculate this factor directly using simple aggregate population level data that could 
produce estimates of Competing Preference score that fits the original Bongaarts equation and that 
represents a revision of fertility intention downwards.  
The objective of this on-going work is not to fully explain the residual of the equation, 
given that there will always be unexplained and latent variables defining one’s fertility, but to 
minimize the residual by addressing into that equation some of the factors that are proved to be 
associated with competing preferences, estimating the counterfactuals. For example, what would 
the fertility deficit be if all never married women were to get married controlling for all socio-
demographic characteristics? What if all women with a bachelor’s degree suddenly had the same 
fertility as the ones without again controlling for other observable variables? This analysis needs 
to be done separately for each socio-demographic group (as the Bongaarts equation was at Chapter 
1) and for each survey year (because different years will have different variables that matter for 
Competition and Constraints). The strategy here is similar to a population standardization, but 
using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) (Austin, 2011, Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). The PSM 
has been used with DHS data in other studies (Vyas and Heise, 2005; Babalola and Vonrasek, 
2005).   
Back to the results of this chapter, the main limitation of this study is the fact that most of 
its analysis are constructed based on the report women give, at the time of the interview, of 
values for their DFS at the moment they did not have any children, sometimes referring to 
decades ago. But I have showed here and also at Chapter 2, that women might revise their goals 
when faced with competition, with unwanted pregnancies or when faced with unexpected sex 
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ratios. So, when the variables utilized in the Bongaarts equation are calculated, although they are 
asking women “back at the time when you did not have children”, women are reporting a DFS 
that might have already suffered transformation throughout the time.  
In that case, the competing preference parameter might be biased because what a women 
may have had reported in the far past might have been higher or lower than what she is reporting 
at the time of the interview. Unfortunately, DHS and PNDS are not the state of the art database 
to evaluate changes in desired fertility because they are cross-section, so they do not capture 
these changes as they happen. However, in the case of Brazil, this is the most appropriate 
database for this kind of study that was available at the time of this research and it is extremely 
rich in regards to fertility information. 
In order to further explore this limitation, in Table 3.8 I reconstruct reports of DFS using 
three different survey years, capturing samples of the same “cohort” of women 10 years later. 
Although they are not the same people given that the data is cross-sectional, women who were 
40-49 in 2006, were 30-39 in 1996 and 20-29 in 1986 assuming that mortality and international 
migration are not biasing my results. So, I am capturing a sample of a true population group.  
Notice in Table 3.8 how the values for the DFS according to age varies a lot over time, 
decreasing with the year and being always smaller for the younger women. For example, in 
2006, women age 20-29 have a DFS of 1.9 while women age 30-39 have a DFS of 2.15 and 
women age 40-49 have a DFS of 2.46. Looking across years for the same age group, women age 
20-29 in 1986 had a DFS of 2.60 in 1986, 2.09 in 1996 and 1.90 in 2006. 
It is impossible to know, however, whether these are effects of age, period or cohort. 
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However, the values for the cohorts on Table 3.8 do not seem to follow a big trend. They 
all decline in 1996 compared to 1986, and then return to higher values in 2006, when they reach 
40-49 year old. Thus, variations may be caused by small sample size differences. 
 I observed two increasing trends, for Protestants (2.41, 2.43 and 2.50 for 1986, 1996 and 
2006 respectively) and region North (2.56 in 1986, 2.62 in 1996 and 2.77 in 2006), and two 
decreasing tendencies, for Education 2 and 4, which refer to Middle School (2.62 for 198, 2.42 
for 1996 and 2.39 for 2006) and High School (2.43 for 1986, 2.30 for 1996 and 2.10 for 2006).  
In sum, the overall result indicate that women do revise their DFS, but not very much. So, 
in the end of the day, I am stuck with a measure of competing preference (FC) that evaluated the 
revisions of a women’s ideal family size of an ideal family size that might already been revised. 
It is possible that some of these of women on Table 3.8 might have revised their DFS because 
they had children. Others, revised down due to Competing Preference. In the end, they might 
cancel one another out. 
So, in my last analysis of the paper, I will do a humble attempt to investigate whether 
women’s preferences for DFS have altered over time controlling for their parity. Stratifying by 
selected socio-demographic characteristics, women aged 40-49 in 2006 are the same women 
aged 30-39 in 1996 and 20-29 in 1986. Using birth calendar data (age of mother at each birth), I 
also know where in time her children were born. So, for example, I am able to track samples of 
cohorts of women who had zero children in 1986 when they were 20-19, but who had one in 
1996 when they were 30-39 and then had 2 in 2006, when they were 40-49. I am also able to see 
their report of DFS at each of these moments and list down the reported DFS for each cohort of 
women who had each combination of parity at each year: 0, 1, 2 or 3 or more children in 1986, 0, 
1, 2 or 3 or more children in 1996, 0, 1, 2 or 3 or more children in 2006. I also calculated 
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measures of dispersion for DFS (mean, standard deviation, coefficient of variation) to understand 
if controlling for the timing of each parity, women at the aggregate level and as a cohort revised 
their intention.  
On Table 3.9, the reports of DFS and the measures of dispersion can be seen for each of 
those combinations as they represent different lines on the table.  
For example, I know that the group of women who had 0 children in 2006 also had 0 in 
1996 and had 0 in 1986. Their mean DFS as a group changed from 2.49 when they were 20-29 in 
1986 to 1.79 when they were 30-39 in 1996 to 1.80 when they were 40-49 in 2006. 
A group of women who started with 1 children in 1986, and moved to having 2 children 
in 1996 and finished with 3 in 2006, moved from having a mean DFS of 2.32 in 1986 to 2.32 in 
1996 to 2.82 in 2006 as a group.  
It is important to notice that given that the ones with zero are a larger pool of women, one 
cannot say that the DFS declined and then increased, but it certainly increased after women had 
the first children.  
The DFS and the measures of dispersion on Table 3.9 consistently increases for every 
group at every 10 years. For instance, for women who had 0 children in all years, the coefficient 
of variation moves from 0.52 in 1986 to 0.63 in 1996 and 0.95 in 2006. The higher the 
coefficient of variation, the more diversity within sample.  
The fact that the DFS changes and gets more diverse either means that women adapted 
their DFS to their current composition or that women who were selected of low fertility 
continued with zero as the other ones moved forward. It is interesting to see, however, that even 
when a women has zero children at age 40-49, she still mentions close to 2 (1.80) as a DFS. 
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Table 3.9 also shows that the major qualitative change is between the first two DHS (1986 
and 1996), with not a lot of movement happening after women turned 40.  
In sum, women’s reports has become more diverse as they follow different life paths with 
the first child birth being a great turning point in defining their mom’s DFC. 
This finding results suggest that the DFS, by the time are reported by women in the 
interview, have already been revised. However, it does not invalidate the Bongaarts parameters, 
but emphasizes that the competing preference parameter is estimated with limitations and can only 
be estimated properly when new measures of DFS make themselves available, and after all other 
factors are measured perfectly.  
Back to the results of this chapter, as Brazil is already 10 years older than its last PNDS 
survey, it will be interesting to see if these patterns of Competing Preferences continued and even 
gained more momentum as public policies that fostered education achievement and college 
enrollment among Blacks and people with low socio-economic status were implemented in the last 
decade.    
Last but not least, although competing preferences depletes fertility related to DFS, no 
other parameter in the Bongaarts equation (2001) exist to represent revisions upwards. For 
example, it is possible that re-marriage, love, peer pressure or even new social trends can cause a 
women to revise her goals upward.  
Future studies should investigate other turning points in a women’s life course. How 
frequent and in what circumstances women re-assess their fertility goals? In what measure and for 
which women an important job offer make women revise their goals? Likewise, for what women 
and how promising a loving partner would need to be in order for a 30 year old single woman 
revise their goals upwards or anticipate their fertility? How far do women go in order to accomplish 
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their dreams? Are the gains of motherhood compensating the losses in terms of professional 
achievements and personal life? In other words, what is the limit of one’s adherence to their own 
identity and how does it change to accommodate conflicting schemas? As Brazil heads to lowest 
low, will one see the participation of Competing Preferences and Constraints increase? What will 
be the new competing preferences and constrains in the near future?  
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 3.1: FC by mean age at first union, Brazil, 1986 
 
 
Figure 3.2: FC by mean age at first union, Brazil, 1996 
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Figure 3.3: FC by Mean age at first union, Brazil, 2006 
 
 
Figure 3.4: FC by proportion of women working, Brazil, 1986 
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Figure 3.5: Fc by proportion of women working, Brazil, 1996 
 
 
Figure 3.6: FC by proportion women working, Brazil, 2006 
 
 
 
 
R² = 0.4959
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
R² = 0.4316
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
25 35 45 55 65 75 85
153 
 
 
154 
 
 
155 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 3.1: Bivariate and Multivariate Poisson regressions of Children Ever Born, women 
age 40 and plus, Brazil, 1986, 1996 and 2006. 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Bivariate and Multivariate Poisson regression of Desired Family Size, all women, 
Brazil, 1986, 1996 and 2006. 
 
 
 
 
Models: Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate
Wealth Index (continuous) 0.80*** 0.89*** 0.80*** 0.88*** 0.81*** 0.88***
Work 0.81*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.95** 0.83*** 0.95***
BA_level 0.41*** 0.62*** 0.52*** 0.73*** 0.58*** 0.81***
Marital status (ref:Single) Cohabiting 32.69*** 24.58*** 11.36*** 9.38*** 5.22*** 4.56***
Married 31.54*** 25.87*** 10*** 9.28*** 4.65*** 4.49***
Separated/Divorced 26.51*** 23.15*** 9.84*** 8.69*** 4.56*** 4.29***
Constant for multivariate model 0.19*** 0.46*** 0.77**
Observations 647 647 2,547 2,529 3,743 3,726
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1986
Note: All multivariate models controlled by Race (except 1986), Region, Urbanicity, Religion and Church attendance (except 1986).
20061996
Incidence Rate Ratios
Incidence Rate Ratios
Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate
Wealth Index (continuous) 0.96*** 0.98*** 0.98** 0.99** 0.97*** 0.97***
Work 0.98 1.00 1.01 0.98 0.99 0.96***
BA_level 0.86*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.98 0.96** 1.03
Marital status (ref:single)
Cohabiting 1.15*** 1.02 1.13*** 1.00 1.19*** 1.03*
Married 1.23*** 1.08*** 1.30*** 1.10*** 1.35*** 1.11***
Separated/Divorced 1.05 0.93** 1.10*** 0.94*** 1.16*** 0.97
Age 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01***
Constant for multivariate model 1.75*** 1.29*** 1.13**
Observations 5,818 5,818 12,492 12,399 15,348 15,287
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1986 1996 2006
Note: All multivariate models controlled by Race (except 1986), Region, Urbanicity, Religion and Church attendance (except 1986).
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Table 3.3: Multinomial logit of Fertility Status, all women aged 30 and plus, Brazil, 1986, 
1996 and 2006. Reference category is Surplus. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Logit regressions of Not wishing to have more children (reference=1) compared 
to people who wish to have it later (0), women who have CEB<DFS, Brazil, women age 30 
and plus, 1986, 1996 and 2006. 
 
 
Neutral Deficit Neutral Deficit Neutral Deficit
Wealth Index (continuous) 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.35*** 0.22***
Work 0.10* 0.10 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.21*
BA_level 1.02*** 1.41*** 0.86*** 0.99*** 0.52*** 1.07***
Marital status (ref:single)
Cohabiting -1.03*** -2.26*** -1.56*** -2.57*** -2.10*** -3.70***
Married -0.49** -1.86*** -1.05*** -2.70*** -1.84*** -3.68***
Separated/Divorced -1.08*** -2.39*** -1.38*** -2.83*** -1.85*** -3.69***
Constant for multivariate model 0.33 0.66* 0.13 1.17*** 0.92 2.47***
Observations 7,991 7,991 6,004 6,004 2,341 2,341
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results are in log odds
2006 1996 1986
Note: All multivariate models controlled by Race (except 1986), Region, Urbanicity, Religion and Church attendance (except 1986).
Models: Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate
Wealth Index (continuous) 1.20** 0.34*** 1.10 0.11 1.06 0.08
Work 0.62*** -0.35* 0.91 -0.08 0.85 -0.13
BA_level 0.70* -0.81*** 0.76* -0.37** 0.58*** -0.53***
Marital status 
cohabiting (ref: married) 1.16 0.12
cohabiting (ref: single) 1.30 0.18 1.65*** 0.33*
Married (ref. single) 1.91 *** 0.51** 2.27*** 0.70***
Divorced (ref: single) 3.92*** 1.33*** 4.47*** 1.41***
0 -0.27 0 -0.20
Constant for multivariate model 2.05 0.12 -1.44
Observations 527 527 828 825 1467 1,455
Note: All multivariate models controlled by Race (except 1986), Region, Urbanicity, Religion and Church attendance (except 1986).
In 1986, women who were not married or cohabiting did not get asked the question about intention for additional births.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results in log odds. 
1986 1996 2006
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Table 3.5: Total count of children who were born in excess (if DFS-CEB <0, Surplus), who 
were not born (if DFS-CEB>0, Deficit) and born according to their mother's CFS (DFS-
CEB=0, Neutral), all women, Brazil, 1986, 1996 and 2006 (CONTINUE). 
 
    1986 1996 2006 
Total Total Neutral 1052 3153 4863 
  Total Surplus 3900 8513 6739 
  Total Deficit 8067 12690 13814 
  CEB 12357 25513 41292 
Education Level 0 Total Neutral 328 685 690 
  Total Surplus 2752 4982 2416 
  Total Deficit 1632 2120 1098 
  CEB 6748 11032 7257 
Education Level 1 Total Neutral 380 1163 1512 
  Total Surplus 896 2497 2714 
  Total Deficit 3036 4548 2954 
  CEB 3637 8542 9807 
Education Level 2 Total Neutral 153 509 1060 
  Total Surplus 123 597 904 
  Total Deficit 1567 2912 3941 
  CEB 878 2655 4587 
Education Level 3 Total Neutral 117 560 1127 
  Total Surplus 91 345 589 
  Total Deficit 1242 2228 3885 
  CEB 694 2383 4226 
Education Level 4 Total Neutral 74 236 472 
  Total Surplus 38 86 99 
  Total Deficit 590 877 1921 
  CEB 400 889 1564 
Catholic Total Neutral 830 2427 4065 
  Total Surplus 3150 6673 5817 
  Total Deficit 6694 9858 10950 
  CEB 10015 19880 23350 
Protestant     500 630 
  Total Neutral 94 1246 694 
  Total Surplus 343 1778 2219 
  Total Deficit 647 3978 3271 
  CEB 1176 5756 5490 
No religion Total Neutral 84 120 82 
  Total Surplus 302 442 137 
  Total Deficit 503 616 250 
  CEB 819 1028 445 
Urban Total Neutral 838 2650 3420 
  Total Surplus 2402 5960 4380 
  Total Deficit 6243 10457 10150 
  CEB 8442 18977 17749 
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Table 3.5: Total count of children who were born in excess (if DFS-CEB <0, Surplus), who 
were not born (if DFS-CEB>0, Deficit) and born according to their mother's CFS (DFS-
CEB=0, Neutral), all women, Brazil, 1986, 1996 and 2006 (CONTINUE). 
 
Rural Total Neutral 214 503 1443 
  Total Surplus 1498 2553 2359 
  Total Deficit 1824 2233 3664 
  CEB 3915 6536 9729 
Wealth Level 0 Total Neutral 120 249 301 
  Total Surplus 1371 1870 1194 
  Total Deficit 1091 1215 908 
  CEB 3136 4256 3334 
Wealth Level 1 Total Neutral 135 591 521 
  Total Surplus 926 3080 1302 
  Total Deficit 1364 2641 1644 
  CEB 2507 7288 4193 
Wealth Level 2 Total Neutral 400 901 1178 
  Total Surplus 1131 2131 1865 
  Total Deficit 3121 3603 3194 
  CEB 3916 6591 7167 
Wealth Level 3 Total Neutral 201 628 1948 
  Total Surplus 317 903 2037 
  Total Deficit 1314 2480 4962 
  CEB 1558 3839 9580 
Wealth Level 4 Total Neutral 196 768 915 
  Total Surplus 155 509 341 
  Total Deficit 1177 2684 3106 
  CEB 1240 3449 3204 
North Total Neutral 114 366 733 
  Total Surplus 440 982 1725 
  Total Deficit 975 1240 2251 
  CEB 1558 2873 5555 
Northeast Total Neutral 249 939 820 
  Total Surplus 2191 4667 1829 
  Total Deficit 2392 4858 2951 
  CEB 4867 10742 5747 
Southeast Total Neutral 531 976 1110 
  Total Surplus 997 1723 1177 
  Total Deficit 3448 3560 2851 
  CEB 4404 6229 5433 
South Total Neutral 158 512 1158 
  Total Surplus 272 543 928 
  Total Deficit 1252 1497 2796 
  CEB 1528 2811 5272 
Center-West Total Neutral   360 1042 
  Total Surplus   598 1080 
  Total Deficit   1535 2965 
  CEB   2858 5471 
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Table 3.5: Total count of children who were born in excess (if DFS-CEB <0, Surplus), who 
were not born (if DFS-CEB>0, Deficit) and born according to their mother's CFS (DFS-
CEB=0, Neutral), all women, Brazil, 1986, 1996 and 2006 (FINAL). 
 
Predicted education 0 Total Neutral 327 681 686 
  Total Surplus 2750 4977 2412 
  Total Deficit 1603 2052 1077 
  CEB 6733 11012 7238 
Predicted education 1 Total Neutral 376 1162 1495 
  Total Surplus 898 2500 2712 
  Total Deficit 2796 4279 2590 
  CEB 3635 8537 9780 
Predicted education 2 Total Neutral 150 499 1018 
  Total Surplus 123 598 904 
  Total Deficit 1245 2526 2689 
  CEB 867 2643 4567 
Predicted education 3 Total Neutral 122 570 1158 
  Total Surplus 91 344 594 
  Total Deficit 1555 2707 4864 
  CEB 706 2405 4261 
Predicted education 4 Total Neutral 77 241 504 
  Total Surplus 38 88 100 
  Total Deficit 868 1121 2579 
  CEB 416 904 1595 
White Total Neutral   1409 2003 
  Total Surplus   2132 1701 
  Total Deficit   5019 5408 
  CEB   8648 9259 
Black Total Neutral   1733 2625 
  Total Surplus   6360 4631 
  Total Deficit   7613 7411 
  CEB   16781 16644 
Note: In 1986, Center-West is included in Southeast. 
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Table 3.6: Estimates of Deficit Fertility based on women's report for Ideal Family Size compared to estimates of Competing 
Preferences (FC) measured as a residual of the Bongaarts equation and compared to the multiplication of the Competing 
Preference residual (FC) by Tempo effect (FT)and involuntary infertility (FI), Brazil, values for 1986, 1996 and 2006. 
 
 
 
 
Adjusted 
Deficit
FC FC*FI *FT % pop
Adjusted 
Deficit
FC FC* FI*FT % pop
Adjusted 
Deficit
FC FC* FI*FT % pop
Total 0.67 0.70 0.69 0.49 0.67 0.84 0.81 0.52 0.61 0.74 0.75 0.62
0 0.79 0.99 0.85 0.40 0.78 1.31 1.24 0.44 0.74 0.97 1.00 0.51
1 0.72 0.81 0.75 0.46 0.73 1.06 1.01 0.48 0.65 0.62 0.71 0.60
2 0.69 0.81 0.74 0.48 0.65 0.76 0.76 0.52 0.56 0.62 0.64 0.64
3 0.66 0.67 0.64 0.49 0.61 0.70 0.66 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.60 0.64
4 0.51 0.37 0.39 0.59 0.56 0.62 0.60 0.56 0.51 0.54 0.61 0.66
0 to 3 0.87 0.72 0.74 0.27 0.84 1.08 0.99 0.34 0.81 0.97 1.00 0.42
4 0.79 0.86 0.81 0.39 0.65 0.92 0.90 0.53 0.55 0.65 0.65 0.64
5 to 8 0.63 0.88 0.79 0.58 0.48 0.69 0.64 0.65 0.36 0.72 0.57 0.76
9 to 11 0.47 0.61 0.51 0.59 0.52 0.58 0.61 0.60 0.36 0.68 0.62 0.77
12 or more 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.64 0.50 0.45 0.51 0.60 0.40 0.49 0.50 0.73
Urban 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.51 0.64 0.80 0.77 0.53 0.57 0.67 0.68 0.63
Rural 0.73 0.68 0.65 0.45 0.75 0.87 0.85 0.48 0.68 0.91 0.94 0.56
North 0.71 0.78 0.80 0.47 0.70 0.94 0.86 0.49 0.62 0.66 0.69 0.64
Northeast 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.51 0.69 0.87 0.84 0.51 0.67 0.78 0.87 0.56
Southeast 0.66 0.73 0.69 0.49 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.53 0.56 0.68 0.66 0.63
South 0.65 0.70 0.68 0.49 0.65 0.54 0.59 0.52 0.55 0.69 0.63 0.68
Center-West 0.65 0.77 0.79 0.50 0.65 0.54 0.52 0.56
Catholic 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.48 0.67 0.72 0.69 0.52 0.60 0.72 0.85 0.63
Protestant 0.60 0.71 0.69 0.55 0.69 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.60
None 0.64 0.99 0.80 0.48 0.63 0.89 0.88 0.54 0.62 0.88 0.89 0.57
0 to 3 0.87 0.72 0.73 0.27 0.84 0.98 0.91 0.33 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.42
4 0.77 0.81 0.76 0.36 0.67 0.75 0.73 0.51 0.57 0.64 0.52 0.62
5 to 8 0.54 0.77 0.68 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.52 0.62 0.41 0.65 0.65 0.73
9 to 11 0.52 0.83 0.72 0.64 0.47 0.52 0.55 0.64 0.31 0.60 0.68 0.80
12 or more 0.45 0.73 0.57 0.69 0.45 0.34 0.42 0.65 0.32 0.44 0.45 0.79
White 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.52 0.63 0.58 0.61 0.53
Black 0.69 0.75 0.74 0.47 0.69 0.84 0.83 0.51
0.44 0.71 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.79
R2: 0.19 0.50 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.62
Figure #: 7 8 9 10 11 12
Note: No information for race was recorded for 1986. In that year, Center-West was included in Southeast.
Urbanicity
Wealth Index
Years of 
achieved 
education
Region
Religion
Predicted 
education 
level
Race
Pearson correlation:
198619962006
1
60
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Table 3.7: Estimates of Surplus fertility based on women's report for Ideal Family Size compared to estimates of Unwanted 
fertility (Fu) measured as the Bongaarts equation and compared to the Unwanted (Fu) multiplied by sex preferences (FSP)and 
child replacement (FR), values and Pearson correlations for Brazil, 1986, 1996 and 2006. 
 
Adjusted 
Surplus
Fu Fu*FSP*FR % pop
Adjusted 
Surplus
Fu Fu*FSP*FR % pop
Adjusted 
Surplus
Fu Fu*FSP*FR % pop
Total 1.32 1.19 1.28 0.18 1.50 1.23 1.32 0.23 1.46 1.34 1.54 0.20
0 1.56 1.28 1.42 0.31 1.78 1.30 1.53 0.37 1.78 1.44 2.04 0.36
1 1.45 1.18 1.36 0.26 1.73 1.27 1.38 0.32 1.59 1.41 1.87 0.26
2 1.35 1.20 1.41 0.21 1.48 1.22 1.28 0.22 1.41 1.31 1.53 0.18
3 1.27 1.17 1.31 0.16 1.31 1.17 1.27 0.17 1.26 1.23 1.34 0.14
4 1.12 1.15 1.23 0.07 1.17 1.15 1.22 0.12 1.14 1.15 1.25 0.10
0 to 3 1.50 1.28 1.66 0.37 1.82 1.33 1.52 0.43 1.69 1.44 1.68 0.39
4 1.38 1.30 1.46 0.26 1.41 1.21 1.32 0.22 1.33 1.30 1.55 0.17
5 to 8 1.25 1.15 1.23 0.12 1.29 1.22 1.32 0.13 1.16 1.26 1.60 0.07
9 to 11 1.16 1.10 1.22 0.09 1.17 1.14 1.23 0.10 1.15 1.22 1.26 0.07
12 or more 1.07 1.13 1.24 0.04 1.11 1.15 1.10 * 0.08 1.10 1.16 1.29 0.07
Urban 1.33 1.21 1.29 0.17 1.46 1.23 1.32 0.21 1.40 1.32 1.49 0.18
Rural 1.32 1.18 1.33 0.20 1.64 1.24 1.53 0.30 1.62 1.39 1.64 0.28
North 1.45 1.21 1.30 0.24 1.52 1.16 1.25 0.24 1.39 1.40 1.54 0.20
Northeast 1.47 1.20 1.41 0.22 1.77 1.26 1.58 0.29 1.82 1.43 1.94 0.30
Southeast 1.28 1.20 1.27 0.16 1.38 1.26 1.58 0.20 1.29 1.30 1.46 0.16
South 1.21 1.05 1.18 0.13 1.24 1.17 1.23 * 0.15 1.22 1.22 1.41 0.13
Center-West 1.25 1.06 1.23 0.15 1.26 1.15 1.26 * 0.18
Catholic 1.33 1.19 1.33 0.19 1.51 1.22 1.59 0.23 1.46 1.35 1.54 0.20
Protestant 1.27 1.22 1.37 0.15 1.46 1.26 1.73 0.23 1.41 1.28 1.39 0.22
None 1.44 1.23 1.36 0.21 1.75 1.28 1.75 0.26 1.58 1.38 1.63 0.22
0 to 3 1.50 1.26 1.64 0.37 1.82 1.33 1.65 * 0.44 1.69 1.44 2.01 0.39
4 1.38 1.30 1.46 0.27 1.41 1.21 1.60 0.23 1.33 1.29 1.47 0.18
5 to 8 1.25 1.18 1.26 0.15 1.29 1.20 1.58 0.14 1.17 1.26 1.48 0.08
9 to 11 1.16 1.12 1.25 0.08 1.17 1.15 1.38 0.09 1.15 1.22 1.56 0.06
12 or more 1.07 1.15 1.26 0.03 1.11 1.15 1.10 * 0.07 1.10 1.16 1.24 0.05
White 1.23 1.17 1.30 0.13 1.33 1.17 1.56 0.17
Black 1.39 1.22 1.32 0.21 1.61 1.27 1.59 0.26
0.73 0.74 0.89 0.64 0.94 0.85
R2: 0.53 0.54 0.80 0.41 0.88 0.72
Figure #: 13 14 15 16 17 18
Note: No information for race was recorded for 1986. In that year, Center-West was included in Southeast.
* Values replaced due to possible calculation errors or technique limitation in the original Bongaarts equation. On Chapter 1, the coefficients of Sex Preferences are shown to be highly sensitive to small sample 
sizes in certain sex compositions, disturbing the overall estimate of this factor when it comes to more sensitive analysis. If original values are kept, outliers highly disturb the correlation. After removing the outliers (*), 
the new correlation was changed to 0.64.
Wealth Index
Years of 
achieved 
education
Urbanicity
Region
Religion
Predicted 
education 
level
Race
Pearson correlation:
2006 1996 1986
1
61
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Table 3.8: Desired Family Size by survey year, age groups and selected covariates, Brazil 
(1986, 1996 and 2006). 
 
Total Catholics North
1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006
40-49 3.44 2.88 2.46 40-49 3.47 2.89 2.45 40-49 4.28 2.94 2.77
30-39 3.00 2.38 2.15 30-39 3.02 2.39 2.13 30-39 3.29 2.62 2.40
20-29 2.60 2.09 1.90 20-29 2.67 2.09 1.94 20-29 2.56 2.11 2.02
Wealth Level 0 Protestants Northeast
1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006
40-49 3.54 3.24 2.89 40-49 3.97 2.96 2.50 40-49 2.93 2.77 2.54
30-39 3.45 2.80 2.52 30-39 3.00 2.43 2.15 30-39 3.07 2.37 2.17
20-29 2.99 2.30 2.10 20-29 2.41 2.14 1.94 20-29 2.75 2.09 1.90
Wealth Level 1 No Religion Southeast
1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006
40-49 3.84 3.04 2.84 40-49 2.28 2.29 2.32 40-49 3.37 2.82 2.31
30-39 3.44 2.53 2.35 30-39 2.70 2.16 1.91 30-39 2.88 2.24 2.08
20-29 2.82 2.10 1.88 20-29 2.25 1.86 1.61 20-29 2.48 2.05 1.84
Wealth Level 2 Education 0 South
1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006
40-49 3.34 2.76 2.44 40-49 3.62 3.08 2.95 40-49 4.06 2.94 2.51
30-39 2.85 2.27 2.01 30-39 3.34 2.56 2.53 30-39 3.11 2.47 2.11
20-29 2.44 2.02 1.88 20-29 2.88 2.26 2.19 20-29 2.67 2.07 1.94
Wealth Level 3 Education 1 Center-West
1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006
40-49 3.38 2.87 2.38 40-49 3.53 2.85 2.39 40-49 3.39 2.72
30-39 2.87 2.35 2.08 30-39 2.88 2.42 2.16 30-39 2.91 2.26
20-29 2.48 2.09 1.86 20-29 2.62 2.07 1.87 20-29 2.27 2.05
Wealth Level 4 Education 2 White 1996 2006
1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006
40-49 2.85 2.39
40-49 3.33 2.80 2.34 40-49 3.30 2.64 2.51 30-39 2.32 2.17
30-39 2.76 2.30 2.20 30-39 2.80 2.27 2.04 20-29 2.12 1.88
20-29 2.52 2.08 1.93 20-29 2.35 2.03 1.84
Black 1996 2006
Urban Education 3
1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 40-49 2.90 2.51
30-39 2.43 2.15
40-49 3.31 2.78 2.37 40-49 2.89 2.71 2.10 20-29 2.06 1.91
30-39 2.89 2.32 2.09 30-39 2.55 2.30 1.99
20-29 2.50 2.04 1.87 20-29 2.43 2.03 1.85 Race 3 1996 2006
Rural Education 4 40-49 2.88 2.65
1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 30-39 2.18 1.91
20-29 2.33 1.86
40-49 3.84 3.34 2.93 40-49 2.56 2.55 2.33 Key Decrease and Increase
30-39 3.36 2.68 2.47 30-39 2.65 2.09 2.23 Decreasing
20-29 2.93 2.32 2.04 20-29 2.53 2.14 1.98 Increasing
Note: No information for race was recorded for 1986. In that year, Center-West was included in Southeast.
All women 
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Table 3.9: Measures of dispersion for Desired Family Size by survey year, age groups, birth 
cohort and children ever born in 1986, Brazil. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Age: 20-29)
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
CV
(Age: 30-39)
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
CV
(Age: 40-49)
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
CV
CEB CEB CEB
0 2.49 1.29 0.52 0 1.79 1.13 0.63 0 1.80 1.70 0.95
1 1.99 1.00 0.50 1 2.00 1.06 0.53
2 2.32 1.25 0.54 2 2.48 1.39 0.56
3 2.89 2.01 0.69 3 3.44 3.73 1.08
total (all parities) 2.49 1.29 0.52 2.45 1.69 0.69 2.64 1.76 0.67
1 2.32 1.14 0.49 1 1.81 1.16 0.64 1 1.95 1.84 0.94
2 2.63 2.35 0.90 2 2.35 0.85 0.36
3 2.43 1.22 0.50 3 2.82 1.47 0.52
total (all parities) 2.32 1.14 0.49 1.97 1.44 0.73 2.70 2.18 0.81
2 2.61 1.26 0.48 2 2.47 1.70 0.69 2 2.46 1.54 0.63
3 2.78 2.01 0.72 3 3.13 1.83 0.58
total (all parities) 2.61 1.26 0.48 2.29 1.34 0.59 2.67 1.67 0.62
Note: CV=coefficient of variation
Desired family size (DFS)
1986 1996 2006
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APPENDIX 1: CHAPTER 1 
a) Construction of the Wealth Index 
The Wealth Index was built following the guidelines of Rutstein and Johnson (2004). This is 
supposed to be a pure economic variable, without taking into account education level or 
occupation type. According to the authors, the wealth index has many advantages over other 
economic variables. It represents a more permanent status when compared to income or 
consumption, especially due to fluctuation of income in Brazil during the 80’s and early nineties, 
in particular during the period of hyper-inflation. It also solves a problem of missing data about 
income. For my Brazilian samples, 21.1% in 1986 and 14% in 2006 do not know the household 
income.  
Wealth is also more easily measured and requires fewer questions than either consumption 
expenditures or income (Rutstein and Johnson, 2004. p. 4). Plus, the assets taken into account in 
the measurements are easily observable by all residents. For instance, it is common to be 
unaware of your parental income, but it is very uncommon to not know whether one owns a 
fridge.    
As suggested by the authors, the variables chosen to compose the index have to be 
appropriate for the Brazilian reality, so they might differ from the ones utilized in this 
dissertation. Likewise, assets and utilities that are able to differentiate households in terms of 
economic prosperity might vary from one period to another. For example, when television was 
an expensive household item, having a TV was an important component of the index. When TV 
became popular and nearly universal, present even in the poorest households, it had to be left out 
of the index because it no longer separated people of different economic classes. Thus, I not only 
adapted the index to the Brazilian reality, but I created one index for each different DHS year 
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and the PNDS. To make it comparable among the 3 survey years, I divided the index into 5 
groups, ranging from 0 to 4, being 4 the wealthiest.  
The configuration of the index was as follow: 
I started by selecting some variables among household assets and utility services available at 
the DHS questionnaires and at the PNDS survey. I then conducted a Principal Component 
Analysis by factoring the variables for each year separately. PCA is a commonly used procedure 
to group strongly correlated variables. I performed the PCA for many different combination of 
variables in all three years, until I found a combination that fit the data well according to the 
PCA. For a matter of importance and space, I am only showing here the final combinations. For 
example, “source of drinking water” and “main material of the roof” did not prove to be relevant 
enough to be included in this index. The final selection after the PCA was as follow:    
For the year 1986, I used possession of television, radio system, bathroom, car, vacuum 
cleaner, washing machine and if the household had a housekeeper, or domestic servant. 
For the year 1996, I used possession of radio system, bathroom, car, vacuum cleaner, 
washing machine, housekeeper and VCR. 
For the year 2006, I used possession of vacuum cleaner, washing machine, housekeeper, 
fridge, telephone line, computer and internet access at home.  
The three PCA resulted in 2 different observable factors, or groups, for each year. 
For 1986, the first factor included the possessions of TV and bathroom, and the second factor 
included the possession of car, housekeeper, vacuum and washing machine. I assigned the same 
weight for each of the possessions, therefore, Factor 1 has three categories: 2= possession of 
television and bathroom, 1=possession of television or bathroom and 0=household does not 
possess any of them.  Similarly, factor 2, has 5 categories: 4= car, housekeeper, vacuum cleaner 
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and washing machine, 3=a combination of 3 out of the 4 already cited, 2=a combination of 2 out 
of the 4, 1=only one out of the 4, 0=household does not possess any of them. 
Then, I ran a crosstab between the two distinct groups, resulting in 12sub- categories. I re-
grouped them according to the number of the possessions: the higher the number of possessions, 
especially the possessions which would differentiate higher classes from lower, the higher the 
Wealth Index of the person. I chose to re-group them so that I could keep comparability with the 
other DHS by creating a 5-level continuous scale ranging from 0 to 4, being 4 the wealthiest 
category.  
The same procedure was used for 1996 and 2006, however, the variables utilized to 
differentiate poorer and richer were different – as it is supposed to be with the PCA method. For 
1996, the factor with the possession of bathroom differentiated the poorest from the rest; while 
car, housekeeper, vacuum and VCR differentiate the richest.  
For 2006, the possession of housekeeper, computer and internet differentiated the richer from 
the others, while the absence of fridge, washing machine and telephone differentiated the poor 
from the rest.  
Tables with the group distribution can be made available upon request.  
 
b) Construction of the Predicted Final Education Level 
 
Studies involving young subjects or school-age subjects are exposed to a common 
problem: their incomplete level of education. In the case of this dissertation analyzes, 22% of the 
respondents in 2006 (goes up to 64% among women age 15-19) and 21% in 1996 (65.3% for 
women age 15-19) are still in school and their achieved years of education might not correspond 
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to their final level of education. Statistical modelling can overcome differences in education level 
by controlling for age. Because this is a descriptive analysis where no control for age can be 
done, I opted for predicting the final level of education of women age 15 to 24 based on her age 
grade distortion and the probability that a women her age and with her current level of education 
would finish subsequent education levels.  
In order to calculate the grade progression probabilities, I used a different database that 
contained the age groups and education levels in 1986, 1987, 1996, 1997, 2006 and 2007 in order 
to build a distribution of women and school grade. The PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra 
Domiciliar) is nationally representative of the Brazilian population.   
I used two successive years (i.e.:1986 and 1987) because it was possible to derive the 
proportion of women who would successfully pass to the next school grade. For example, the 
proportion of 15 years-old who were in the 9th grade in 1986 and the proportion of 16 years-old 
who were in the 10th grade in the 1987 have been successful. Any 16 years old in the 9th grade in 
1987 would be considered to have failed one year in school.  
By doing that, I created a probability matrix for annual transitions. Assuming that these 
probabilities were roughly constant for a few years to come, I got the probability of transition to 
the next school level for each age and grade. For example, I found that the probability of having 
an Incomplete High School Degree (having 8 to 10 years of education) of a White45 women age 
17 years-old who were in the 9th grade in 2006 was 0.17. I also found that her probability of 
finishing High School was 0.68. Her probability of going to college was 0.15.  
                                                          
45 I calculated different probabilities for Whites and Blacks. I could have calculated for other social strata, but the refinement of 
this measurement is out of the scope of this dissertation given the complexity of the calculations. 
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After obtaining these probabilities using PNAD, I went back to the DHS and PNDS data 
to create, in every single year, for every women, a random variable ranging from 0 to 1 named 
“u”. A random White women age 17, for example, had the value of u= 0.25 while other had the 
value of u=0.83. I then assigned (or better, I predicted) one education level for each women 
based on her age, her current level and her value for u: 
In the previous example, the White women aged 17 with a value of u=0.25 would be 
assigned Incomplete High School (because her probability is lower than the 0.68 that is 
necessary to continue to finish High School). The women with the u=0.83 would be assigned 
Graduated High School because she would need to be at least 0.85 (0.68 + 0.17) to be considered 
“College”.    
This procedure was done for all three combinations (1986 and 1987; 1996 and 1997; and 
2006 and 2007). The strongest assumption I am making is that the grade progressions remains 
the same from year to year after 1987, 1997 and 2007, even though I know education outcomes 
have been improving in Brazil and, ideally, I would have to track women in 1987, 1988, 1989 
and so on.  
A quick analysis of the results (that deserves further investigation or even a future paper) 
show how the probability of finishing high school and proceeding to college has increased 
enormously over the decades. It has also showed how these probabilities are much higher for 
Whites.  
My predicted education levels which are used in the Bongaarts equation are: Elementary 
School or less (0 to 3 years of education), Elementary School (4), Middle School (5 to 8), High 
School (9 to 11) and college or some college (12 or more).  
Tables with the group distribution can be made available upon request  
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APPENDIX 1.2: CHAPTER 1 
The estimation of Sex Preferences as stated in the methods section lead some of the results to be 
inflated. That happens because the technique requires the division of the population in parity and 
composition, as can be seen in the example below: 
Parity Composition 
number of 
women 
(Pi) 
Number 
who 
doesn't 
want 
anymore 
Proportion 
doesn't 
want (Ci) 
Proportion 
Min (Ci*) 
Number of 
women/kids 
in the 
absence of 
preferences 
(Ci*Pi) 
1 b 5,519,480 2,735,999 0.50 0.50 2735999 
1 g 5,136,525 2,731,087 0.53 0.50 2546169 
2 bb 1,915,823 1,386,610 0.72 0.72 1386610 
2 bg 1,558,071 1,244,829 0.80 0.72 1127681 
2 gb 1,539,519 1,301,803 0.85 0.72 1114253 
2 gg 1,274,700 969,165 0.76 0.72 922586 
       
 ∑Pi= 16,944,118   
(∑(Ci*Pi) 
=  
                     
9,833,298  
       
       
 
Arnold 
(∑(Ci*Pi/∑Pi):  
                        
1.7231      
       
 
If higher the amount of variation in the proportion who doesn’t want (Ci), more inflated 
the rate will be (see below how the result of the division changes drastically from 1.72 to 2.45). 
The high variability might be caused by having too many parities with different compositions, to 
small sample sizes, or to both.  
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Parity Composition 
number of 
women 
(Pi) 
Number 
who 
doesn't 
want 
anymore 
Proportion 
doesn't 
want (Ci) 
Proportion 
Min (Ci*) 
Number of 
women/kids 
in the 
absence of 
preferences 
(Ci*Pi) 
1 b 5,519,480 2,759,740 0.50 0.50 2759740 
1 g 5,136,525 2,619,628 0.51 0.50 2568263 
2 bb 1,915,823 1,436,867 0.75 0.25 478956 
2 bg 1,558,071 623,228 0.40 0.25 389518 
2 gb 1,539,519 1,170,034 0.76 0.25 384880 
2 gg 1,274,700 318,675 0.25 0.25 318675 
       
 ∑Pi= 16,944,118   
(∑(Ci*Pi) 
=  
                     
6,900,031  
       
       
 
Arnold 
(∑(Ci*Pi/∑Pi):  
                        
2.4557      
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APPENDIX 2: CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Table A2.1: Top 5 preferred composition, women without children, Brazil, 1996 and 2006 
(CONTINUE). 
 
  1996       2006   
  n %     n % 
TOTAL 
bg 2,001 47.39   bg 1,927 40.89 
xx 385 9.12   xx 672 14.26 
No child 251 5.95   x 365 7.74 
g 240 5.68   No child 342 7.26 
bgg 223 5.28   g 290 6.15 
bbg 187 4.43   xxx 229 4.86 
b 171 4.05   bgg 179 3.8 
x 168 3.98   b 176 3.73 
bbgg 151 3.58   bbg 127 2.69 
Whites 
bg 773 47.02   bg 734 39.21 
xx 175 10.64   xx 336 17.95 
No child 101 6.14   x 158 8.44 
bgg 81 4.93   No child 132 7.05 
x 76 4.62   xxx 99 5.29 
Black 
bg 1,220 47.58   bg 1,037 41.65 
xx 210 8.19   xx 284 11.41 
g 175 6.83   No child 196 7.87 
No child 150 5.85   x 175 7.03 
bgg 141 5.5   g 174 6.99 
Wealth Level 0 
bg 154 45.29   bg 91 37.45 
bgg 25 7.35   xx 32 13.17 
bbgg 22 6.47   No child 24 9.88 
g 19 5.59   x 17 7 
bbg 19 5.59   g 13 5.35 
Wealth Level 1 
bg 441 50.63   bg 230 44.83 
g 58 6.66   xx 54 10.53 
xx 52 5.97   g 35 6.82 
No child 52 5.97   No child 31 6.04 
bgg 41 4.71   x 27 5.26 
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Table A2.1: Top 5 preferred composition, women without children, Brazil, 1996 and 2006 
(CONTINUE). 
Wealth Level 2 
bg 580 46.29   bg 448 41.25 
xx 115 9.18   xx 174 16.02 
No child 89 7.1   No child 86 7.92 
g 71 5.67   x 82 7.55 
bgg 68 5.43   g 74 6.81 
Wealth Level 3 
bg 386 46.34   bg 679 40.51 
xx 100 12   xx 230 13.72 
g 51 6.12   x 159 9.49 
bgg 50 6   No child 123 7.34 
No child 42 5.04   g 101 6.03 
Wealth Level 4 
bg 428 47.45   bg 479 40.08 
xx 98 10.86   xx 182 15.23 
No child 53 5.88   x 80 6.69 
g 40 4.43   No child 78 6.53 
xxx 39 4.32   xxx 69 5.77 
Urban 
bg 1,707 48.1   bg 1,453 40.28 
xx 333 9.38   xx 484 13.42 
No child 215 6.06   No child 282 7.82 
g 206 5.8   x 274 7.6 
bgg 184 5.18   g 241 6.68 
Rural 
bg 294 43.68   bg 474 42.86 
xx 52 7.73   xx 188 17 
bbgg 41 6.09   x 91 8.23 
bgg 39 5.79   No child 60 5.42 
No child 36 5.35   xxx 54 4.88 
  1996       2006   
  n %     n % 
Catholics 
bg 1,560 47.69   bg 1,454 40.21 
xx 306 9.35   xx 535 14.8 
g 193 5.9   x 292 8.08 
No child 183 5.59   No child 251 6.94 
bgg 177 5.41   g 207 5.72 
Protestant 
bg 293 49.49   bg 375 44.48 
xx 44 7.43   xx 103 12.22 
No child 32 5.41   No child 70 8.3 
bbg 31 5.24   g 63 7.47 
g 30 5.07   x 53 6.29 
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Table A2.1: Top 5 preferred composition, women without children, Brazil, 1996 and 2006 
(CONTINUE). 
 
No religious affiliation 
bg 98 42.61   bg 43 39.45 
xx 21 9.13   x 12 11.01 
No child 21 9.13   No child 11 10.09 
g 14 6.09   xx 7 6.42 
x 13 5.65   g 6 5.5 
North 
bg 247 53.7   bg 311 43.5 
g 37 8.04   xx 89 12.45 
No child 33 7.17   No child 54 7.55 
bgg 28 6.09   x 41 5.73 
bbg 27 5.87   bgg 35 4.9 
Northeast 
bg 815 48.51   bg 443 42.07 
xx 123 7.32   xx 114 10.83 
g 110 6.55   No child 86 8.17 
bgg 105 6.25   g 84 7.98 
No child 98 5.83   x 71 6.74 
Southeast 
bg 548 45.29   bg 375 35.65 
xx 129 10.66   xx 179 17.02 
No child 75 6.2   x 107 10.17 
b 68 5.62   g 76 7.22 
x 63 5.21   No child 74 7.03 
South 
bg 216 45.28   bg 381 39.08 
xx 60 12.58   xx 181 18.56 
No child 32 6.71   x 87 8.92 
x 30 6.29   No child 62 6.36 
bbg 27 5.66   g 49 5.03 
Center-West 
bg 175 44.3   bg 417 45.42 
xx 61 15.44   xx 109 11.87 
xxx 23 5.82   No child 66 7.19 
bgg 21 5.32   x 59 6.43 
bbg 18 4.56   xxx 50 5.45 
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Table A2.1: Top 5 preferred composition, women without children, Brazil, 1996 and 2006 
(CONTINUE). 
 
Cohabitation 
bg 86 51.5   bg 262 42.46 
g 13 7.78   xx 91 14.75 
xx 12 7.19   x 53 8.59 
x 11 6.59   g 42 6.81 
b 8 4.79   xxx 33 5.35 
Married 
bg 153 36.69   bg 204 39.92 
xx 69 16.55   xx 106 20.74 
xxx 29 6.95   x 44 8.61 
x 28 6.71   xxx 30 5.87 
bgg 24 5.76   g 27 5.28 
Separated/Divorced 
bg 41 39.81   bg 67 35.64 
No child 13 12.62   x 20 10.64 
b 9 8.74   No child 20 10.64 
g 7 6.8   g 18 9.57 
bgg 7 6.8   xx 17 9.04 
Single 
bg 1,721 48.68   bg 1,393 41.02 
xx 299 8.46   xx 458 13.49 
No child 219 6.2   No child 272 8.01 
g 200 5.66   x 248 7.3 
bgg 186 5.26   g 203 5.98 
No Church attendance 
bg 381 45.96   bg 297 37.83 
xx 66 7.96   xx 103 13.12 
No child 58 7   g 72 9.17 
g 46 5.55   No child 69 8.79 
bgg 44 5.31   x 68 8.66 
Church attendance 
bg 1,521 48.1   bg 1,630 41.5 
xx 298 9.42   xx 569 14.49 
g 180 5.69   x 297 7.56 
No child 172 5.44   No child 273 6.95 
bgg 169 5.34   g 218 5.55 
Not virgin 
bg 684 43.73   bg 1,220 41.4 
xx 154 9.85   xx 442 15 
No child 114 7.29   x 254 8.62 
g 112 7.16   No child 172 5.84 
b 78 4.99   g 171 5.8 
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Table A2.1: Top 5 preferred composition, women without children, Brazil, 1996 and 2006 
(FINAL). 
 
Virgin 
bg 1,317 49.55   bg 707 40.03 
xx 231 8.69   xx 230 13.02 
bgg 153 5.76   No child 170 9.63 
No child 137 5.15   g 119 6.74 
bbg 130 4.89   x 111 6.29 
Not working 
bg 1,091 49.64   bg 1,098 41.72 
xx 185 8.42   xx 359 13.64 
g 125 5.69   x 193 7.33 
No child 120 5.46   No child 176 6.69 
bgg 107 4.87   g 159 6.04 
Working 
bg 910 44.96   bg 829 39.84 
xx 200 9.88   xx 313 15.04 
No child 131 6.47   x 172 8.27 
bgg 116 5.73   No child 166 7.98 
g 115 5.68   g 131 6.3 
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Table A2.2: Proportion of women who desires additional children given her current 
composition and probabilities that the proportions are the same, women with only one child, 
Brazil, 1996 and 2006. 
 
 
 
 
Had a Boy Had a Girl Had a Boy Had a Girl
% wants 
more
% wants 
more
Probability
% wants 
more
% wants 
more
Probability
TOTAL 0.52 0.50 95.00 0.53 0.52 82.77
Race
White 0.50 0.49 58.80 0.58 0.55 85.83
Blacks and Brown 0.52 0.50 83.00 0.51 0.49 75.09
Religion
Catholic 0.51 0.48 90.70 0.55 0.51 98.37
Protestant 0.60 0.57 73.97 0.50 0.60 1.48
Non Religious 0.64 0.63 45.62 0.38 0.51 2.52
Urbanicity
Urban 0.49 0.46 98.29 0.52 0.50 77.16
Rural 0.61 0.62 33.00 0.62 0.59 68.42
Region
North 0.56 0.60 10.53 0.51 0.55 20.12
Northeast 0.55 0.54 66.03 0.51 0.50 58.01
Southeast 0.44 0.43 65.37 0.53 0.47 97.00
South 0.48 0.39 99.81 0.55 0.55 46.20
Center-West 0.61 0.61 44.91 0.63 0.63 45.74
Education Level
0 0.40 0.41 40.75 0.48 0.45 69.16
1 0.56 0.53 84.17 0.58 0.55 90.21
2 0.57 0.51 97.96 0.56 0.53 75.72
3 0.50 0.47 85.99 0.50 0.49 57.18
4 0.47 0.53 5.10 0.42 0.52 6.35
Wealth Index (percentile)
0 0.67 0.63 73.30 0.54 0.45 91.10
1 0.58 0.54 77.33 0.57 0.57 48.81
2 0.53 0.52 67.63 0.51 0.51 50.55
3 0.53 0.49 95.94 0.54 0.54 46.40
4 0.40 0.43 12.31 0.52 0.48 85.95
Church attendance
No 0.46 0.46 50.56 0.52 0.47 92.75
Yes 0.53 0.51 96.12 0.55 0.54 74.56
Work Status
No 0.56 0.55 78.70 0.54 0.56 15.67
Yes 0.48 0.45 94.25 0.53 0.47 99.34
Marital Status
Married 0.57 0.55 80.42 0.59 0.56 95.11
Separated/Divorced 0.39 0.29 99.48 0.42 0.33 97.67
Single 0.44 0.42 68.62 0.38 0.49 0.58
Note: Binomial distribution was assumed. Where the probability is smaller than 5%, the null hypothesis (the hypothesis 
that the proportions are the same) can be rejected. That means in those cases, the proportions are statistically 
different. Some values are significant due to discrepant sample sizes. Those won't be commented. 
19962006
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Table A2.3: Proportion of women who desires additional children given her current 
composition and probabilities that the proportions are the same, women with two children, 
Brazil, 1996 and 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Had BB Had GG Had BG Had BB Had GG Had BG
TOTAL 0.24 0.20 0.15 96.10 0.62 0.00 0.22 0.24 0.24 12.41 41.18 81.80
Race
White 0.22 0.19 0.12 80.69 0.10 0.00 0.16 0.21 0.19 8.21 29.24 77.07
Blacks and Brown 0.23 0.19 0.18 89.61 26.21 1.01 0.26 0.28 0.28 25.85 51.20 73.58
Religion
Catholic 0.24 0.19 0.14 96.66 0.73 0.00 0.22 0.24 0.24 17.43 43.21 75.98
Protestant 0.23 0.25 0.17 30.32 5.14 11.07 0.30 0.28 0.19 50.85 9.42 4.28
Non Religious 0.10 0.67 0.24 56.95 88.31 72.12 0.12 0.25 0.43 5.78 74.14 99.33
Urbanicity
Urban 0.23 0.17 0.13 98.52 3.42 0.00 0.19 0.22 0.22 18.19 59.01 86.12
Rural 0.25 0.25 0.19 44.81 2.82 2.10 0.31 0.39 0.31 9.66 9.32 42.91
Region
North 0.27 0.26 0.23 45.30 19.71 17.65 0.39 0.29 0.31 78.05 49.10 12.67
Northeast 0.35 0.18 0.17 99.55 37.66 0.00 0.22 0.28 0.29 5.15 48.03 92.38
Southeast 0.16 0.15 0.10 58.36 5.72 1.93 0.19 0.23 0.21 13.75 26.67 64.16
South 0.18 0.20 0.10 33.12 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.20 48.67 75.30 69.86
Center-West 0.27 0.23 0.22 70.55 38.76 13.93 0.24 0.30 0.21 18.74 9.60 24.64
Education Level
0 0.36 0.31 0.15 63.38 0.56 0.01 0.25 0.25 0.24 43.33 33.36 33.26
1 0.27 0.21 0.17 96.41 9.43 0.07 0.24 0.26 0.27 31.65 60.31 75.01
2 0.18 0.14 0.14 84.08 51.91 10.13 0.18 0.22 0.19 15.33 21.81 52.18
3 0.20 0.21 0.15 34.60 4.06 5.09 0.12 0.25 0.21 0.89 20.19 90.49
4 0.20 0.18 0.11 49.96 5.94 2.46 0.25 0.13 0.18 76.39 50.89 12.61
Wealth Index (percentile)
0 0.25 0.33 0.25 12.13 11.17 37.44 0.26 0.35 0.40 9.00 63.16 92.15
1 0.45 0.17 0.23 99.95 71.25 0.01 0.34 0.22 0.27 94.69 73.32 8.93
2 0.33 0.20 0.18 99.82 21.45 0.00 0.16 0.25 0.24 0.89 33.38 94.91
3 0.14 0.18 0.13 5.69 3.22 34.04 0.23 0.29 0.18 11.68 1.38 9.88
4 0.16 0.19 0.07 21.52 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.19 38.38 87.94 90.85
Church attendance
No 0.26 0.16 0.11 94.63 8.75 0.02 0.24 0.21 0.24 63.59 63.29 43.93
Yes 0.23 0.20 0.16 87.77 1.02 0.00 0.21 0.25 0.23 7.70 20.04 68.54
Work Status
No 0.26 0.25 0.18 69.03 0.57 0.05 0.27 0.25 0.24 64.22 30.94 15.55
Yes 0.21 0.14 0.13 98.30 18.70 0.02 0.16 0.23 0.24 1.57 53.07 98.73
Marital Status
Married 0.25 0.22 0.14 85.55 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.26 0.26 20.66 46.33 76.17
Separated/Divorced 0.16 0.10 0.20 89.30 97.62 73.16 0.13 0.20 0.17 5.52 21.27 67.61
Single 0.27 0.64 0.18 0.19 0.01 12.07 0.78 0.73 0.15 56.42 30.10 67.45
Note: Binomial distribution was assumed. Where the probability is smaller than 5%, the null hypothesis (the hypothesis that the proportions are the same) can be rejected. That means in those 
cases, the proportions are statistically different. Some values are significant due to discrepant sample sizes. Those won't be commented. 
GG vs. 
BB
GG vs. 
BG
BB vs. 
BG
% wants more % wants more
2006 1996
Probabilities
GG vs. 
BB
GG vs. 
BG
BB vs. 
BG
Probabilities
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Table A2.4: Parity Progression Rates by selected variables, all women with children, Brazil, 1996.  
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b 0.77 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.83 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.73 0.80 0.84 0.80 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.82 0.72 0.88 0.78 0.68 0.65 0.70
g 0.76 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.83 0.76 0.79 0.74 0.72 0.79 0.84 0.80 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.76 0.81 0.67 0.87 0.76 0.66 0.69 0.69
In-group signif icance
b_b 0.65 0.60 0.68 0.62 0.75 0.66 0.70 0.62 0.57 0.64 0.80 0.75 0.66 0.54 0.50 0.64 0.71 0.64 0.84 0.62 0.50 0.42 0.41
b_g 0.62 0.52 0.68 0.60 0.71 0.68 0.70 0.57 0.48 0.55 0.74 0.72 0.64 0.55 0.43 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.81 0.58 0.46 0.46 0.34
g_b 0.64 0.57 0.69 0.62 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.60 0.55 0.63 0.79 0.73 0.62 0.57 0.50 0.64 0.67 0.56 0.84 0.59 0.49 0.43 0.45
g_g 0.66 0.61 0.69 0.63 0.75 0.70 0.72 0.59 0.59 0.63 0.76 0.77 0.64 0.58 0.51 0.65 0.71 0.64 0.80 0.64 0.56 0.53 0.47
In-group signif icance
b_b_b 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.53 0.76 0.60 0.65 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.78 0.67 0.55 0.44 0.40 0.61 0.54 0.44 0.76 0.53 0.33 0.33 0.22
b_b_g 0.52 0.39 0.59 0.48 0.64 0.65 0.60 0.39 0.45 0.51 0.73 0.61 0.51 0.40 0.27 0.52 0.56 0.41 0.68 0.46 0.34 0.36 0.11
b_g_b 0.57 0.51 0.59 0.54 0.70 0.56 0.60 0.54 0.53 0.56 0.69 0.67 0.56 0.46 0.38 0.56 0.64 0.54 0.74 0.47 0.40 0.39 0.17
b_g_g 0.57 0.44 0.63 0.52 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.48 0.46 0.38 0.75 0.68 0.49 0.50 0.22 0.57 0.54 0.61 0.73 0.47 0.37 0.34 0.33
g_b_b 0.57 0.49 0.62 0.51 0.74 0.60 0.69 0.52 0.43 0.46 0.80 0.66 0.53 0.55 0.32 0.58 0.61 0.56 0.71 0.52 0.35 0.40 0.12
g_b_g 0.60 0.51 0.63 0.55 0.73 0.61 0.70 0.48 0.59 0.46 0.81 0.68 0.56 0.48 0.28 0.61 0.55 0.63 0.77 0.54 0.30 0.29 0.15
g_g_b 0.57 0.52 0.60 0.53 0.71 0.65 0.66 0.50 0.49 0.40 0.73 0.64 0.56 0.45 0.38 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.72 0.60 0.41 0.20 0.20
g_g_g 0.58 0.49 0.62 0.53 0.71 0.63 0.66 0.49 0.54 0.42 0.76 0.65 0.55 0.44 0.42 0.59 0.54 0.69 0.74 0.56 0.38 0.23 0.43
In-group signif icance
In group significance denotes the p value for the X2 test of within group differences. 
Notes: Statistically significant differences are in bold when reference category is b_b or b_b_b. Statistically significant differences are in red when reference category is g_g or g_g_g. If red and bold, number is 
statistically different than both reference categories. 
0.000
0.0000.000 0.000
0.000 0.000
0.006 (except No 
Affiliation)  0.090 (except 
Catholic)
non-sig0.000 (except 2) 0.000
0.0000.004 (except 2).
0.000 0.000 0.0020.008 (1 and 4) < 0.061 0.000
1
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Table A2.5: Parity Progression Rates by selected variables, all women with children, Brazil, 2006.  
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b 0.35 0.68 0.75 0.69 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.74 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.73 0.74 0.66 0.90 0.78 0.66 0.57 0.59
g 0.35 0.69 0.73 0.69 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.80 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.64 0.71 0.77 0.64 0.89 0.80 0.64 0.57 0.58
In-group signif icance
b_b 0.56 0.49 0.60 0.52 0.63 0.68 0.59 0.53 0.48 0.53 0.77 0.62 0.60 0.52 0.37 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.76 0.61 0.44 0.41 0.28
b_g 0.52 0.43 0.58 0.49 0.59 0.64 0.56 0.50 0.42 0.52 0.70 0.66 0.51 0.50 0.34 0.54 0.51 0.45 0.77 0.54 0.43 0.34 0.30
g_b 0.53 0.46 0.56 0.50 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.74 0.62 0.60 0.47 0.34 0.52 0.56 0.53 0.77 0.57 0.43 0.33 0.31
g_g 0.57 0.49 0.61 0.54 0.62 0.65 0.63 0.54 0.48 0.54 0.77 0.67 0.58 0.52 0.41 0.57 0.56 0.51 0.81 0.61 0.47 0.35 0.34
In-group signif icance
b_b_b 0.49 0.38 0.54 0.42 0.58 0.61 0.53 0.44 0.37 0.45 0.64 0.60 0.50 0.42 0.26 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.68 0.45 0.39 0.28 0.19
b_b_g 0.44 0.33 0.50 0.40 0.52 0.48 0.53 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.68 0.55 0.48 0.37 0.16 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.63 0.44 0.35 0.21 0.13
b_g_b 0.46 0.37 0.50 0.45 0.47 0.58 0.46 0.45 0.38 0.40 0.62 0.45 0.59 0.39 0.22 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.59 0.48 0.32 0.26 0.15
b_g_g 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.48 0.57 0.64 0.55 0.46 0.41 0.45 0.72 0.64 0.47 0.48 0.20 0.52 0.53 0.48 0.67 0.51 0.37 0.36 0.17
g_b_b 0.48 0.34 0.56 0.45 0.54 0.62 0.56 0.40 0.42 0.38 0.69 0.62 0.52 0.37 0.31 0.49 0.50 0.33 0.65 0.49 0.28 0.33 0.25
g_b_g 0.47 0.39 0.51 0.43 0.54 0.59 0.43 0.46 0.36 0.49 0.64 0.55 0.50 0.42 0.20 0.48 0.47 0.38 0.63 0.50 0.30 0.34 0.14
g_g_b 0.47 0.39 0.52 0.44 0.52 0.55 0.53 0.41 0.48 0.40 0.67 0.53 0.47 0.42 0.30 0.47 0.50 0.41 0.60 0.47 0.41 0.29 0.13
g_g_g 0.48 0.44 0.51 0.46 0.53 0.55 0.47 0.38 0.50 0.53 0.72 0.54 0.45 0.46 0.29 0.51 0.46 0.29 0.65 0.47 0.37 0.32 0.30
In-group signif icance
In group significance denotes the p value for the X2 test of within group differences. 
Notes: Statistically significant differences are in bold when reference category is b_b or b_b_b. Statistically significant differences are in red when reference category is g_g or g_g_g. If red and bold, number is 
statistically different than both reference categories. 
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000
0.0000.000
0.000 0.000
0.000
0.077 (except Prot.)
0.016 (Except Prot.)
 0.004 (except Region 5).
0.003
0.000
0.006
0.000
1
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Does intention translate into behavior? 
 
In light of the Theory of Conjunctural Action, I now move to the realms of outcomes to 
see whether a women’s preferences can be noticed in her wish and likelihood of progressing to 
higher parity order births. So far, I know that women’s intentions are different than what would be 
expected from the preferences once they start having children, as suggested by the analysis of post-
rationalization. But who are more likely to proceed to higher parities according to their existing 
composition? In the previous sections, I observed that the most desired composition is the balance 
(bg). Therefore, I expect that women who already have two children of the same sex might show 
a greater propensity to desire more children and to continue childbearing in order to have them.  
In Table A2.2 and A2.3 (Appendix 2: Chapter 2) I present the proportion of women who 
desires an additional child given the composition of the existing children (only women who has 
had at least one child ever born). I utilized the same datasets to calculate these proportions, but I 
used women’s answers to the question “would you like an additional children”? The results are 
showed separately by survey year and can be seen on Table A2.2 for women who had one child 
wishing a second child and on Table A2.3 for women who had two children wishing a third child.  
I ran Binomial tests in order to check whether the proportions of women who wishes to 
have an additional child is different according to the sex of existing children. On Table A2.2, I 
compared women who had a boy with women who had a girl. The probabilities can be seen on the 
columns to the right. Where the probability is smaller than 5%, the null hypothesis (the hypothesis 
that the proportions are the same) can be rejected. That means in those cases, the proportions are 
statistically different. On Table A2.3, I first compare women who had two girls compared to 
women who had two boys (Column GG vs. BB), then women who had two girls compared to 
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women who had one of each (GG vs. BG). Last, I compared the women who had two boys 
compared to women who had one boy and a girl (BB vs. BG).  
For Table A2.2, at the level of 5% in 1996, Protestants, people without religious affiliation 
and singles have slighter higher proportions of wishing an additional child if the first is a girl. For 
example, while 60% of the Protestants who had a girl say they want an additional child, only 50% 
who had a boy say so. It is impossible to know, however, whether this is a search for balance or a 
son preference. I also believe that those values only came up significant due to the small sample 
sizes in those categories (not shown). In 1996, very few people who have children are not Catholic 
or are single. In 2006, as can be seen in Table A2.2, all proportions for parity one were not 
statistically significant. That is, there are no significant differences for women that had a boy or a 
girl in their odds of wishing to have a second child.  
For parities of two children moving forward to parity 3, as can be seen in Table A2.3, the 
socio-demographic groups start to look more different. In 1996, however, given that the sample 
sizes are still small for some groups and there is no clear tendency (not even a significant value at 
the country level), the results are not strong and won’t be taken into consideration1. I believe that 
in the year of 1996, the sex of the existing children are less important for moving forward probably 
because desired family size and especially fertility rates, were still very high. It is also important 
to notice that comparing to 2006, 1996 has much less daughter preference in general. 
In 2006, on the other hand, the values at the country level on Table A2.3 are significant: 
the proportion who wants a third child is much lower if the first two children are of opposite sexes 
than if the first are of the same sex. For example, while 24% of women who had two boys say they 
are willing to have a third child, only 15% of the ones who had a boy and a girl say so.  
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This is an indication of balance preference because the strength of the desire to continue is 
high for both people with two girls and two boys: those who had two girls also have higher chances 
of wishing more (20%). There is also a clear tendency when analyzing socio-demographic groups, 
with most of them following this national finding: this is the case of married, Catholics, South and 
Southeast, very low and very high educational levels, people who attend church, and people who 
don’t work. 
If the proportion is statistically significant for people with two girls and two boys when 
compared to women who have a sex mix, it is impossible to know for sure whether a certain group 
is looking for balance or has a son/daughter preference. However, if the direction of the strength 
goes in only one direction (if a person with two girls is more likely to wish an additional child, but 
those with two boys are not more likely to wish an additional child), I will assume there is a sex 
preference.   
Thus, in 2006, I will deduce son preference for wealth level 3 and daughter preference for 
Blacks, Northeast, Education Level 1, wealth level 1 and 2, for those who don’t go to church, and 
for people who work.  Singles have too small of a sample size to be considered in this analysis. 
Finally, intentions of having an additional children might not actually translate into 
behavior either. As a last attempt to evaluate sex preferences, I present real parity progression rates 
for all women until parity 4 (Table A2.4 for 1996 and Table A2.5 for 2006 in the Appendix 2: 
Chapter 2). Parity progressions are useful because they avoid ex post-rationalization, since women 
are not being directly asked about their preferences. I assume that in the past, when they decided 
to have an additional child, they took into account the composition of the children they already 
had. I neither also cannot affirm that a future child won’t exist.   
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The numbers represent the proportion who moved forward in the childbearing process 
given the composition already had. The closer the number is to 1, the higher the proportion 
moving forward. For example, in Table A2.4, 77% of the women in 1996 who had a son has 
moved forward while 76% of those who had a girl moved forward. On Table A2.5, for the year 
of 2006, 35% moved forward.  
In order to see if those proportions are statistically different from one another, I ran 
Bivariate logits to see if I can predict whether a person stopped at parity 1, 2 or 3 based on the 
sex composition already had. I investigated whether the proportions are different within groups 
(comparing Black and Whites, for example) and also by parity composition within category 
(comparing within a certain category for a certain year and parity, having a girl with having a 
boy, for example). The results are shown in the table (see Table A2.4 and Table A2.5 footnote 
for explanations about which differences are statistically significant). 
Take, for example, Table A2.5, Center-West, progression for 3 birth. While 48% of the 
women who had two boys or two girls move forward, 42% of women who had a boy and then a 
girl and 49% of the ones who had a girl and a boy moved forward. The coefficients in bold 
(regardless of color) are statistically different than one another (bb compared bg). Likewise, the 
numbers in red are statistically different from each other as well (bg compared to gg).  
Unfortunately, descriptive analysis such as these cannot inform about the proportion of 
these children who were unwanted, neither can they tell apart how much of this progression is 
due to different desired family sizes (or intrinsic differences in fertility levels). So, comparisons 
between groups’ sex preferences should be made with caution.    
Summing up, the progression to the 2nd child based on the sex of the first child is less 
dependent on the key covariates than I previously thought. Notice in Tables A2.4 and A2.5 how 
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the sex of the first child matters very little for further progression. When it comes to two children 
and the progression to the 3rd birth, however, for every single group in both years the proportion 
progressing for higher parities is bigger if the first two children are of the same sex, regardless of 
being a boy or girl – a great suggestion of balance preference when it comes to real behavior. The 
differences in progression are less significant in 1996 probably because fertility was still high.  
In general, the proportion of women progressing to higher order births decreased 
throughout the two years analyzed in this paper given the general decline in fertility that probably 
generated an increase in sex indifference. Much fewer people are willing to trade in family size 
for parity composition. One can also notice that progression declines with increasing education 
(notice in Table A2.4 and A2.5 how the proportion moving forward is smaller the higher the 
education level). Take, for example, Table A2.5, the proportion moving forward after having two 
sons. For the first education level, 64% will move forward. For the second level, 60%. For the 
third, 50%. For the forth, 42%. Finally, women with college education only progresses for a third 
birth 26% of the times in case of having two boys. The same behavior is found for wealth index, 
because more educated and wealthier people will always have fewer children than their 
counterparts. Likewise, inhabitants of rural areas will always be more likely to progress to higher 
order births than people who live in urban areas.  
Much of this difference is explained by different levels of contraceptive access, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. This can be also suggested by the role of education, and urbanization in 
reducing gender preferences. Highly educated and urban women are the ones with the higher costs 
of opportunity when having children, so it is natural to think that they would be the first ones to 
give up on their desired composition and present indifference as observed in the data. Future work 
should illuminate the differences in post-rationalization by women of different social groups. It is 
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possible that since educated and urban women are more indifferent, they should also be the ones 
with fewer levels of rationalization. 
In an attempt to summarize the most important results of this Chapter, in the Box 2 below 
I summarize the hypotheses of this work and the most important indications of sex preferences 
found with the four different methods employed. Notice how for a Parity Progression and for the 
proportion of women who wishes an additional children, balance and indifference were aggregated 
due to the problems in telling them apart. I also included a row for the findings of Chapter 1. In 
that case, I listed just the variables which has higher values for the sex-preference factor (FSP). 
That analysis, however, cannot tell much about the direction of that preference. 
In a general sense, the findings are consistent with the hypothesis presented in this chapter 
and with the findings for chapter 1. For example, separated/divorced, virgin, women who work, 
singles and mid-educated women have more daughter preference, while region South is constantly 
preferring male, if not a balance. Married, Catholic, church goers and rural areas are more into 
balance, as predicted.  
It is also possible to see that the more difficult it is for a women to trade in family sizes in 
order to achieve her desired composition, more difficult it is for her to match her intentions and 
outcomes (see, for example, urban women). Unless, of course, she mentions that she is indifferent. 
The fact that the parity progression of highly educated is unaltered by sex, also strengthens the 
hypothesis that they are indifferent and less willing to trade off quantity for quality given that their 
opportunity cost of having too many children is much higher.  
 
 
 
186 
 
Box 2: Summary of findings by type of sex preference and methods utilized in this chapter. 
 Daughter Son Balance Indifference 
Hypotheses 
(Chapter 2) 
Single 
Divorced/Separated 
Black 
Low educated/Low income 
Work 
Virgin 
Urban 
South Married 
Rural 
Catholic/Protestant 
Church goers 
Urban 
High education 
Desired Sex Ratio Urban (2006) South 
Rural 
High school 
  
Multinomial Logits Single 
Separated/Divorced 
Virgin (2006) 
North/Northeast 
Work 
Church goers 
South 
 
Black 
Urban (2006) 
Non church-goers 
Married 
Old 
Rural 
Catholic 
Church goers 
Wealth 
High education 
Virgin (1996) 
Proportion wishing 
an additional child 
giving the sex of the 
existing children 
Black 
Northeast 
Education 1 
Wealth 1,2 
No church 
Work  
Wealth 3 
 
Married 
Catholic 
South 
Southeast 
Low and High education 
Church goers 
Don’t work 
Wealth 3 (1996) 
Parity progression Primary education (1996) 
High wealth 
High school 
Low educated White 
Black 
Rural/Urban 
North 
Northeast 
South 
Center-West 
Wealth 2, 3 and 4. 
Catholic 
Low educated 
Primary 
High school 
Whites (1996) 
South (1996) 
Center-West (1996) 
Bongaarts 
(Chapter 1) 
Low educated (2006) 
Rural, Highly educated, South, Center-West, Southeast, Catholic, Protestants, Whites 
(1996) 
Notes:  
For Odds Wishing and Parity progression, I united Indifference with Balance Preferences because it is impossible to 
tease them apart.  
Unless otherwise specified in parenthesis, the relationship was found for both years (1996 and 2006). 
All relationships found to be statistically significant are represented in this Box, even if the coefficients are small. 
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In conclusion, these finding shows the applicability of the Theory of Conjunctural Action 
to explaining sex preferences in Brazil. Although women have their intentions formed by their 
schemas as can be seen in the analysis of intentions, the conjunctures of life may even change what 
they consider to be good, as could be seen in the analysis of post-rationalization. For those who 
are unsatisfied, women still have the agency to keep going or at least, to say they “wish they could”. 
One thing to be learned from the analysis of the parity progressions and future intentions 
is that although the search for balance has been declining (lower proportions of people continuing 
childbearing regardless of sex composition), most social groups will still show some tendency of 
continuing when they are caught by surprise of having two of the same sex. Thus, for Brazilian 
women, sex preferences matters for progression, even if subtly, so family size increases in the 
same direction and with the strength of this preference.  
It is also important to say that it has been 10 years since the last PNDS. It is very possible 
that such patterns have been totally transformed in the face of the most recent fertility decline.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
188 
 
APPENDIX 3: CHAPTER 3 
Table A3.1: Population values for: mean years of education, mean age at first union and 
proportion of women in the labor force by year, Brazil, DHS (1986, 1996) and PNDS (2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006
Wealth level 0 2.24 2.93 4.69 19.06 18.86 18.09 40.73 44.5 29.94
Wealth level  1 3.96 4.48 5.96 19.04 19.18 18.85 37.5 45.29 36.11
Wealth level  2 5.85 6.18 7.08 19.81 19.82 19.39 45.58 48.9 43.89
Wealth level  3 7.26 7.13 7.88 20.53 20.35 19.80 46.74 54.18 48.92
Wealth level  4 9.13 9.01 10.37 21.54 21.07 21.68 47.66 58.8 60.18
Groupedu 0 1.53 1.62 1.66 19.09 18.86 18.21 38.55 44.25 34.81
Groupedu 1 4.89 5.06 5.18 19.43 19.38 18.72 39.46 44.82 39.62
Groupedu 2 8.73 8.63 8.71 20.43 20.09 19.46 38.58 46.88 40.28
Groupedu 3 11.00 11.00 11.00 21.89 21.68 21.12 60.41 66.67 55.71
Groupedu 4 12.00 12.00 12.00 23.59 23.62 23.30 76.01 80.16 75.84
Urban 6.43 6.71 8.28 20.05 20.03 20.08 44.68 51.43 51.07
Rural 3.16 3.79 6.09 19.43 19.29 18.91 41.65 46.07 35.82
North 6.06 6.57 7.49 18.78 19.07 18.77 40.48 50.3 40.76
Northeast 4.63 5.46 7.20 19.57 19.72 19.54 38.95 46.88 45.67
Southeast 6.29 6.70 7.83 20.56 20.55 20.39 46.88 52.22 46.75
South 5.70 6.67 7.85 19.54 20.16 20.14 48.82 56.97 54.76
Center-West . 6.27 7.82 . 19.17 19.51 . 50.75 43.88
Catholics 5.65 6.07 7.56 19.92 19.92 19.74 44.38 50.59 47.34
Protestants 5.63 6.14 7.93 19.83 19.74 19.69 40.5 50.19 43.07
No-religion 5.17 6.08 7.46 19.29 19.21 18.73 40.92 44.67 38.75
Escola 0 1.51 1.61 1.65 19.11 18.88 18.23 38.5 44.37 34.97
Escola 1 4.76 4.98 5.08 19.44 19.40 18.76 40.4 45.38 40.44
Escola 2 8.27 8.40 8.50 20.48 20.08 19.52 38.92 47.4 44.06
Escola 3 10.50 10.72 10.65 21.81 21.57 20.99 54.24 63.08 51.34
Escola 4 11.63 11.74 11.62 23.10 23.48 22.98 68.1 73.99 66.49
White . 6.97 8.15 . 20.25 20.17 . 51.98 50.11
Black . 5.65 7.09 . 19.63 19.44 . 49.41 44.67
Mean years of education Mean age at first union
Proportion of Women in the 
labor force
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Table A3.2: Calculation process of Adjusted Deficit and Adjusted Surplus factors 
(CONTINUE) 
  1986   1996   2006 
  Total 
Total Neutral 1052   3153   4863 
Total Surplus -3900   -8513   -6739 
Total Deficit 8067   12690   13814 
CEB 12357   25513   41292 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 20424   38203   0.67 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.61   0.67   27478 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 8457   17000   20739 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.46   1.50   1.32 
            
  Education Level 0 
Total Neutral 328   685   690 
Total Surplus -2752   -4982   -2416 
Total Deficit 1632   2120   1098 
CEB 6748   11032   7257 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 8380   13152   8355 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.81   0.84   0.87 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 3996   6050   4841 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.69   1.82   1.50 
            
  Education Level 1 
Total Neutral 380   1163   1512 
Total Surplus -896   -2497   -2714 
Total Deficit 3036   4548   2954 
CEB 3637   8542   9807 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 6673   13090   12761 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.55   0.65   0.77 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 2741   6045   7093 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.33   1.41   1.38 
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Table A3.2: Calculation process of Adjusted Deficit and Adjusted Surplus factors 
(CONTINUE) 
            
  Education Level 2 
Total Neutral 153   509   1060 
Total Surplus -123   -597   -904 
Total Deficit 1567   2912   3941 
CEB 878   2655   4587 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 2445   5567   8528 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.36   0.48   0.54 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 755   2058   3683 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.16   1.29   1.25 
            
  Education Level 3 
Total Neutral 117   560   1127 
Total Surplus -91   -345   -589 
Total Deficit 1242   2228   3885 
CEB 694   2383   4226 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 1936   4611   8111 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.36   0.52   0.52 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 603   2038   3637 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.15   1.17   1.16 
            
  Education Level 4 
Total Neutral 74   236   472 
Total Surplus -38   -86   -99 
Total Deficit 590   877   1921 
CEB 400   889   1564 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 990   1766   3485 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.40   0.50   0.45 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 362   803   1465 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.10   1.11   1.07 
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Table A3.2: Calculation process of Adjusted Deficit and Adjusted Surplus factors 
(CONTINUE) 
 
            
  Catholic 
Total Neutral 830   2427   4065 
Total Surplus -3150   -6673   -5817 
Total Deficit 6694   9858   10950 
CEB 10015   19880   23350 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 16709   29738   34300 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.60   0.67   0.68 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 6865   13207   17533 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.46   1.51   1.33 
            
  Protestant 
      500   630 
Total Neutral 94   -1246   -694 
Total Surplus -343   1778   2219 
Total Deficit 647   3978   3271 
CEB 1176   5756   5490 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 1823   0.69   0.60 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.65   2732   2577 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 833   1.46   1.27 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.41         
            
  No religion 
Total Neutral 84   120   82 
Total Surplus -302   -442   -137 
Total Deficit 503   616   250 
CEB 819   1028   445 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 1322   1644   695 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.62   0.63   0.64 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 517   586   308 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.58   1.75   1.44 
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Table A3.2: Calculation process of Adjusted Deficit and Adjusted Surplus factors 
(CONTINUE) 
 
            
  Urban 
Total Neutral 838   2650   3420 
Total Surplus -2402   -5960   -4380 
Total Deficit 6243   10457   10150 
CEB 8442   18977   17749 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 14685   29434   27899 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.57   0.64   0.64 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 6040   13017   13369 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.40   1.46   1.33 
            
  Rural 
Total Neutral 214   503   1443 
Total Surplus -1498   -2553   -2359 
Total Deficit 1824   2233   3664 
CEB 3915   6536   9729 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 5739   8769   13393 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.68   0.75   0.73 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 2417   3983   7370 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.62   1.64   1.32 
            
  Wealth Level 0 
Total Neutral 120   249   301 
Total Surplus -1371   -1870   -1194 
Total Deficit 1091   1215   908 
CEB 3136   4256   3334 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 4227   5471   4242 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.74   0.78   0.79 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 1765   2386   2140 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.78   1.78   1.56 
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Table A3.2: Calculation process of Adjusted Deficit and Adjusted Surplus factors 
(CONTINUE) 
 
            
  Wealth Level 1 
Total Neutral 135   591   521 
Total Surplus -926   -3080   -1302 
Total Deficit 1364   2641   1644 
CEB 2507   7288   4193 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 3871   9929   5837 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.65   0.73   0.72 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 1581   4208   2891 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.59   1.73   1.45 
            
  Wealth Level 2 
Total Neutral 400   901   1178 
Total Surplus -1131   -2131   -1865 
Total Deficit 3121   3603   3194 
CEB 3916   6591   7167 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 7037   10194   10361 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.56   0.65   0.69 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 2785   4460   5302 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.41   1.48   1.35 
            
  Wealth Level 3 
Total Neutral 201   628   1948 
Total Surplus -317   -903   -2037 
Total Deficit 1314   2480   4962 
CEB 1558   3839   9580 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 2872   6319   14542 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.54   0.61   0.66 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 1241   2936   7543 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.26   1.31   1.27 
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Table A3.2: Calculation process of Adjusted Deficit and Adjusted Surplus factors 
(CONTINUE) 
 
            
  Wealth Level 4 
Total Neutral 196   768   915 
Total Surplus -155   -509   -341 
Total Deficit 1177   2684   3106 
CEB 1240   3449   3204 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 2417   6133   6310 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.51   0.56   0.51 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 1085   2940   2863 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.14   1.17   1.12 
            
  North 
Total Neutral 114   366   733 
Total Surplus -440   -982   -1725 
Total Deficit 975   1240   2251 
CEB 1558   2873   5555 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 2533   4113   7806 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.62   0.70   0.71 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 1118   1891   3830 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.39   1.52   1.45 
            
  Northeast 
Total Neutral 249   939   820 
Total Surplus -2191   -4667   -1829 
Total Deficit 2392   4858   2951 
CEB 4867   10742   5747 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 7259   15600   8698 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.67   0.69   0.66 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 2676   6075   3918 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.82   1.77   1.47 
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Table A3.2: Calculation process of Adjusted Deficit and Adjusted Surplus factors 
(CONTINUE) 
 
            
  Southeast 
Total Neutral 531   976   1110 
Total Surplus -997   -1723   -1177 
Total Deficit 3448   3560   2851 
CEB 4404   6229   5433 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 7852   9789   8284 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.56   0.64   0.66 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 3407   4506   4256 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.29   1.38   1.28 
            
  South 
Total Neutral 158   512   1158 
Total Surplus -272   -543   -928 
Total Deficit 1252   1497   2796 
CEB 1528   2811   5272 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 2780   4308   8068 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.55   0.65   0.65 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 1256   2268   4344 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.22   1.24   1.21 
            
  Center-West 
Total Neutral     360   1042 
Total Surplus     -598   -1080 
Total Deficit     1535   2965 
CEB     2858   5471 
All children in the absence of deficit (CEB+deficit) 4393   8436 
CEB/(CEB+deficit)     0.65   0.65 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-surplus) 2260   4391 
CEB/(CEB-surplus)     1.26   1.25 
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Table A3.2: Calculation process of Adjusted Deficit and Adjusted Surplus factors 
(CONTINUE) 
 
            
  Predicted education 0 
Total Neutral 327   681   686 
Total Surplus -2750   -4977   -2412 
Total Deficit 1603   2052   1077 
CEB 6733   11012   7238 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 8336   13064   8315 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.81   0.84   0.87 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 3983   6035   4826 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.69   1.82   1.50 
            
  Predicted education 1 
Total Neutral 376   1162   1495 
Total Surplus -898   -2500   -2712 
Total Deficit 2796   4279   2590 
CEB 3635   8537   9780 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 6431   12816   12370 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.57   0.67   0.79 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 2737   6037   7068 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.33   1.41   1.38 
            
  Predicted education 2 
Total Neutral 150   499   1018 
Total Surplus -123   -598   -904 
Total Deficit 1245   2526   2689 
CEB 867   2643   4567 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 2112   5169   7256 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.41   0.51   0.63 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 744   2045   3663 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.17   1.29   1.25 
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Table A3.2: Calculation process of Adjusted Deficit and Adjusted Surplus factors 
(CONTINUE) 
 
            
  Predicted education 3 
Total Neutral 122   570   1158 
Total Surplus -91   -344   -594 
Total Deficit 1555   2707   4864 
CEB 706   2405   4261 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 2261   5112   9125 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.31   0.47   0.47 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 615   2061   3667 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.15   1.17   1.16 
            
  Predicted education 4 
Total Neutral 77   241   504 
Total Surplus -38   -88   -100 
Total Deficit 868   1121   2579 
CEB 416   904   1595 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit) 1284   2025   4174 
CEB/(CEB+deficit) 0.32   0.45   0.38 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus) 378   816   1495 
CEB/(CEB-surplus) 1.10   1.11   1.07 
            
  White 
Total Neutral     1409   2003 
Total Surplus     -2132   -1701 
Total Deficit     5019   5408 
CEB     8648   9259 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit)     13667   14667 
CEB/(CEB+deficit)     0.63   0.63 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus)     6516   7558 
CEB/(CEB-surplus)     1.33   1.23 
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Table A3.2: Calculation process of Adjusted Deficit and Adjusted Surplus factors (FINAL) 
 
           
  Black 
Total Neutral     1733   2625 
Total Surplus     -6360   -4631 
Total Deficit     7613   7411 
CEB     16781   16644 
All children in the absence of deficit 
(CEB+deficit)     24394   24055 
CEB/(CEB+deficit)     0.69   0.69 
All children in the absence of surplus (CEB-
surplus)     10421   12013 
CEB/(CEB-surplus)     1.61   1.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
199 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abramovay, Ricardo; and Ana Amelia Camarano. 1998. “Êxodo rural, envelhecimento e masculinização 
no Brasil: panorama dos últimos cinquenta anos”. Revista Brasileira de Estudos de 
População, 15(2), 45-65. 
Adetunji, Jacob A. 1998. “Unintended childbearing in developing countries: levels, trends, and 
determinants.” DHS Analytical Reports No. 8. Calverton, MD: Macro International. 
Alicia Adsera; and Alicia Menendez (2011) “Fertility Changes in Latin America in Periods of Economic 
Uncertainty”. Population Studies 65 (1): 37–56, 2011. 
Alves, José Eustaquio Diniz; and Suzana Cavenaghi. 2009. "Timing of Childbearing in Below 
Replacement Fertility Regimes: How and Why Brazil is Different." XXVI IUSSP International 
Population Conference.  
Amaral, Ernesto .F.L.; and Joseph .E Potter. 2015. “Determinants of Female Sterilization in Brazil, 
2001-2007”. RAND working paper. Document Number: WR-1093.  
Arnold, Fred. 1997. “Gender Preferences for Children”. Demographic and Health Surveys Comparative 
Studies No.23.  
Bachrach, Christine. 2001. “Comment: The puzzling persistence of postmodern fertility 
preferences”. Population and Development Review, 27(Suppl), 332–338. 
Barros, Juliana Vasconcelos de Souza; and Laura L. R. Wong. 2012. "Prevalência, Conhecimento e 
Tipos De Métodos Contraceptivos Utilizados Pelas Mulheres, Segundo o Tipo De União: Um 
Estudo Para Brasil e México." XVIII Encontro Nacional De Estudos Populacionais, ABEP, 
Águas de Lindóia/SP, Brasil.  
BEMFAM. 1997. Sociedade Civil Bem-Estar Familiar no Brasil. DHS Final Reports. Brazil DHS, 1996. 
Rio de Janeiro, Brasil and Macro International Inc. Columbia, Maryland, USA. March 
BEMFAM. 1987. Sociedade Civil Bem-Estar Familiar no Brasil. DHS Final Reports. Brazil DHS, 1986. 
Rio de Janeiro, Brasil and Macro International Inc. Columbia, Maryland, USA. December 
Berquó, Elza; and Suzana Cavenaghi. 2006. "Breve Nota Sobre a Redução no Número Médio De Filhos 
Por Mulher no Brasil." Novos Estudos 74(2).  
Berquó, Elza; Sandra Garcia; and Liliam Lima. 2012. “Reprodução na juventude: perfis 
sociodemográficos, comportamentais e reprodutivos na PNDS 2006”. Revista de Saúde 
Pública, 46(4), 685-693.  
200 
 
Billari, Francesco. C.; Hans-Peter. Kohler; Gunnar Andersson; and Hans Lundström. 2007. 
"Approaching the Limit: Long-Term Trends in Late and Very Late Fertility." Population and 
Development Review 33(1): 149-170. 
Billari, Francesco C.; Aart C Liefbroer; and Dimiter Philipov. 2006. “The Postponement of Childbearing 
in Europe: Driving Forces and Implications”. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research Special 
issue on "Postponement of Childbearing in Europe". 2006 Page 1-17. 
Blau, Francine D.; and Lawrence M Kahn. 2000. “Gender differences in pay”. NBER working paper, n. 
7732. 
Blossfeld, Hans-Peter.; and Johannes Huinink. 1991. “Human Capital Investments or Norms of Role 
Transition? How Women's Schooling and Career Affect the Process of Family 
Formation”. American Journal of Sociology, 97(1), 143–168.  
Bongaarts, John.  1978. “A Framework for Analyzing the Proximate Determinants of Fertility.”  
Population and Development Review 4:105-132. 
Bongaarts, John (1997). “Trends in unwanted childbearing in the developing world.” Studies in Family 
Planning 928(4): 267-277. 
Bongaarts, John (1999) “The fertility impact of changes in the timing of childbearing in the developing 
world”. Population Studies. Vol. 53, No. 3 (Nov., 1999), pp. 277-289  
Bongaarts, John (2001). “Fertility and Reproductive Preferences in Post-Transitional Societies”. 
Population and Development Review 27(Supplement: Global Fertility Transition): 260-281. 
Bongaarts, John (2003) “Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of 
educational differences and fertility preferences”. Population Studies. Volume 57, Issue 3, 2003 
Bongaarts, John (2013) “The Implementation of Preferences for Male Offspring”. Population and 
Development Review, 39: 185–208. doi: 10.1111/j.1728-4457.2013.00588.x 
Bongaarts, John; and Griffith Feeney.  1998.  “On the Quantum and Tempo of Fertility” Population and 
Development Review 24:271-291. 
Bongaarts, John; and Robert G. Potter.1983 Fertility, Biology and Behavior.  New York: Academic 
Press. Chapter 1 and 2. 
Bonifacio, G. M. O. 2011. Progressão da parturição e intervalo entre nascimentos num contexto de 
declínio da fecundidade: uma aplicação a países da América Latina. Thesis (MA degree) - 
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte.  
Brand, Jennie E.; and Dwight Davis. 2011. “The impact of college education on fertility: evidence for 
heterogeneous effects”. Demography. 2011 Aug;48(3):863-87. doi: 10.1007/s13524-011-0034-3. 
BRASIL. Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatística. Censo Demografico 2010: Resultados Gerais da Amostra. Disponivel em: < 
201 
 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/presidencia/noticias/imprensa/ppts/0000000847310412201231572
7483985.pdf>  
Brockmann Hilke., 1999, “Girls preferred? Changing patterns of sex preferences in the two German 
states”, Working Paper. Max-Planck Institute for Demographic Research. 1999-010, September 
Caetano, Andre J. 2004. O declínio da fecundidade e suas implicações: uma introdução. In: Caetano, , 
A.J., Alves, J.E.D. e Correa, S. (Orgs.), Dez anos do Cairo: tendências da fecundidade e direitos 
reprodutivos no Brasil. Campinas: Abep e UNFPA, 2004, p. 11-19. 
Caetano, Andre J.; and Joseph E. Potter. 2004. “Politics and Female Sterilization in Northeast Brazil”. 
Population and Development Review. Volume 30, Issue 1, pages 79–108, March 2004 
Caldwell, Pat. ; and Peter A. Mcdonald. 2006. Demographic Transition Theory. Policy Responses to 
Low Fertility and its Consequences: a Global Survey. Springer Netherlands. 2006-01-01.  P 321-
348 
Camarano, Ana Amelia. 1997. “Movimentos migratorios recentes na regiao nordeste”. Anais. Encontro 
Nacional sobre Migracao. Curitiba. Pg. 189 to 208. 
Carvalho, Angelita Alves.  Insatisfação ou discrepância? Uma análise das preferências de fecundidade e 
do comportamento reprodutivo de casais de alta escolaridade em Belo Horizonte/MG Dissertation 
(PhD) Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, UFMG, Brasil. CEDEPLAR/UFMG. 2014.  
Carvalho, José A. M.; and Fausto Brito. jul./dez. 2005. "A Demografia Brasileira e o Declínio Da 
Fecundidade no Brasil: Contribuições, Equívocos e Silêncios." R. Bras. Est. Pop. 22(2):351-369-
São Paulo.  
Carvalho, José Alberto M. de. 1998. “Demographic dynamics in Brazil: Recent trends and 
perspectives,” Brazilian Journal of Population Studies 1: 5–23. 
Castro Martin, Teresa. 2002. “Consensual unions in Latin America: Persistence of a dual nuptiality 
system”. Journal of Comparative Family Studies 33(1): 35–55 
CEBRAP, Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento and DECIT, Departamento de Ciência e 
Tecnologia / MS. 2008. Pesquisa Nacional de Demografia e Saúde da Criança e da Mulher – 
PNDS 2006 – DICIONÁRIO DE DADOS E VARIÁVEIS.CEBRAP, DECIT.  
Chackiel, Juan; and Suzana Schkolnik. 2004. “América Latina: los sectores rezagados en la transición de 
la fecundidad”. In: Naciones Unidas. 2004. La fecundidad en América Latina: ¿Transición o 
revolución?. Serie Seminarios y Conferencias: (36): 496p. Santiago de Chile, 9-11 July, 2003. pp: 
51-74. 
Chackiel, Juan. 2004. “La transición de la fecundidad en América Latina 1950-2000.” Papeles de 
Población 41: 9-58. 
202 
 
Cohen, Joel; Øystein Kravdal; and Nico Keilman. 2011. “Childbearing impeded education more than 
education impeded childbearing in a cohort of Norwegian women”. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Science 108(29):11830-5 
Cohen, Philip N. 2015. The family: diversity, inequality, and social change. University of Maryland. First 
edition. 
Conselho Nacional de Justica. 2015. Cadastro Nacional de Adocao. Relatorios Estatisticos. Website. 
http://www.cnj.jus.br/programas-e-acoes/cadastro-nacional-de-adocao-cna. Last access: 11-11-
2015.   
Coutinho, Raquel Zanatta. 2011. A carne é fraca: religião, religiosidade e iniciação sexual entre estudantes 
do ensino médio na Região Metropolitana de Belo Horizonte, 2008. Thesis (MA). Belo Horizonte: 
Centro de Desenvolvimento e Planejamento Regional – Cedeplar, UFMG, 2011.    
Coutinho, Raquel Zanatta; and Andre Braz Golgher. 2014. “The changing landscape of religious 
affiliation in Brazil between 1980 and 2010”. Revista Brasileira de Estudos Populacionais. 31, 
n.1, p. 73-98, jan./jun.  
Covre-Sussai, Maira; Bart Meuleman; Sarah Botterman; and Koen Matthijs, 2015. “Traditional and 
modern cohabitation in Latin America”, Demographic Research,  32, 873 
Curtis, Siân L. jan./jun. 2012. “Contraceptive use Dynamics Research Needs Post Fertility Transition." 
R. Bras. Est. Pop. Rio De Janeiro 29(n. 1):191-193.  
Curtis, Sian L.; and Ian Diamond. 1995. “When fertility seems too high for contraceptive prevalence: 
An analysis of northeast Brazil”. International Family Planning Perspectives, Volume 21, 
Number 2, June 1995 
Das Gupta, M; and P.N. Mari Bhat. 1997. ‘Fertility decline and increased manifestation of sex bias in 
India”, Population Studies 51(3): 307-316 
Das Gupta, Monica; Jiang Zhenghua; Li Bohua; Xie Zhenming; Woojin Chung; and Bae Hwa-Ok. 
2002. “Why is son preference so persistent in East and South Asia? A cross-country study of 
China, India and the Republic of Korea,” Policy Research Working Paper. The World Bank. 
Davis, Kingsley; and Judith Blake. 1956. "Social structure and fertility: An analytic framework."  
Economic Development and Cultural Change 4:211-235.      
Dharmalingam, Arunachalam; Rajan, Sowmya; and Morgan, S. Philip. 2014. “The Determinants of 
Low Fertility in India”. Demography. Volume 51, Issue 4, pp 1451-1475. 04 Jul 2014 
Dias Junior, Claudio. 2010. “Diferenciais no comportamento reprodutivo das mulheres Brasileiras: uma 
análise a partir dos grupos ocupacionais”. Dados (Rio de Janeiro. Impresso), v. 53, p. 233-266, 
2010. 
203 
 
Dyson, Tim; and Mick Moore. 1983. “On Kinship Structure, Female Autonomy, and Demographic 
Behavior in India”. Population and Development Review 9 (1). Population Council: 35–60. 
doi:10.2307/1972894. 
Esteve, Albert; Ron Lesthaeghe; and Antonio López-Gay. (2012), “The Latin American Cohabitation 
Boom, 1970–2007”. Population and Development Review, 38: 55–81. doi: 10.1111/j.1728-
4457.2012.00472.x 
Fry,  Richard.  2013.  “A Rising Share of Young Adults Live in Their Parents’ Home”. Social and 
Demographic Trends. Pew Research Center (report).. 
Gallagher, Sally K. 1996. “Symbolic Traditionalism and Pragmatic Egalitarianism: Contemporary 
Evangelicals, Families and Gender”. Annual Meeting of Association for the Sociology of Religion, 
New York, August 1996.  
Gerson, Kathleen. 2011. The Unfinished Revolution: Coming of Age in a New Era of Gender, Work, and 
Family. Oxford University Press.  
Goldani, Ana Maria. 2001. "What will happen to Brazilian fertility?." Completing the Fertility Transition. 
UN Publications. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/completingfertility/RevisedGOLDANIpaper.PDF 
Guilmoto, Christophe Z. 2012. Gender Imbalances at Birth. Trends, Differentials and Policy 
Implications. Bangkok : UNFPA. 
Gupta, Neeru; and Iuri C. Leite. 1999. “Adolescent Fertility Behavior: Trends And Determinants in 
Northeastern Brazil”. International Family Planning Perspectives, 25(3), 125-130. 
Hakkert, Ralph. 2001. “Levels and determinants of wanted and unwanted fertility in Latin America.” 
Paper presented at the General Conference of the IUSSP, Salvador, Brazil, 18-24 August. 
Hank Karsten; and Hans-Peter Kohler, 2000 “Gender preferences for children in Europe: empirical results 
from 17 FFS countries”, Demographic Research [Online] 2, available at http://www. 
demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol2/1 
Heaton, Tim B.; Renata Forste, R.; and Samuel M. Otterstrom. 2002. “Family transitions in Latin America: 
first intercourse, first union and first birth”. Int. J. Popul. Geogr., 8: 1–15, 2002. 
Ibisomi, Latifat; Clifford Odimwegu; Alfred Otieno; and Murungaru Kimani. 2005. “Degree of Preference 
Implementation and Fertility Changes in Developing Countries. In: The XXVth IUSSP 
Conference. Tours, France; 2005. 
Itaborai, Nathalie Reis. “Trabalho feminino e mudanças na família no Brasil (1984-1996)”. 2003. R. bras. 
Est. Pop., Campinas, v. 20, n. 2, p. 157-176, jul./dez.  
Jacobsen, Rune; Henrik Møller; and Gerda Engholm, 1999, “Fertility rates in Denmark in relation to the 
sexes of preceding children in the family”, Human Reproduction, 14, pp. 1127-1130. 
204 
 
Johnson-Hanks, Jennifer; Christine Bachrach; S. Philip Morgan; and Hans-Peter Kohler. 2011. 
Understanding family change and variation: toward a theory of conjunctural action. New York: 
Springer  
Juhn, Chinhui; and Simon Potter. 2006. “Changes in Labor Force Participation in the United States”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 20, Number 3-Summer, pages 27-46. 
Júnior, Cláudio S. D. 2008. "Comportamento Reprodutivo Das Mulheres Trabalhadoras Urbanas 
Brasileiras." XVI Encontro Nacional De Estudos Populacionais, ABEP Caxambu-MG-Brasil.  
Karsten Hank; and Hans-Peter Kohler, 2003. “ Les préférences relatives au sexe des enfants : de nouvelles 
données allemandes ”, Population 1/2003 (Vol. 58) , p. 139-150 URL : www.cairn.info/revue-
population-2003-1-page-139.htm. DOI : 10.3917/popu.301.0139. 
Kohler, Hans-Peter. 2006. “Review of Postponement of Childbearing and Low Fertility in 
Europe”. European Journal of Population, 22(4), 423–429.  
Kohler, Hans-Peter; and Jose Antonio Ortega. 2002. “Tempo-adjusted period parity progression measures, 
fertility postponement and completed cohort fertility”. Demographic Research [online available 
at http:// www.demographic-research.org] 6(6), 91–144. 
Kreider, Amanda; David Shapiro; Malika Sinha; and Catherine Varner. 2009. “Socioeconomic progress 
and fertility transition in the developing world: evidence from the Demographic and Health 
Surveys”. Anais do XXVI IUSSP International Population Conference. 2009.  
Lacerda, Marisa Alves; Paula de Miranda-Ribeiro; Andre Junqueira Caetano; and Carla Jorge Machado. 
2005. "Mensuração e Perfis De Demanda Insatisfeita Por Contracepção Nos Municípios De Belo 
Horizonte e Recife, 2002." Revista Brasileira De Estudos De População 22(1):113-129.  
Lameirão, Adriana Paz. 2011. “Mercado de Trabalho, Desigualdade Social e de Gênero”. Seminario 
Nacional da Pos-Graduacao em Ciencias Sociais da UFES. v1 n1  
Leone, Tiziana and Andrew Hinde. 2002. “Sterilization and union dynamics in Brazil”. Journal of 
Biosocial Science 37: 459-469. 
Leone, Tiziana; and Andrew Hinde. 2007. “Fertility and union dissolution in Brazil: an example of multi-
process modelling using the Demographic and Health Survey calendar data”. Demographic  
Research. V. 17 - article 7, pp. 157-180, 2007.  
Leone, Tiziana; and Andrew Hinde. 2005 “Sterilization and Union Instability in Brazil”. Journal of 
Biosocial Science 08/2005; 37(4):459-69. DOI:10.1017/S0021932004006972 ·  
Lesthaeghe, Ron. 2014. “The second demographic transition: A concise overview of its development”. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111, 18112–18115. 
Lesthaeghe, Ron J; and Paul Willems. 1999. "Is Low Fertility a Temporary Phenomenon in the 
European Union?  ." Population and Development Review 25(2):211-228.  
205 
 
Luis Rosero-Bixby. 1996. Nuptiality trends and fertility transition in Latin America. Oxford, Clarendon 
Press. 135-150 
Lutz, Wolfgang; Brian C. O'Neill; and Sergei Scherbov.(2003. “Europe’s population at a turning point”. 
Science 28 Mar 2003:Vol. 299, Issue 5615, pp. 1991-1992. DOI: 10.1126/science.1080316 
Marleau, Jacques; and Martine Maheu. “Un garcon ou une fille? Le choix des femmes et des hommes à 
l’égard d’un seul enfant”. Population. 1998, 53: 1033-1042. 
Marteleto, Leticia J.; and Molly Dondero. 2013. “Maternal age at first birth and adolescent education in 
Brazil”. Demographic Research. 2013 Apr 10;28. doi: 10.4054/DemRes.2013.28.28. 
Marteleto, Letícia J.; and Mary C Noonan. 1998. “Grandmothers as Childcare Providers in Brazil”. Annual 
meetings of the Population Association of America, April 2-4, 1998, Chicago. 
Martin, Teresa Castro. 1995. “Women's Education and Fertility: Results from 26 Demographic and Health 
Surveys”. Studies in Family Planning, 26(4), 187–202. http://doi.org/10.2307/2137845 
Martin, Teresa Castro; and Fatima Juarez. 1995. “The impact of women’s education on fertility in Latin 
America: searching for explanations”. International Family Planning Perspectives, v. 21, n. 2, p. 
52-80, June. 
Martine, George. 1996. “Brazil’s fertility decline, 1965–95: a fresh look at key factors”. Population and 
Development Review 22(1), 47–73. 
Mason, Karen Oppenheim. 1997.  “Explaining Fertility Transitions.”  Demography 34:443-454. 
Menken, Jane. 1985. "Age and fertility: How late can you wait."  Demography 22:469-84. 
Merrick, Thomas; and Elza Berquo. 1983. “The determinants of Brazil's recent rapid decline in fertility”. 
Washington: National Academy Press, 1983. (Committee on Population and Demography, 
Report ,23). 
MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE. 2008. Pesquisa Nacional de Demografia e Saúde da Mulher e da Criança 
PNDS 2006, Relatório Final. BRASÍLIA/DF: CENTRO BRASILEIRO DE ANÁLISE E 
PLANEJAMENTO.  
Miranda-Ribeiro, Adriana; and Ricardo A. Garcia. 2012. "Transições Da Fecundidade no Brasil: Uma 
Análise à Luz Dos Diferenciais Por Escolaridade." XVIII Encontro Nacional De Estudos 
Populacionais, ABEP(Águas de Lindóia/SP – Brasil).  
Miranda-Ribeiro, Adriana de; José Antonio Ortega; and Eduardo Luiz Gonçalves Rios-Neto. 2006. 
“Efeito tempo, quantum e efeito parturição na transição da fecundidade no Brasil: aplicação do 
modelo de Köhler and Ortega”. In: XV Encontro Nacional de Estudos Populacionais, Caxambú.  
Miranda-Ribeiro, Adriana de; Eduardo Luiz Gonçalves Rios-Neto; and José Alberto Magno de 
Carvalho. 2013. “Efeitos tempo, parturição e quantum no Brasil: indicadores de período e 
evidências empíricas”. Revista Brasileira de Estudos de População, 30(1), 145-170.  
206 
 
Morgan, S. P.; Guo Zhigang; and Sarah Hayford. 2009. "China's Below Replacement Fertility: Recent 
trends and Future Prospects." Population and Development Review 35(3): 605-630. 
Morgan, S. Philip; Antonio McDaniel; Andrew T. Miller; and Samuel H. Preston. 1993. “Racial 
Differences in Household and Family Structure at the Turn of the Century”. American Journal of 
Sociology, 98(4), 799-828. 
Morgan, S. Philip. 1991. “Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Childlessness”. American 
Journal of Sociology, 97(3), 779-807. 
Morgan, S. Philip (2003). "Is Low Fertility a Twenty-First-Century Demographic Crisis?" Demography 
40(4): 589-603. 
Morgan, S.P.; Taylor, M.G. 2006. “Low fertility at the turn of the Twenty-First Century”. Annual 
Review of Sociology, v. 32, p. 375-99. 
Myrskyla, Mikko; Hans-Peter Kohler; and Francesco C. Billari. 2012. “High development and fertility: 
fertility at older reproductive ages and gender equality explain the positive link”. Max Planck 
Institute for Demographic Research, Konrad-Zuse-Str. 1, 18057 Rostock, Germany. 
Ogland, Curtis P; Xiaohe Xue; John P. Bartkowski; and Emmanuelle G. Ogland. 2011. “The Association 
of Religion and Virginity Status Among Brazilian Adolescents”. Journal of Adolescent Health , 
Volume 48 , Issue 6 , 651 – 653.  
Olsen, Randall. 1980. “Estimating the effect of child mortality on the number of births”. Demography, 
17, 429–443.  
Park, Chai Bin; and Nam-Hoon Cho. 1995. “Consequences of Son Preference in a Low-fertility Society: 
Imbalance of the Sex Ratio at Birth in Korea”. Population and Development Review 21 (1). 
Population Council: 59–84. doi:10.2307/2137413 
Paulilo, Maria Ignez S. “O Peso do Trabalho Leve”. Departamento de Ciências Sociais- UFSC Revista 
Ciência Hoje - n° 28/1987. 
Paulo, Maira A. 2012. "Uma Análise do Diferencial De Salários Entre as Mulheres Que São Mães e 
Aquelas Que Não São Mães, e Entre Aquelas Que Postergam e Não Postergam a Fecundidade no 
Período Entre 1984 a 2009." Trabalho Apresentado no XVIII Encontro Nacional De Estudos 
Populacionais, ABEP Águas de Lindóia/SP – Brasil.  
Perpetuo, Ignez H. O.; and Wong, Laura R. 2006. “Towards a replacement rate: programs and policies 
which affected the fertility course in Brazil”. Papeles de poblacion, CIEAP/UAEM, N. 47. 
January/March. 
PNAD. Brasilia, Brasil. Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem Domiciliar National Household Sample 
Survey: Brazilian Institute of Geographical Statistics (IBGE). .  
207 
 
Pollard, Michael; and S. Philip Morgan. 2002. “Emerging Parental Gender Indifference? Sex Composition 
of Children and the Third Birth”. American Sociological Review. Vol. 67. No. 4 (Aug., 2002), 
pp.600-613. 
Potter, Joseph E. 1999. “The persistence of outmoded contraceptive regimes: the cases of Mexico and 
Brazil”. Population and Development Review, New York, v. 25, n. 4, p. 703-739, Dec.  
Potter, Joseph E.; Carl Schmertmann; Renato Assuncao; and Suzana Cavenaghi. 2010. “Mapping the 
timing, pace, and scale of the fertility transition in Brazil”. Population and Development Review, 
36, 283–307, 2010. 
Potter, Joseph E.; Schmertmann, Carl; and Suzana Cavenaghi. 2002. “Fertility and development: 
evidence from Brazil”. Demography, Chicago, v. 39, n. 4, p. 739- 761, Nov., 2002. 
Preston, Samuel H. 1978. "Introduction," in Preston (ed) The Effects of Infant and Child Mortality on 
Fertility.  New York: Academic Press. 
Rios-Neto, Eduardo L. G. 2005. "Questões Emergentes Na Análise Demográfica: O Caso Brasileiro." R. 
Bras. Est. Pop 22(2):371-408-São Paulo.  
Rios-Neto, Eduardo L. G.; Vania C. Silva; Adriana de Miranda-Ribeiro; José A. Ortega; and José A. M. 
Carvalho. 2005. "Fertility Decline in Brazil: A Different Tempo Effect with Strong 
Consequences." Population Association of America Annual Meeting Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
2005 PAA Annual Meeting, 2005.  
Rios-Neto, Eduardo.; and Raquel Guimarães. 2013. “The Educational Gradient of Low Fertility in Latin 
America”. XXVII International Population Conference, Busan, 2013 
Rosero-Bixby, Luis; Teresa Castro Martin; and Teresa Martin Garcia. 2009. “Is Latin America starting 
to retreat from early and universal childbearing?,” in Demographic Transformations and 
Inequalities in Latin America: Historical Trends and Recent Patterns. Latin American 
Population Association (ALAP) Serie Investigaciones 8: 219–241.  
Silva, Joao Luiz Pinto; and Fernanda Garanhani Castro Surita. 2012. “Gravidez na adolescência: 
Situação atual”. Revista Brasileira de Ginecologia e Obstetrícia, 34, 347–350.  
Silvestro, Milton Luiz.; Ricardo Abramovay; Marcio Antonio de Mello; Clovis Dorigon; and Ivan Tadeu 
Baldissera. 2001. Os impasses sociais da sucessão hereditária na agricultura familiar. 
Florianópolis: Epagri; Brasília, DF: Nead/Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário, 2001.  
Smock, Pamela; and Fiona Rose Greenland. 2010. "Diversity in Pathways to Parenthood: Patterns, 
Implications, and Emerging Research Directions." Journal of Marriage and Family, 72(3): 576-
593. 
Sobotka, Tomas. 2004. “Is lowest-low fertility explained by the postponement of 
childbearing?”  Population and Development Review 30(2):195–220. 
208 
 
Souza, Laetícia R.; Eduardo L. G. Rios-Neto; and Bernardo L. Queiroz. 2011, Rio de Janeiro. "A 
Relação Entre Parturição e Trabalho Feminino no Brasil." R. Bras. Est. Pop. Rio De Janeiro v. 
28(n. 1):p. 57-79-jan./jun.  
Stein, Petra; Sebastian Willen; and Monika Pavetic. 2014. “Couples' fertility decision making”. 
Demographic Research, 30, 1697-1731. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1556066787?accountid=14244 
Tavares, Luciane Santiago; Iuri Leite; Marina Ferreira de Noronha; Roberto do Nascimento Rodruigues; 
Geraldo Marcelo da Cunha; Joaquim Gonçalves Valente; Joyce Mendes de Andrade Schramm; 
and Maria de Fátima Santos Costa. 2013. “Diferenciais da carga de doença das condições 
maternas entre mulheres de 15 a 44 anos no Estado de Minas Gerais, 2004-2006”. Revista 
Brasileira de Estudos de População, 30(Suppl. ), S119-S134.  
Teichman, Yona; Dorit Rabinovitz; and Yaron Rabinovitz. 1992. “Gender preferences of pregnant women 
and emotional reaction to information regarding fetal gender and postpartum: an examination of 
Freud’s view about motivation and motherhood”. Sex Roles. 1992, 26: 175-195. 
Testa, Maria Rita; and Laurent Toulemon. 2006. “Family Formation in France: Individual Preferences 
and Subsequent Outcomes”. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research, 4, 41–75. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23025477 
Trussell, James; and Randall Olsen. August 1983. "Evaluation of the Olsen Technique for Estimating 
the Fertility Response to Child Mortality." Demography Volume 20(Issue 3):391-405.  
UNDP. 2013. The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World. Human Development Report 
2013. Available at <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/BRA.pdf>. Last 
accessed on March 23 2016. 
Verona, Ana Paula A. “Sexual initiation and religion in Brazil”. Dissertation (PhD). University of Texas 
at Austin, 2010.  
Verona, Ana Paula; Claudio Dias Jr., Dimitri Fazito; and Paula Miranda-Ribeiro. 2015. “First conjugal 
union and religion: Signs contrary to the Second Demographic Transition in 
Brazil?”, Demographic Research, 2015, 33, 985 
Waiselfisz, Julio Jacobo. Mapa da Violencia 2013. Homicidios e Juventude no Brasil. Juventude Viva, 
Brasilia, 2013. 
Wajman, Simone; and Eduardo Rios-Neto. “Quantas serão as mulheres: cenários para a atividade 
feminine”. In: Rocha, M. I. B. (Org) Trabalho e gênero: mudanças, permanências e 
desafios. Campinas: ABEP, NEPO/Unicamp e Cadeplar/UFMG; São Paulo: 34, 2000. 384 p 
Waller, Jerome. 1975. “Sex of children and ultimate family size by time and class”. Social Biology. 1975, 
23: 210-225. 
209 
 
Westoff, Charles; and Luis Ochoa. 1991. Unmet need and the demand for family planning. 
Demographic and health surveys comparative studies. Institute for Resource 
Development/Macro International, Inc. Columbia, Maryland, n. 5, 1991. 
Whinter, Juliana; and Andre Braz Golgher. 2010. “Uma investigação sobre a aplicação de bônus adicional 
como política de ação afirmativa na Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)”. Revista 
Brasileira de Estudos de População (Impresso), v. 28, p. 333-360, 2010. 
Wood, Charles; and Frank Bean. 1977. “Offspring Gender and Family Size: Implications from a 
Comparison of Mexican Americans and Anglo Americans”. Journal of Marriage and the Family. 
1977, 39: 129-139. 
